
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN TRANSITION:

LEADERSHIP, TRUST, AND WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIPS

Editör:
Doç. Dr. Polat YÜCEKAYA



BİDGE Yayınları

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Organizational Behavior in Transition: Leadership, Trust, and Workplace Relationships

Editor: Doç. Dr. Polat YÜCEKAYA

ISBN: 978-625-5057-68-6

1st Edition
Page Layout By: Gözde YÜCEL
Publication Date: 2026-10-25
BİDGE Yayınları

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Güzeltepe Mahallesi Abidin Daver Sokak Sefer Apartmanı No: 7/9 Çankaya / Ankara

PREFACE

Organizational Behavior in Transition: Leadership, Trust, and Workplace Relationships

Organizations today face increasingly complex challenges shaped by technological transformation, changing employee expectations, evolving leadership practices, and growing demands for organizational effectiveness and safety. These developments have made understanding human behavior in organizational settings more important than ever. *Organizational Behavior in Transition: Leadership, Trust, and Workplace Relationships* brings together scholarly perspectives on key issues that influence leadership practices, workplace relationships, and employee behavior in contemporary organizations.

This volume is founded on the understanding that organizational behavior is a multidimensional field in which leadership, interpersonal relationships, employee attitudes, and organizational conditions are closely interconnected. The chapters explore five distinct yet complementary topics: safety-critical organizational behaviors in aviation organizations, the development and validation of a deceptive leadership scale, organizational gossip from a demographic perspective, the tensions between control, trust, and autonomy in digital leadership, and the relationship between commuting, job satisfaction, and employee withdrawal. Collectively, these contributions address important questions concerning organizational safety, leadership credibility, informal workplace communication, digital transformation, and employee attitudes.

A central theme connecting these studies is the influence of organizational contexts on individual and collective behavior. While leadership practices can shape trust and employee autonomy, informal social interactions may affect workplace relationships and perceptions. Similarly, technological developments and commuting experiences can introduce new challenges for organizations seeking to sustain employee satisfaction, engagement, and effectiveness. By examining these issues from different perspectives, this book aims to provide a broader understanding of the dynamics that shape contemporary organizational life.

The book is intended for academics, researchers, graduate students, and practitioners interested in organizational behavior, leadership, and human resource management. It seeks to contribute to ongoing scholarly discussions while offering insights that may inform organizational research and practice. The diversity of topics also highlights the importance of examining organizational challenges through complementary theoretical, empirical, and methodological approaches.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the contributing authors for their scholarly dedication and valuable contributions to this volume. I hope that this book will stimulate further research, encourage critical reflection, and support a deeper understanding of the changing relationships between leadership, trust, and workplace behavior. Ultimately, understanding organizations requires recognizing that they are not merely formal structures but dynamic social environments shaped by the people who work within them. By bringing these perspectives together, this volume seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of organizational behavior and the challenges facing organizations in a rapidly changing world.

Editor

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Polat YÜCEKAYA

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CHAPTER 1

COMMUTING AND EMPLOYEE WITHDRAWAL: THE ROLE OF JOB SATISFACTION

ONUR EMRE[1]

Introduction

The changing spatial distribution of jobs and housing has reshaped commuting patterns, travel distances, costs, and related outcomes (Rouwendal, 1999; Ben-David & Sharabi, 2009). The development of polycentric cities and the geographical dispersion of employers have made journeys between home and work increasingly complex, extending the implications of commuting beyond transportation and urban planning into organizational life (Clark, Huang, & Withers, 2003). Commuting can increase stress and diminish individual well-being (Koslowsky, Aizer, & Krausz, 1996), while also contributing to perceptions of being undercompensated relative to the time and resources devoted to travel (Stutzer & Frey, 2008). However, commuting burdens must be considered alongside the potential benefits associated with employment and residential choices. Stutzer and Frey (2007) observed that individuals may be willing to tolerate longer commutes when these are offset by

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advantages such as higher income or a more desirable living environment.

Commuting also influences the employment opportunities available to individuals. Travelling longer distances can expand access to a broader range of jobs, but it may also make positions less attractive when they are difficult or costly to reach. Residential location and commuting decisions are therefore closely intertwined with employment choices. For example, living farther from the city center may provide access to more attractive housing at lower purchase prices or rental costs, although this advantage may come with longer commutes (van Ommeren, Rietveld, & Nijkamp, 1997). These trade-offs suggest that commuting should not be viewed solely as a transportation burden. Rather, it is part of the broader set of costs and benefits individuals weigh when deciding where to live and work.

Despite these potential advantages, commuting can have important implications for employees' job attitudes and decisions about remaining with an employer. Job dissatisfaction and job mobility have both been associated with commuting experiences (Novaco, Stokols, & Milanesi, 1990). A survey conducted in the United States reported that 48% of working adults experienced greater job dissatisfaction because of commuting, 32% considered commuting when choosing their current job, 27% believed they could perform their duties from home, and 15% indicated that they would change jobs to obtain a shorter commute (The Workforce Institute, 2011). Similarly, long-distance commuting has been associated with tardiness, absenteeism, and job dissatisfaction (Kluger, 1998). More broadly, commuting experiences have been identified as potential contributors to reduced job performance and unfavorable work attitudes, as well as organizational withdrawal (Koslowsky, 1997).

The relationship between commuting and employment decisions can be understood in terms of the costs and benefits individuals evaluate when considering a job opportunity. During the job search, individuals may compare positions within the same city, consider the distance between potential workplaces and their residences, and assess the ease of travelling to work. Commuting costs therefore represent an important determinant of job-search behavior (van den Berg & Gorter, 1997). As these costs increase, individuals may become less willing to accept positions that require longer or more expensive commutes, potentially preferring jobs closer to home even when they offer lower wages.

These considerations do not disappear once an individual accepts a job. Employees continue to weigh the burdens of commuting against the benefits of their employment. Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2004) and Kahneman and Krueger (2006) discussed the negative affect and limited enjoyment associated with commuting in the context of daily life. Commuting has also been identified as one of the least enjoyable daily activities, sometimes evaluated even more negatively than work itself (Krueger, Kahneman, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2009). Individuals may therefore need to derive, or anticipate deriving, sufficient utility from their employment or other aspects of daily life to tolerate the burdens of commuting. Research has associated commuting with physiological and psychological responses, reduced productivity, increased absenteeism (Koslowsky, 1997), and lateness (van Ommeren & Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, 2011).

These findings raise an important question for organizational behavior: do commuting costs translate into employee withdrawal, or do their consequences depend on employees' attitudes toward their jobs? Although commuting has been examined extensively in relation to transportation, residential choice, and individual well-being, its implications for organizational behavior warrant further

attention. In particular, the relationships among commuting costs, job satisfaction, and employee withdrawal may be more complex than a straightforward association between a longer or more expensive commute and withdrawal behavior.

This chapter examines the relationships between commuting time, monetary commuting costs, job satisfaction, and employee withdrawal behavior. Specifically, it investigates whether commuting costs are directly associated with withdrawal, whether they are negatively associated with job satisfaction, and whether job satisfaction mediates or moderates the relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal. By examining these relationships together, the chapter seeks to clarify how commuting experiences may be connected to employees' workplace attitudes and behaviors. The empirical findings are considered in light of the potential influence of commuting experiences, employment conditions, and organizational constraints.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, Section 3 describes the method, and Section 4 reports the findings. Section 5 discusses the results, Section 6 outlines the study's limitations and directions for future research, Section 7 considers the practical implications, and Section 8 presents the conclusion.

The Relationship Between Commuting, Job Satisfaction, and Withdrawal

Commuting costs can influence employment decisions at several stages, from evaluating a job offer to deciding whether to remain in an existing position. Individuals consider not only the wages and other benefits associated with employment but also the time and money required to travel between home and work. As commuting costs increase, the overall attractiveness of a job may decline, potentially affecting employees' attitudes and behavior.

Monetary expenses are one component of these costs; the time spent travelling is another (van Ommeren & Fosgerau, 2009). The relationship between commuting costs and employment outcomes therefore needs to be examined along both dimensions.

From an organizational behavior perspective, withdrawal behavior is one possible consequence of employees' experiences and evaluations of their work. If commuting imposes substantial costs without compensating benefits, employees may become less satisfied with their jobs and may respond by reducing their participation in organizational life. The present study therefore proposes that commuting time and monetary commuting costs are positively related to withdrawal behavior. It also examines whether these two dimensions of commuting costs are negatively related to job satisfaction.

The distinction between commuting time and monetary costs is important because the two dimensions do not necessarily have identical consequences. Time spent travelling represents a loss of discretionary time, whereas monetary expenses reduce the financial benefits employees receive from their employment. Both can affect how employees evaluate their jobs, but their effects may depend on individual circumstances and the broader employment context. Based on these arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Time spent during the commute is positively related to withdrawal behavior.

Hypothesis 2: Monetary costs of commuting are positively related to withdrawal behavior.

Hypothesis 3: Time spent during the commute is negatively related to job satisfaction.

Hypothesis 4: Monetary costs of commuting are negatively related to job satisfaction.

The Mediating and Moderating Roles of Job Satisfaction

Employee withdrawal can arise from perceptions of injustice, mistreatment, abuse, and other unfavorable workplace experiences. In some circumstances, interpersonal relationships with coworkers can also encourage employees to avoid the workplace (Hanisch & Hulin, 1991; Bawa & Jantan, 2005). Among the factors associated with withdrawal, job satisfaction is generally recognized as an important predictor of employee behavior (Robbins & Judge, 2010).

The theory of planned behavior provides a perspective for understanding how individuals' evaluations and intentions relate to their actions (Ajzen, 1991). Applied to the present context, employees who are dissatisfied with their jobs may engage in withdrawal behaviors as a means of escaping or responding to unfavorable work experiences. Such behaviors may range from arriving late or being absent to changing positions within the same organization or eventually leaving the employer. Withdrawal can therefore serve as a way of distancing oneself from workplace stressors and dissatisfaction (Spector et al., 2006).

Previous research provides a basis for considering job satisfaction in the relationship between commuting and withdrawal. Costa, Pickup, and Di Martino (1988) found significant differences in job satisfaction between commuters and noncommuters, reporting that only approximately 28% of commuters in their study were satisfied with their jobs. Brooke (1986) proposed that job satisfaction mediates the relationship between antecedents of employee behavior and withdrawal, a relationship that has been examined in subsequent studies.

These arguments suggest that commuting costs may be associated with withdrawal partly through their relationship with job satisfaction. Employees who experience high commuting costs may evaluate their jobs less favorably, and this dissatisfaction may, in

turn, be associated with greater withdrawal behavior. Under this explanation, commuting costs need not have a statistically significant direct relationship with withdrawal for an indirect relationship through job satisfaction to exist.

The present study therefore proposes that job satisfaction mediates the relationship between commuting time and withdrawal behavior and the relationship between monetary commuting costs and withdrawal behavior. The corresponding hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 5: Job satisfaction mediates the relationship between time spent during the commute and withdrawal behavior.

Hypothesis 6: Job satisfaction mediates the relationship between monetary costs of commuting and withdrawal behavior.

Job satisfaction may also function as a moderator rather than solely as a mediator. Mediation concerns the mechanism through which a relationship occurs, whereas moderation concerns whether the strength or direction of a relationship depends on another variable. In the present context, job satisfaction may condition the relationship between commuting costs and withdrawal behavior.

Employees who are highly satisfied with their jobs may be more willing to tolerate demanding or expensive commutes because they value other aspects of their employment. Conversely, employees with low job satisfaction may be less willing to accept the same commuting burden. From this perspective, the relationship between commuting costs and withdrawal may vary according to employees' levels of job satisfaction.

The study therefore also examines whether job satisfaction moderates the relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal behavior. The final two hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 7: Job satisfaction moderates the relationship between time spent during the commute and withdrawal behavior.

Hypothesis 8: Job satisfaction moderates the relationship between monetary costs of commuting and withdrawal behavior.

Participants, Measures, Data Collection, and Analysis

All constructs were assessed using established measurement scales, except commuting costs, which were assessed with study-specific measures. The response format differed by construct.

Job satisfaction. Job satisfaction was measured using the scale developed by Spector (1985), which had previously demonstrated validity and reliability in Turkish. Participants responded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree very much) to 5 (agree very much). The scale demonstrated high internal consistency in the present sample (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$).

Withdrawal behavior. Withdrawal behavior was measured using items from Gruys and Sackett (2003). Participants indicated how frequently they engaged in the specified behaviors on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). An example item was "Intentionally come to work late." The scale's internal consistency was acceptable (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.76$).

Monetary costs of commuting. Monetary commuting costs were assessed by asking participants to evaluate the amount of money they spent on commuting relative to their income. Responses ranged from 1 (too little) to 5 (too much). This measure therefore captured respondents' perceived relative burden of commuting expenses rather than an exact monetary amount.

Time spent commuting. Commuting time was assessed using a five-category response scale ranging from 1 (up to 20 minutes) to 5 (100 minutes or more). This measure captured commuting duration through ordered response categories rather than continuous measurements of travel time.

The use of established scales for job satisfaction and withdrawal provided a basis for assessing these constructs consistently across participants. The commuting measures, however, relied on respondents' categorical assessments rather than exact time records or expenditure calculations. This distinction is relevant when interpreting the relationships examined in the study.

Regression analysis was used to examine the hypothesized direct relationships between commuting time, monetary commuting costs, withdrawal behavior, and job satisfaction. Specifically, the direct-effect hypotheses were evaluated by examining the relationships between commuting time and withdrawal behavior, monetary commuting costs and withdrawal behavior, commuting time and job satisfaction, and monetary commuting costs and job satisfaction.

The proposed mediating effects of job satisfaction were examined using conditional process analysis with the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). The analysis assessed whether commuting time and monetary commuting costs were indirectly related to withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction. Bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples were used to evaluate the indirect effects.

Finally, the study examined whether job satisfaction moderated the relationships between commuting time and withdrawal behavior and between monetary commuting costs and withdrawal behavior. These analyses tested whether the relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal varied according to employees' levels of job satisfaction.

Together, these analyses allowed the study to examine both the direct relationships between commuting costs and employee outcomes and the potential indirect and conditional relationships involving job satisfaction.

Findings

The analyses examined the direct relationships between commuting costs, job satisfaction, and withdrawal behavior, followed by the proposed mediating and moderating effects of job satisfaction. The results provide partial support for the proposed model: the findings differ between direct relationships and indirect effects.

Commuting time and withdrawal behavior. The regression of withdrawal behavior on commuting time produced $R^2 = 0.011$ and $p = 0.126$. The relationship was not statistically significant; Hypothesis 1 was therefore not supported. The results did not establish a direct relationship between commuting time and withdrawal behavior in the present sample.

Monetary commuting costs and withdrawal behavior. The regression of withdrawal behavior on monetary commuting costs produced $R^2 = 0.002$ and $p = 0.550$. The relationship was not statistically significant, and Hypothesis 2 was not supported. The analysis thus did not establish a direct relationship between the relative monetary burden of commuting and withdrawal behavior.

Commuting time and job satisfaction. The regression of job satisfaction on commuting time produced $R^2 = 0.103$ and $p = 0.103$. The relationship was not statistically significant, and Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Monetary commuting costs and job satisfaction. The analysis identified a statistically significant relationship between monetary commuting costs and job satisfaction ($R^2 = 0.026$, $p = 0.019$). The regression coefficient was negative, indicating that greater monetary commuting costs relative to income were associated with lower job satisfaction. Hypothesis 4 was therefore supported.

The proposed indirect relationships were examined using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bootstrap samples.

Commuting time, job satisfaction, and withdrawal behavior. The analysis identified a statistically significant negative indirect effect of commuting time on withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction. The bootstrap confidence interval extended from −0.0629 to −0.018. Because the interval did not include zero, the indirect effect was statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 5. Commuting time was thus indirectly associated with withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction, despite the nonsignificant direct relationship reported for Hypothesis 1.

Monetary commuting costs, job satisfaction, and withdrawal behavior. The analysis also identified a significant indirect effect of monetary commuting costs on withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction. The confidence interval extended from 0.0044 to 0.1795. Because the interval did not include zero, Hypothesis 6 was supported. Monetary commuting costs were thus indirectly associated with withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction, even though their direct relationship with withdrawal was not statistically significant.

The study also examined whether job satisfaction moderated the relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal behavior.

For the interaction between commuting time and job satisfaction, the confidence interval ranged from −0.413 to 0.4267. Because the interval included zero, the moderating effect was not statistically significant, and Hypothesis 7 was not supported.

Similarly, the interaction between monetary commuting costs and job satisfaction was not statistically significant. The confidence interval ranged from −0.2758 to 0.423 and again included zero. Hypothesis 8 was therefore not supported.

The findings thus did not support the proposition that job satisfaction changes the strength of the relationship between either commuting time or monetary commuting costs and withdrawal behavior.

Overall, the relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal behavior cannot be adequately characterized by direct relationships alone. Although neither commuting time nor monetary commuting costs showed a statistically significant direct relationship with withdrawal behavior, both showed significant indirect relationships through job satisfaction. The moderating effects of job satisfaction were not supported.

Discussion

This study examined the relationships between commuting costs, job satisfaction, and employee withdrawal behavior. The findings indicate that these relationships are more complex than a direct association between commuting costs and withdrawal would suggest. Neither commuting time nor monetary commuting costs showed a statistically significant direct relationship with withdrawal behavior. The hypothesized negative relationship between commuting time and job satisfaction was also nonsignificant, whereas monetary commuting costs were negatively associated with job satisfaction. At the same time, job satisfaction mediated the relationships between both dimensions of commuting costs and withdrawal behavior. The proposed moderating effects of job satisfaction were not supported.

These findings suggest that commuting costs should not automatically be assumed to translate into withdrawal behavior. Their organizational consequences may depend on how employees evaluate their jobs, the extent to which commuting costs can be changed, and the constraints imposed by employment and labor-market circumstances.

The absence of a statistically significant relationship between commuting time and withdrawal behavior raises questions about the circumstances under which employees translate commuting burdens into workplace behavior. One possible explanation is that commuting time is shaped by factors such as distance, transportation mode, and infrastructure rather than being determined entirely by an employee's choice. Employees may therefore perceive their commuting duration as a relatively fixed condition of their lives rather than a problem that can be addressed through workplace behavior.

Withdrawal behavior also carries potential consequences for employees, particularly when they have limited flexibility within their organizations. Employees may be reluctant to withdraw from work because of investments they have made in their current positions, the nature of their skills, or the limited availability of alternative employment. Muchinsky and Morrow (1980) argued that negative attitudes may be less readily expressed through turnover during periods of high unemployment. When alternative employment is difficult to obtain, employees may tolerate unfavorable working conditions rather than risk unemployment.

This explanation may be particularly relevant to the present sample. At the time of the study, Türkiye's national unemployment rate was approximately 10%, while unemployment among younger people was around 19%, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat, 2014). Given that the majority of participants were relatively young, their employment decisions may have been influenced by concerns about finding alternative work. Under such conditions, employees may continue to tolerate lengthy commutes because the perceived risks of leaving their jobs outweigh the disadvantages of commuting.

The relationship between monetary commuting costs and withdrawal behavior was also nonsignificant. As with commuting

time, monetary expenses may reflect structural circumstances rather than discretionary choices. Transportation prices, fuel costs, long distances, and the limited availability of alternatives can make commuting expensive regardless of an employee's attitudes toward the organization. The financial burden of commuting may thus be experienced as a consequence of broader economic conditions rather than as a problem that can be addressed by withdrawing from work. Expensive public transportation, high fuel prices, unavoidable travel distances, and a constrained labor market may limit the extent to which commuting costs translate into observable withdrawal behavior.

Taken together, these findings suggest that commuting costs and withdrawal behavior should not be assumed to have a straightforward relationship. Employees may experience commuting as burdensome while remaining in their jobs because of financial considerations, limited employment alternatives, and constraints on their ability to change either their residential or employment circumstances.

The absence of a statistically significant relationship between commuting time and job satisfaction is consistent with the possibility that employees distinguish between their work experiences and the time required to travel to work. Commuting time may be perceived as a consequence of traffic congestion, transportation infrastructure, or residential location rather than as an intrinsic characteristic of the job itself. Employees may consequently tolerate lengthy commutes without necessarily evaluating their jobs less favorably.

This interpretation does not imply that commuting time is inconsequential. Rather, its relationship with job satisfaction may depend on intervening psychological processes or other contextual factors. Sonnentag and Frese (2013), for example, discussed studies in which relationships between stressors and absenteeism were weak or nonsignificant, and in some cases negative. Such findings

illustrate that the relationship between an unfavorable condition and a behavioral outcome may not be direct. Processes involving strain, or shared variance between stressors and strain, may help explain why an apparently burdensome condition does not consistently predict withdrawal.

The present findings therefore suggest that commuting time alone may be insufficient to explain differences in job satisfaction. How employees experience and interpret their commutes, together with their broader evaluations of their jobs, may be important to understanding the relationship.

One of the principal findings of the study concerns the indirect relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction. Both commuting time and monetary commuting costs showed statistically significant indirect effects through job satisfaction, despite the absence of statistically significant direct relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal.

The indirect effect involving commuting time can be interpreted as a suppression effect. Suppression occurs when the direct and indirect components of a relationship operate in opposing directions, potentially obscuring the overall relationship between a predictor and an outcome (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). In the present study, the indirect relationship through job satisfaction was negative, indicating that the pathway involving job satisfaction operated in a direction different from the proposed positive direct relationship between commuting time and withdrawal.

This result highlights the importance of distinguishing between direct and indirect relationships. Commuting time may be associated with withdrawal through one mechanism, while its relationship with job satisfaction contributes to an opposing

pathway. When these pathways operate in different directions, the overall direct relationship may be weak or statistically nonsignificant. A nonsignificant direct relationship therefore does not necessarily mean that commuting time has no relationship with withdrawal through other variables.

Job satisfaction is an established predictor of employee withdrawal (Robbins & Judge, 2010). Employees who are satisfied with their work may be more willing to tolerate commuting demands because they value other aspects of their jobs. Conversely, dissatisfaction may be associated with a greater tendency to disengage from work or avoid the workplace. In this sense, job satisfaction may help explain why employees facing similar commuting burdens exhibit different behavioral responses.

The findings also indicate that monetary commuting costs were indirectly associated with withdrawal through job satisfaction. Greater monetary costs were associated with lower job satisfaction, and the indirect relationship with withdrawal was positive. This pattern is consistent with the argument that commuting expenses may diminish employees' evaluations of their jobs, which may, in turn, be associated with greater withdrawal behavior.

Nevertheless, these findings should be interpreted within the limits of the study's design. The cross-sectional data do not establish temporal ordering or causal relationships. The mediation results provide evidence of statistically significant indirect associations consistent with the proposed model, rather than definitive proof that commuting costs cause changes in job satisfaction that, in turn, cause withdrawal.

The study did not find statistically significant moderating effects of job satisfaction on the relationships between commuting time and withdrawal or between monetary commuting costs and withdrawal. These results do not support the hypothesis that the

strength of the relationship between commuting costs and withdrawal systematically varies according to employees' levels of job satisfaction in the present sample.

The absence of significant interaction effects should be interpreted cautiously. Detecting moderation effects can be statistically challenging, particularly when interaction effects are small or when the data provide limited variation in the relevant variables. Previous methodological research has discussed the difficulties involved in detecting interactions and moderator effects in regression analysis (McClelland & Judd, 1993; Aguinis, 1995; Champoux & Peters, 1987).

The nonsignificant moderation results do not contradict the mediation findings because the two analyses address different questions. The mediation results concern the indirect associations operating through job satisfaction, whereas the moderation analyses examine whether job satisfaction changes the strength of the relationship between commuting costs and withdrawal. The evidence supports the former pattern but not the latter in this sample.

Commuting is not necessarily an entirely negative experience. Although travel between home and work requires time and other resources, individuals may derive benefits from it or use it for activities they would otherwise struggle to accommodate in their daily schedules. Research has suggested that individuals may prefer an optimal amount of commuting rather than no commuting at all and may sometimes be willing to travel longer than their actual commuting duration (Redmond & Mokhtarian, 2001; van Ommeren, 1998; Lyons & Chatterjee, 2008; Ory et al., 2004).

Commuting time can provide opportunities to read, make telephone calls, or engage in other activities that individuals would not otherwise allocate time to during the day. The commute may therefore have a form of subjective utility that differs across

individuals. Ory et al. (2004) described this issue through the concept of subjective mobility, which emphasizes individual differences in how commuting is evaluated. Whether a commute is experienced negatively may depend on employees' tolerance for stressors, their ability to use travel time productively, and the conditions they encounter during the journey.

This perspective offers a possible explanation for why commuting duration does not necessarily correspond to job dissatisfaction or withdrawal. Two employees with similar commuting times may evaluate their experiences differently because they derive different benefits from travel or encounter different levels of discomfort and stress. The duration of commuting is therefore only one aspect of the broader commuting experience.

Commuting also requires physical and mental effort, but its consequences depend on how individuals allocate their time and experience the journey. The commute from work to home, in particular, may provide an opportunity for psychological detachment from work. Van Hooff (2015) emphasized the importance of psychological detachment during the journey home, which can serve as a transition between work and home life and provide an opportunity to relax and recover. Gatersleben and Uzzell (2007) similarly suggested that commuting may offer individuals an opportunity to devote time to themselves.

These arguments reinforce the need to distinguish objective commuting costs from employees' subjective evaluations of their commuting experiences. Time and money are measurable dimensions of commuting, but their implications for work-related attitudes and behavior may depend on how employees interpret the costs and benefits involved.

The organizational context may also help explain the observed relationships. Berry, Leelchook, and Clark (2012)

suggested that organizational norms can influence the salience and expression of withdrawal behaviors. Organizations differ in the extent to which they tolerate lateness, absenteeism, and other forms of counterproductive work behavior. Some impose strict attendance requirements and monitoring systems, whereas others provide greater flexibility in work arrangements.

In the present sample, only 13.8% of participants reported having unconventional work schedules. The majority therefore worked in conventional daytime arrangements, including white-collar and blue-collar positions. Such arrangements may provide limited flexibility in when employees begin or finish work. Workplaces may also impose attendance controls or some degree of surveillance, restricting employees' opportunities to respond to commuting difficulties through lateness or absence.

Employment insecurity may provide another explanation for the relationship between commuting and withdrawal. Research has associated job insecurity with employee attitudes and behaviors, including job satisfaction, performance, absenteeism, and counterproductive behavior (Reisel et al., 2010; Staufenbiel & König, 2010). Probst, Stewart, Gruys, and Tierney (2007) also reported that higher levels of job insecurity can be associated with fewer counterproductive behaviors because employees perceive their jobs as being at risk.

When employees believe that their employment is insecure, they may be less willing to engage in visible withdrawal behaviors that could jeopardize their positions. Rather than responding to dissatisfaction through lateness, absenteeism, or other observable forms of withdrawal, employees may remain at work despite unfavorable conditions. This possibility is consistent with the argument that labor-market constraints can limit employees' behavioral responses to commuting burdens.

The absence of significant direct relationships in the present study may therefore reflect not only the characteristics of commuting but also the organizational and economic conditions within which employees make decisions. Commuting costs may be experienced as burdensome without necessarily producing observable withdrawal, particularly when employees have limited alternatives or face strict attendance requirements.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings. They also identify opportunities for future research on commuting, job satisfaction, and employee withdrawal.

First, commuting time and monetary commuting costs were assessed through participants' responses rather than objective records. Participants reported their commuting duration using categorical response options and evaluated their monetary commuting expenses relative to their income. Although these measures provided a practical way to assess commuting costs, they did not capture exact travel durations or expenditure amounts. Future research could employ commuting diaries, travel records, or more detailed expenditure measures to obtain a more precise assessment.

Second, the study employed a cross-sectional design and relied on self-reported measures for all variables. These characteristics may have introduced common method bias and limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the temporal ordering of the relationships. Self-report measures were selected partly for their practical advantages, including anonymity and confidentiality (Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2001), and their use in assessing withdrawal behavior is not without precedent: previous research has reported a high correlation between self-reported and record-based absence measures (Shapira-Lishchinsky & Rosenblatt, 2008). Organizations may also not maintain adequate records of withdrawal behaviors,

and access to existing records may be restricted (Johns, 2003). Nevertheless, dissatisfaction and withdrawal may be underreported because participants may be reluctant to disclose socially undesirable behaviors. Berry, Carpenter, and Barratt (2012) discussed concerns about self-reports of counterproductive work behavior, while Randall and Fernandes (1991) examined the influence of socially desirable responding on self-reported behavior. Future studies could therefore combine self-report measures with organizational attendance records or other behavioral indicators, where access and confidentiality requirements permit.

Third, the demographic composition of the sample may limit the generalizability of the findings. Participants were predominantly male, relatively young, highly educated, and comparatively new to organizational life. These characteristics may influence how employees respond to commuting burdens and workplace dissatisfaction. Younger employees, for example, may differ in their willingness to tolerate commuting costs because of their employment circumstances, career investments, or exposure to job insecurity. The extent to which these characteristics influenced the present findings cannot be established from the available data.

Future research should examine the relationships between commuting costs and withdrawal across more diverse samples, including employees of different ages, educational backgrounds, organizational tenures, occupations, and employment arrangements. Comparative studies across industries and labor markets could also help establish whether the relationships observed here vary according to employment conditions.

Future research should also incorporate additional psychological and organizational variables to clarify the mechanisms linking commuting experiences to employee outcomes. Stress and burnout are particularly relevant because commuting may contribute to employees' overall demands and strain. Examining

these variables could help explain why commuting costs do not always demonstrate direct relationships with withdrawal behavior and whether their effects operate through psychological processes.

Labor-market conditions and urban structure also warrant greater attention. Job security and unemployment may influence employees' willingness or ability to respond to dissatisfaction through withdrawal. High unemployment and limited employment opportunities may discourage employees from leaving their jobs or engaging in visible withdrawal behaviors. Future studies should therefore consider unemployment rates, perceived job insecurity, and the availability of alternative employment when investigating the relationships between commuting and employee behavior.

Job commitment and job engagement represent additional avenues for investigation. Both constructs may be associated with employees' responses to commuting burdens and could function as mediators or moderators in relationships between commuting costs and organizational outcomes. Their inclusion may help distinguish the role of employees' attachment to their jobs from the role of their satisfaction with specific aspects of their employment.

Finally, commuting should be examined in relation to broader life outcomes. Although the present study focused on job satisfaction and workplace withdrawal, commuting experiences may also affect life satisfaction, social interactions, family life, and work–life balance. Research incorporating these outcomes could provide a more comprehensive understanding of how commuting affects employees beyond the workplace and how these effects interact with organizational experiences.

Practical Implications

The findings have several implications for employers seeking to manage the potential consequences of commuting. Although the study did not establish significant direct relationships between

commuting costs and withdrawal behavior, the negative association between monetary commuting costs and job satisfaction, together with the significant indirect relationships through job satisfaction, suggests that commuting deserves consideration as part of the broader employment experience.

Employers should consider strategies that reduce the burden of commuting or give employees greater flexibility in managing their working time. Flexible working hours and compressed workweeks may help employees allocate their time more effectively and reduce the difficulties associated with fixed commuting schedules. Where operational requirements permit, such arrangements may give employees greater control over the relationship between travel and work. Commuting-related difficulties should be treated as a concern shared by employers and employees rather than as a burden that employees must manage entirely on their own.

Some organizations already provide commuting-related benefits. In the present sample, company-provided shuttle services were used by a majority of the blue-collar workers. Such services are an employment benefit that may help employees manage the practical demands of travelling to work. Future research could examine whether employer-provided transportation, commuting subsidies, flexible scheduling, and similar arrangements influence employees' commuting experiences, job satisfaction, and workplace behavior.

The findings also have implications for recruitment. Employers sometimes consider applicants' residential distance from the workplace when assessing whether they are likely to experience commuting difficulties. However, the present study did not establish a significant direct relationship between commuting time and withdrawal behavior. The results therefore provide no empirical

basis within this sample for assuming that applicants who live farther away will necessarily exhibit greater withdrawal.

Restricting recruitment to applicants who live close to the workplace could unnecessarily narrow the applicant pool. Employers should therefore avoid treating residential proximity as a reliable standalone indicator of future withdrawal behavior. A more appropriate approach would consider the actual requirements of the position, the working arrangements offered, and the available evidence regarding applicants' suitability.

Conclusion

Commuting requires employees to allocate time and financial resources to travelling between home and work. Although commuting is often treated as a transportation or personal-life issue, it also forms part of the broader context in which employees evaluate their jobs and make decisions about their workplace behavior. This study examined whether commuting time and monetary commuting costs were related to withdrawal behavior and whether job satisfaction mediated or moderated these relationships.

Neither commuting time nor monetary commuting costs showed a statistically significant direct relationship with withdrawal behavior. The hypothesized negative relationship between commuting time and job satisfaction was also nonsignificant. Monetary commuting costs, by contrast, were negatively associated with job satisfaction. The study also identified significant indirect relationships between both dimensions of commuting costs and withdrawal behavior through job satisfaction, while the proposed moderating effects of job satisfaction were not supported.

These findings suggest that commuting costs should not be treated as sufficient explanations of employee withdrawal. Their implications may depend on employees' evaluations of their jobs, the utility they derive from commuting, the flexibility available within

their organizations, and the constraints imposed by employment insecurity and labor-market conditions. Commuting may be burdensome without necessarily producing observable withdrawal, particularly when employees have limited alternatives or perceive their jobs as valuable despite the associated travel costs.

The study contributes to the discussion of commuting as an organizational behavior issue by examining commuting costs, job satisfaction, and withdrawal within a single empirical framework. Its findings also highlight the importance of distinguishing direct relationships from indirect associations and of considering the organizational and economic contexts in which employees experience commuting. Further research using longitudinal designs, more precise measures of commuting costs, and broader samples is needed to clarify these relationships and establish how commuting experiences influence employees' attitudes and behavior over time.

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CHAPTER 2

DIGITAL PARADOXES OF LEADERSHIP: THE CONTROL, TRUST, AND AUTONOMY CONUNDRUM IN THE AGE OF AGILITY

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Introduction: The Leadership Crisis in the Shadow of Digital Transformation

The accelerating pace of digital transformation has fundamentally altered the terrain upon which leadership operates. Organizations once governed by hierarchical command-and-control structures now find themselves navigating volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environments that demand unprecedented levels of adaptability, speed, and innovation. The emergence of digital technologies—from algorithmic management systems and real-time performance dashboards to AI-powered decision-support tools and ubiquitous communication platforms—has simultaneously expanded the capabilities of leaders while introducing a constellation of paradoxes that defy conventional management wisdom. As Smith and Lewis (2011) argued in their

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seminal dynamic equilibrium model, organizational paradoxes are not anomalies to be eliminated but rather enduring tensions that must be actively managed. The digital age, however, has amplified these paradoxes to a degree that threatens the very foundations of effective leadership practice.

At the heart of this chapter lies a central observation: the very tools and practices that promise to enhance organizational agility—digital surveillance, algorithmic decision-making, instant communication, and unlimited worker autonomy—frequently produce outcomes that undermine the very objectives they were designed to achieve. Leaders who embrace data-driven management discover that their metrics capture compliance rather than commitment. Those who mandate continuous responsiveness find that strategic thinking atrophies under the weight of perpetual reactivity. And organizations that grant workers boundless autonomy in the name of empowerment inadvertently cultivate decision fatigue, role ambiguity, and burnout. These are not isolated failures of implementation; they are structural paradoxes inherent in the sociotechnical systems of contemporary work life.

This chapter develops a paradoxical leadership framework grounded in the premise that the most productive response to these digital paradoxes is neither to choose between competing demands nor to seek a permanent resolution. Instead, drawing on Zhang et al.'s (2015) construct of paradoxical leader behavior and Smith and Lewis's (2011) dynamic equilibrium model, we argue that leaders must learn to simultaneously hold competing tensions—control and autonomy, data and intuition, speed and reflection—in a state of productive, dynamic balance. The chapter proceeds through eight substantive sections, each examining a distinct paradox of digital leadership, before synthesizing these insights into a holistic Paradoxical Leadership Model designed for the age of agility and artificial intelligence.

Conceptual Foundations: Socio-Technical Definitions of Agility, Control, and Autonomy

Before examining the paradoxes themselves, it is essential to establish the conceptual architecture upon which the subsequent analysis rests. The three constructs at the center of this chapter—agility, control, and autonomy—are each embedded within broader socio-technical systems that shape their meaning and consequences in organizational contexts. Treating these concepts as isolated variables, rather than as interconnected elements of a dynamic system, has been a persistent source of both theoretical confusion and practical missteps in the leadership literature.

Agility as Organizational Capacity

Organizational agility refers to the capacity of an enterprise to detect, interpret, and respond to environmental changes with speed and effectiveness while maintaining coherence with its strategic intent (Teece et al., 2016). Agility is frequently conflated with mere speed—the ability to react quickly to external stimuli—but this reduction obscures a critical distinction. True agility encompasses both reactive responsiveness and proactive strategic adaptation. It requires not only the operational flexibility to pivot when conditions change but also the strategic foresight to anticipate change before it arrives. This dual nature of agility—simultaneously reactive and proactive—constitutes the first paradoxical tension that leaders must navigate. As Raisch and Krakowski (2021) demonstrated in their analysis of the automation-augmentation paradox in artificial intelligence, the very technologies designed to enhance organizational responsiveness can paradoxically constrain strategic imagination by privileging short-term optimization over long-term exploration.

Control as Socio-Technical Function

Control in organizations has been theorized since Thompson's (1967) foundational work on organizations in action as a mechanism for reducing uncertainty and ensuring alignment between individual behavior and organizational objectives. In the digital era, control has undergone a profound transformation. Traditional bureaucratic control—exercised through formal rules, hierarchical authority, and direct supervision—has been supplemented and in many cases supplanted by algorithmic control, in which software systems monitor, evaluate, and direct worker behavior through automated mechanisms (Möhlmann et al., 2021). This shift from interpersonal to technological control has significant implications for leadership, as it alters the locus of power, the nature of accountability, and the psychological experience of being managed. Parent-Rocheleau and Parker (2022) documented how algorithmic management systems function as work designers, shaping not only what workers do but how they experience their work, often in ways that reduce job autonomy, task variety, and social interaction without the explicit awareness or intention of human leaders.

Autonomy as Psychological Need and Organizational Resource

Autonomy occupies a paradoxical position in contemporary organizational theory. On one hand, self-determination theory identifies autonomy as one of three basic psychological needs—alongside competence and relatedness—whose satisfaction is essential for intrinsic motivation, well-being, and effective functioning (Ryan & Deci, 2000). On the other hand, the autonomy paradox—first articulated by Mazmanian et al. (2013) in their study of mobile email devices among knowledge professionals—reveals that the very technologies that increase workers' sense of autonomy simultaneously erode it by creating expectations of perpetual

availability and self-imposed work extension. Knowledge professionals who adopted mobile email devices reported feeling greater control over when and where they worked, yet these same devices led them to work more hours, respond to messages during evenings and weekends, and experience a gradual erosion of boundaries between work and personal life. This paradox—autonomy as both liberator and captor—is central to understanding the challenges facing leaders in digital organizations.

The Algorithm of Quiet Quitting: Does Digital Surveillance Transform Workers into "Minimally Compliant Ghosts"?

The proliferation of digital surveillance technologies in the workplace represents one of the most consequential and contested developments in contemporary management practice. Electronic performance monitoring (EPM) systems—ranging from keystroke loggers and screenshot capture tools to AI-powered sentiment analysis of communication patterns—have become ubiquitous, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the shift to remote and hybrid work arrangements. While proponents argue that such tools enhance accountability, ensure productivity, and provide data for evidence-based management decisions, a growing body of research suggests that the consequences of digital surveillance are far more complex and frequently counterproductive than its advocates acknowledge.

The fundamental paradox of digital surveillance is this: as monitoring intensity increases, the behavioral data that leaders receive becomes progressively less reflective of genuine engagement, commitment, and discretionary effort, and progressively more reflective of strategic compliance—behaviors specifically calibrated to satisfy the metrics being tracked. Drawing on Ashforth and Lee's (1990) foundational model of defensive behavior in organizations, which identified mechanisms such as

overconforming, playing dumb, smoothing, and stretching as self-protective strategies, we argue that digital surveillance creates a new form of organizational defense: performative compliance. Performative compliance occurs when workers optimize their visible behaviors to satisfy algorithmic monitoring criteria while simultaneously withdrawing the cognitive and emotional engagement that those behaviors were intended to capture.

Bucher et al. (2021) provided compelling evidence of this phenomenon in their study of gig economy workers facing algorithmic management. They introduced the concept of anticipatory compliance—the practice of adapting one's behavior not in response to explicit directives but in anticipation of what the algorithm might reward or penalize. Workers reported undervaluing their own work, staying under the algorithmic radar, and developing elaborate strategies to game the system without triggering penalty mechanisms. The result is a workforce that appears productive on the surface while experiencing progressive disengagement beneath it—the organizational equivalent of a minimally compliant ghost.

The implications for leadership are profound. Leaders who rely on surveillance-derived data to assess organizational health may be operating on fundamentally misleading information. The dashboards they consult may reflect not genuine commitment but strategic compliance. The performance metrics they track may capture not value creation but value simulation. As Gal et al. (2020) argued in their virtue ethics critique of people analytics, the vicious cycle of algorithmic management—in which increased monitoring leads to increased gaming, which in turn justifies even more intensive monitoring—creates an environment in which neither leaders nor workers can develop the virtues necessary for genuine organizational flourishing. This represents perhaps the most insidious dimension of the surveillance paradox: it degrades not only

the quality of data available to leaders but also the moral character of the organizational community.

The Ghost of Command and Control: Biological and Cultural Roots of Micromanagement in the Digital Age

If digital surveillance represents the technological face of excessive control, micromanagement represents its behavioral face. Despite decades of management scholarship documenting the corrosive effects of micromanagement on employee morale, creativity, and organizational performance, the tendency toward excessive control remains stubbornly persistent. This persistence raises a fundamental question: why do leaders continue to micromanage even when they know it is counterproductive? The answer, we argue, lies at the intersection of behavioral economics and neuroscience, where deep-seated cognitive biases and neurobiological reward mechanisms create powerful incentives for control that operate below the threshold of conscious awareness.

From a behavioral economics perspective, the compulsion toward control can be understood through the lens of Kahneman's (2011) dual-process theory of cognition. System 1—the fast, intuitive, and automatic mode of thinking—generates rapid judgments about threat and safety that are evolutionarily calibrated for environments where loss aversion and hyper vigilance conferred survival advantages. When leaders perceive uncertainty, complexity, or potential failure, System 1 generates an immediate, pre-conscious impulse to reassert control—to monitor more closely, to specify more precisely, to intervene more frequently. This impulse is reinforced by the illusion of control bias, a well-documented cognitive bias in which individuals systematically overestimate their ability to influence outcomes through personal intervention (Kahneman, 2011). The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: uncertainty triggers the control impulse; the control impulse leads to

micromanagement; micromanagement reduces perceived uncertainty (even if actual uncertainty remains unchanged); and the temporary reduction in anxiety reinforces the micromanagement behavior.

From a neuroscience perspective, Rock's (2008) SCARF model provides a complementary explanation. The model identifies five domains of social experience that the brain evaluates for threat or reward: status, certainty, autonomy, relatedness, and fairness. Micromanagement, we argue, simultaneously activates the reward centers of two SCARF domains for the leader while threatening the corresponding domains for subordinates. For the leader, exerting control enhances perceived status (I am in charge) and certainty (I know what is happening), triggering dopaminergic reward pathways that reinforce the controlling behavior. For the subordinate, the same behavior threatens autonomy (I have no freedom) and status (I am not trusted), activating the brain's threat response and generating the defensive behaviors documented by Ashforth and Lee (1990). This asymmetric neurobiological experience—reward for the controller, threat for the controlled—creates a structural incentive for micromanagement that persists even when leaders are intellectually aware of its negative consequences.

Culturally, the command-and-control paradigm is embedded in organizational structures, incentive systems, and professional identities that have been constructed over more than a century of industrial management practice. Schein (2010) argued that organizational culture operates at multiple levels, from visible artifacts and espoused values to deeply held underlying assumptions. In many organizations, the underlying assumption that leadership equates to control remains so deeply embedded that it is taken for granted rather than questioned. Leaders who fail to exert close control may be perceived as weak, disengaged, or irresponsible—even when their restraint is deliberately calibrated to foster

autonomy and innovation. Thus, the ghost of command and control persists not because leaders are ignorant of its costs but because both neurobiological mechanisms and cultural structures actively sustain it.

The Speed Trap: How the Culture of Instant Response Devours Strategic Thinking

The digital workplace has engendered a culture of instant response in which the velocity of communication has become conflated with the quality of decision-making. Email, messaging platforms, and collaborative tools have collapsed the temporal distance between the receipt of information and the expectation of a response, creating what Perlow (2012) termed the "24/7 habit"—a norm of perpetual availability that erodes the boundaries between work and non-work life and, more fundamentally, between reactive and reflective cognition. The paradox of the speed trap is that the pursuit of organizational agility—the capacity to respond rapidly to changing conditions—can paradoxically destroy the very strategic thinking capacity that distinguishes effective adaptation from mere reactivity.

Kahneman's (2011) distinction between System 1 and System 2 thinking is again illuminating here. Strategic thinking—the capacity to synthesize complex information, identify patterns across extended time horizons, evaluate trade-offs, and formulate coherent long-term plans—is quintessentially a System 2 activity: slow, deliberative, and cognitively demanding. The culture of instant response, by contrast, privileges System 1 processing: rapid, intuitive, and heuristically driven. When leaders are continuously bombarded with requests, notifications, and decisions requiring immediate attention, the cognitive resources available for System 2 thinking are progressively depleted. This is not merely a matter of time allocation; it reflects the deeper phenomenon of ego depletion,

in which the exertion of self-regulatory capacity in one domain impairs subsequent self-regulation in unrelated domains (Baumeister et al., 1998). Leaders who spend their days responding to a relentless stream of emails, messages, and ad hoc requests may simply lack the cognitive resources necessary for sustained strategic reflection by the time the opportunity arises.

The organizational consequences of the speed trap extend beyond individual cognitive depletion. When responsiveness becomes the primary metric of professional effectiveness, a subtle but powerful cultural shift occurs: the quality of thinking is evaluated not by its depth, rigor, or long-term orientation but by its speed and surface plausibility. Strategic initiatives are formulated in compressed timeframes, evaluated on the basis of PowerPoint summaries rather than substantive analysis, and abandoned at the first sign of difficulty because the cognitive and organizational infrastructure for sustained strategic commitment has been eroded by the culture of instant response. This dynamic is particularly insidious because it is self-reinforcing: as strategic thinking atrophies, the quality of strategic decisions declines; as the quality of decisions declines, organizations experience more crises and surprises; and as crises multiply, the demand for rapid response intensifies, further crowding out the strategic reflection that might prevent the next crisis.

Ibarra (2015) observed that effective leadership requires a fundamental shift from operational to strategic mindsets—a shift that demands deliberate practice and protected time for reflection. Yet the architecture of the digital workplace systematically obstructs this shift by filling every available moment with demands for immediate response. The speed trap, therefore, is not merely an individual habit to be corrected through better time management; it is a structural feature of digitally mediated work environments that requires systemic intervention at the organizational level.

Algorithmic Boss or Humanist Leader? The Cultural Cost of Data-Driven Decision-Making

The rise of data-driven decision-making represents one of the most significant shifts in management practice in the twenty-first century. Davenport and Harris (2017) documented how organizations that compete on analytics achieve superior performance by systematically leveraging data to inform strategic and operational decisions. Yet the enthusiastic adoption of data-driven approaches has obscured a critical tension: the displacement of human judgment by algorithmic recommendation carries a cultural cost that is rarely acknowledged, let alone systematically assessed. This section examines the conflict between algorithmic rationality and humanistic leadership—between the logic of optimization and the logic of meaning.

Lee (2018) demonstrated that algorithmic decisions are consistently perceived as less fair and trustworthy than equivalent decisions made by humans, even when the outcomes are identical. This perception gap is not merely a transient artifact of technological unfamiliarity; it reflects a fundamental difference in how humans evaluate the legitimacy of authority. Human decision-makers are seen as capable of understanding context, exercising empathy, and acknowledging exceptions—qualities that algorithms, by their nature, cannot replicate. When leaders delegate decisions to algorithmic systems, they sacrifice not only the perception of fairness but also the relational infrastructure—the sense of being seen, understood, and valued as a person rather than as a data point—upon which organizational trust and commitment depend. Duggan et al. (2020) further demonstrated that algorithmic management in gig economy contexts creates a distinctive form of employment relationship characterized by reduced worker voice, diminished procedural justice, and heightened worker precarity.

The cultural cost of data-driven decision-making extends beyond perceptions of fairness to encompass the erosion of practical wisdom—what Aristotle termed phronesis and what Flyvbjerg (2001) identified as the core competence of social science and, by extension, of leadership in complex human systems. Phronesis involves the capacity to make sound judgments in situations characterized by ambiguity, value conflict, and contextual nuance—precisely the situations in which algorithmic decision-making is most likely to fail. Algorithms excel at optimization within well-defined parameter spaces, but they cannot adjudicate between competing values, navigate ethical dilemmas, or exercise the kind of contextual judgment that effective leadership demands. As Raisch and Krakowski (2021) noted, the automation-augmentation paradox in AI means that the same technologies that automate routine decision-making can also augment human judgment—but only if leaders resist the temptation to fully delegate decisions to algorithmic systems and instead cultivate the complementary relationship between human wisdom and machine intelligence.

Jarrahi et al. (2021) offered a sociotechnical perspective on this challenge, arguing that algorithmic management should not be understood as a purely technological phenomenon but as a process emerging from the continuous interaction of organizational members and algorithmic systems. The key question, therefore, is not whether leaders should use data and algorithms—they clearly must in a competitive environment—but how they can integrate algorithmic insights with humanistic values in a way that preserves the relational and moral dimensions of leadership while harnessing the analytical power of computational systems. This requires what we term algorithmic humility: the recognition that data provides essential input for decision-making but never constitutes a complete basis for the exercise of leadership judgment.

The Autonomy Trap: Why Boundless Freedom Exhausts the Digital Worker

If the preceding sections have emphasized the dangers of excessive control, this section examines the equally pernicious consequences of its apparent opposite: unlimited autonomy. The autonomy trap refers to the paradoxical phenomenon in which the removal of external constraints—in the name of empowerment, flexibility, and self-direction—generates psychological and organizational pathologies that are as debilitating as those produced by micromanagement. The central argument is that autonomy without structure is not liberation; it is abandonment, and abandonment produces its own distinctive forms of suffering.

The psychological mechanism underlying the autonomy trap is decision fatigue—the progressive deterioration of decision quality following extensive decision-making activity. Vohs et al. (2008) demonstrated that making choices depletes the same limited self-regulatory resource that is required for subsequent self-control and active initiative. When workers are granted unlimited autonomy, they are implicitly required to make a vastly expanded set of decisions: not only what to do but when, how, where, with whom, and to what standard. Each of these decisions, however trivial, draws on the same finite cognitive resource. Over time, the cumulative effect of this decision burden manifests as decision fatigue, reduced self-regulation, and ultimately burnout—the psychological syndrome characterized by emotional exhaustion, cynicism, and reduced professional efficacy (Maslach & Leiter, 2016).

The autonomy trap is compounded by role ambiguity—the experience of uncertainty about the expectations, responsibilities, and boundaries of one's role. When organizations grant workers extensive autonomy without simultaneously providing clear goal structures, role definitions, and performance expectations, they create the conditions for what Kreiner et al. (2006) described as

identity tension—the struggle to negotiate an optimal balance between personal and organizational identities in the absence of clear structural cues. Workers who lack role clarity expend significant cognitive and emotional energy simply determining what they should be doing, leaving fewer resources for doing it well. Schwartz (2004) articulated this dynamic in terms of the paradox of choice: the proliferation of options does not enhance well-being and effectiveness but rather generates anxiety, decision paralysis, and chronic dissatisfaction.

Mazmanian et al. (2013) provided a particularly vivid illustration of the autonomy trap in their study of knowledge professionals using mobile email devices. These professionals experienced the autonomy to work anytime and anywhere as simultaneously liberating and enslaving. The removal of temporal and spatial boundaries did not produce genuine freedom; instead, it shifted the responsibility for boundary management entirely onto the individual, creating a situation in which workers felt compelled to be always available not because they were explicitly required to be but because the absence of boundaries made it impossible to define legitimate periods of unavailability. The result was a self-reinforcing cycle in which greater autonomy led to longer working hours, greater work-family conflict, and higher levels of stress—precisely the opposite of what the autonomy was intended to achieve.

The implication for leadership is clear but counterintuitive: effective autonomy requires structure. Leaders must not simply remove constraints and declare workers free; they must actively design the organizational conditions—clear goals, role definitions, decision frameworks, and boundary norms—that make autonomy sustainable rather than overwhelming. As Ryan and Deci (2000) demonstrated, autonomy is not the absence of external regulation but the experience of volition—the sense that one's actions are self-endorsed and congruent with one's values. This experience of

volition is most reliably fostered not by the removal of all constraints but by the provision of structures that support competent, self-directed action within clearly defined parameters.

Synthesis: A Holistic Leadership Framework for Managing Paradoxes (The Paradoxical Leadership Model)

The preceding sections have identified five interrelated paradoxes of digital leadership: the surveillance paradox (monitoring undermines the engagement it seeks to ensure), the control paradox (the compulsion to control is neurobiologically and culturally reinforced even when counterproductive), the speed paradox (the pursuit of agility destroys the strategic thinking that effective adaptation requires), the algorithmic paradox (data-driven optimization displaces the humanistic judgment that leadership demands), and the autonomy paradox (unlimited freedom exhausts rather than empowers). Each of these paradoxes presents leaders with what appears to be an irreconcilable choice: control or autonomy, data or intuition, speed or reflection, surveillance or trust, optimization or meaning.

The Paradoxical Leadership Model proposed here rejects this framing entirely. Drawing on Zhang et al.'s (2015) construct of paradoxical leader behavior—defined as seemingly competing yet interrelated behaviors that meet simultaneous but opposing demands—and Smith and Lewis's (2011) dynamic equilibrium model of organizing, we propose that the appropriate response to digital paradoxes is neither to choose one pole over the other nor to seek a permanent synthesis that eliminates the tension. Instead, leaders must develop the capacity to hold competing demands in a state of dynamic equilibrium, continuously adjusting the balance between them in response to changing circumstances. This "both/and" approach to leadership was articulated by Smith et al. (as cited in the Harvard Business Review discussion of "Both/And"

Leadership), who argued that organizational success depends on simultaneously addressing conflicting demands rather than choosing between them.

The Five Paradoxical Leadership Practices

The Paradoxical Leadership Model identifies five core practices that correspond to the five paradoxes examined in this chapter. Each practice involves the simultaneous cultivation of seemingly opposing orientations, held in productive tension through deliberate leadership action.

Practice 1: Trustful Accountability. Rather than choosing between surveillance (accountability without trust) and abandonment (trust without accountability), leaders must create systems that simultaneously ensure accountability and convey trust. This means designing monitoring systems that are transparent, participatory, and developmental rather than punitive and hidden. It means involving workers in the definition of what is measured and why, ensuring that metrics capture genuine value creation rather than mere compliance, and using monitoring data primarily for feedback and growth rather than for evaluation and control. Franken and Braganza (2020) demonstrated that paradoxical leadership in public sector organizations fosters employee resilience precisely because it maintains structural accountability while preserving relational trust.

Practice 2: Informed Restraint. Rather than oscillating between micromanagement (excessive control) and disengagement (insufficient guidance), leaders must practice informed restraint: maintaining sufficient oversight to ensure strategic alignment while consciously restraining the impulse to control operational details. This requires awareness of the neurobiological and cultural forces that drive the control impulse (as analyzed in Section 4) and the deliberate cultivation of alternative mechanisms for achieving certainty—such as shared vision, mutual accountability, and

developmental feedback—that do not depend on direct supervision. Fuerstenberg and Alfes (2021) showed that paradoxical leadership promotes work engagement precisely by simultaneously fostering goal clarity (structure) and work autonomy (freedom), demonstrating that clarity and autonomy are not opposites but complements.

Practice 3: Reflective Responsiveness. Rather than choosing between speed (reactive agility) and depth (strategic reflection), leaders must institutionalize reflective responsiveness: the capacity to respond rapidly when necessary while systematically protecting time and cognitive resources for sustained strategic thinking. This requires structural interventions—such as designated "thinking time," protected strategic planning periods, and norms that value thoughtful deliberation as much as rapid response—rather than relying on individual willpower to resist the culture of instant response. Perlow's (2012) research at the Boston Consulting Group demonstrated that when teams collectively committed to predictable time off, not only did work-life balance improve but team communication, learning, and client delivery also enhanced—a vivid illustration of the both/and principle in action.

Practice 4: Algorithmic Humility. Rather than choosing between algorithmic rationality (data-driven decision-making) and humanistic judgment (intuitive, value-laden decision-making), leaders must cultivate algorithmic humility: the disciplined integration of data-driven insights with humanistic values and practical wisdom. This means using data to inform rather than replace judgment, treating algorithmic recommendations as inputs to a deliberative process rather than as outputs to be implemented, and maintaining the organizational capacity for ethical reasoning, contextual interpretation, and value adjudication that algorithms cannot provide. As Gal et al. (2020) argued, reframing people analytics as a "fallible companion" rather than an authoritative oracle

can help organizations break the vicious cycle of algorithmic management while still benefiting from data-driven insights.

Practice 5: Structured Freedom. Rather than choosing between constraint (structure without autonomy) and license (autonomy without structure), leaders must design what we call structured freedom: organizational conditions that provide sufficient structure to prevent decision fatigue, role ambiguity, and boundary erosion while preserving genuine worker autonomy and self-direction. This means establishing clear goals and priorities, defining role boundaries and decision rights, creating norms for availability and response times, and providing decision frameworks that reduce cognitive burden without eliminating meaningful choice. Batool et al. (2023) emphasized that paradoxical leadership operates at multiple levels simultaneously—individual, team, and organizational—and that its effectiveness depends on the alignment of paradoxical practices across these levels. Structured freedom, therefore, is not merely an individual leadership behavior but an organizational design principle that must be embedded in systems, processes, and cultural norms.

The Dynamic Equilibrium Mechanism

The five practices described above are not static prescriptions but dynamic processes that require continuous adjustment. Drawing on Smith and Lewis's (2011) dynamic equilibrium model, we propose that paradoxical leadership operates through a cyclical mechanism of acceptance, confrontation, and navigation. Leaders must first accept the existence of paradoxical tensions—recognizing that control and autonomy, speed and reflection, data and intuition are not problems to be solved but tensions to be managed. They must then confront these tensions directly rather than avoiding or denying them, making the competing demands explicit and involving stakeholders in the process of negotiating their balance. Finally, they

must navigate the tensions through ongoing experimentation, reflection, and adjustment, recognizing that the optimal balance point shifts over time as organizational conditions, strategic priorities, and environmental demands evolve.

Pearce et al. (2019) introduced the concept of meta-paradoxical leadership, arguing that leaders must not only manage specific paradoxes but also manage the paradox of paradox management itself—the tension between the need for consistent leadership principles and the need for flexible, context-dependent responses. This meta-level awareness is essential for preventing paradoxical leadership from degenerating into either rigidity (applying the same balance point regardless of context) or chaos (abandoning all consistency in the name of flexibility). Sparr (2022) further demonstrated that paradoxical leadership functions as a form of sensegiving, helping followers make meaning of contradictory demands and thus fostering change-readiness and change-oriented performance.

Conclusion and Future Research Directions: The Evolution of Leadership in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

This chapter has argued that digital transformation does not merely change the tools available to leaders; it fundamentally alters the nature of the paradoxes they must navigate. The digital paradoxes of leadership—surveillance and trust, control and autonomy, speed and reflection, data and intuition, freedom and structure—are not temporary disruptions that will be resolved by the next generation of technology. They are enduring features of the sociotechnical landscape of contemporary work that require a fundamentally different approach to leadership than the either/or logic that has dominated management practice for more than a century. The Paradoxical Leadership Model proposed here offers a both/and alternative: a framework for simultaneously cultivating competing

orientations in a state of dynamic equilibrium that is continuously adjusted in response to changing conditions.

The implications of this analysis extend beyond the present moment to the emerging challenges of the artificial intelligence era. As AI systems become increasingly capable of performing tasks that were previously the exclusive domain of human judgment—strategic analysis, creative problem-solving, interpersonal communication—the paradoxes examined in this chapter will intensify rather than diminish. The automation-augmentation paradox identified by Raisch and Krakowski (2021) will become more acute as leaders must decide not only how to use AI but also how to preserve the distinctly human capacities—empathy, ethical reasoning, practical wisdom, and relational attunement—that define leadership at its best. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) demonstrated that the labor market effects of automation depend not on the technology itself but on the institutional and organizational choices that govern its deployment. The same principle applies to leadership: the evolution of leadership in the age of AI will be determined not by the capabilities of the technology but by the choices leaders make about how to integrate those capabilities with humanistic values and practices.

Several promising directions for future research emerge from this analysis. First, empirical studies are needed to test the Paradoxical Leadership Model in diverse organizational contexts, examining how the five practices interact with organizational culture, industry dynamics, and national institutional environments. Second, longitudinal research designs are required to understand how the dynamic equilibrium mechanism operates over time—how leaders adjust the balance between competing demands as conditions change and what factors predict successful versus unsuccessful navigation of paradoxical tensions. Third, the implications of generative AI for paradoxical leadership demand urgent attention: as

AI systems become capable of producing text, images, and recommendations that are indistinguishable from human output, the boundary between algorithmic and humanistic decision-making will become increasingly blurred, creating new paradoxes that the current framework must be extended to address. Fourth, cross-cultural research is essential to determine whether the paradoxical leadership practices identified here are universally applicable or whether they require significant adaptation in cultural contexts with different assumptions about authority, autonomy, and the relationship between individuals and organizations.

The digital age does not need leaders who are faster, more data-driven, or more technologically sophisticated than their predecessors. It needs leaders who are more paradoxical—leaders who can hold competing truths simultaneously, who can resist the seductive simplicity of either/or thinking, and who can navigate the irreducible complexities of organizational life with wisdom, humility, and moral courage. The paradoxes of digital leadership are not obstacles to be overcome; they are the terrain upon which the future of leadership will be built.

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CHAPTER 3

SAFETY-CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIORS IN AVIATION ORGANIZATIONS

SADİYE OYA IŞIKCI[1]

Introduction

Aviation is one of the most complex and high-risk sociotechnical systems in human history. Despite its high level of technological maturity, aviation continues to operate in dynamic and complex environments where human performance remains a critical determinant of safety. Consequently, aviation should be understood not merely as a technological system but as a sociotechnical system in which human factors play a central role in ensuring safety, enhancing operational efficiency, and supporting organizational performance (Stanton et al., 2019).

For this system to operate safely, it is dependent not only on advanced technology, stringent regulations, and effective oversight mechanisms, but also on the holistic alignment of organizational behaviors. Systematic investigations of major accidents and incidents in aviation history have demonstrated that, alongside technical failures, human-factor-induced errors, organizational

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communication breakdowns, leadership deficiencies, and deviations in institutional culture have played a significantly determining role (Reason, 1997; Helmreich & Merritt, 2017; Shappell et al., 2017; Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019; Amalberti & Wioland, 2020). These findings necessitate that safety management be approached not merely as a technical problem but, first and foremost, as an organizational and behavioral matter.

Historically, aviation safety was largely viewed through a technical perspective, with primary emphasis placed on pilots' technical competence and aircraft performance. As aviation systems became increasingly complex, greater attention shifted toward non-technical skills, including communication, decision-making, situational awareness, crew coordination, and workload management. Consequently, modern aviation recognizes that these non-technical competencies are integral to safe operations and that managing human factors requires an organizational rather than purely individual perspective (Helmreich & Merritt, 2017; Bükeç & Başdemir, 2021). This shift extends beyond individual and crew-level competencies to encompass broader organizational attitudes and behaviors, a dimension explored in the following section.

This chapter adopts an integrative perspective that brings together insights from organizational behavior and aviation research to examine the critical behavioral determinants of safety in civil aviation organizations. Moving beyond a purely technical understanding of safety, it conceptualizes aviation systems as inherently socio-technical structures in which human and organizational factors play a decisive role in both the establishment and sustainability of safety outcomes. In this context, the chapter focuses on a set of core organizational behaviors associated with human factors, which emerge as interrelated and mutually reinforcing competencies within complex operational environments.

Although the aviation safety literature provides substantial insight into specific human-factor domains, existing reviews have generally examined these domains in isolation or from perspectives other than the organizational behavior lens adopted here. To address this gap, this chapter asks: What are the key organizational behavior dimensions that shape safety performance in civil aviation organizations, and how do these dimensions interact as an integrated system? In answering this question, the chapter moves beyond fragmented analyses of individual human factors to develop a systemic understanding of how these behavioral dimensions collectively shape organizational safety performance.

To address this question, the chapter adopts a conceptual and integrative approach grounded in a structured and comprehensive review of the relevant literature. Drawing on interdisciplinary sources spanning aviation human factors, organizational behavior, and safety science, it synthesizes both theoretical and empirical insights to identify core behavioral dimensions and examine their interrelationships. More specifically, the chapter follows a narrative and integrative literature review methodology (Snyder, 2019; Torraco, 2005), which is well suited to synthesizing conceptually and methodologically diverse literatures into a coherent theoretical framework rather than statistically aggregating narrowly defined empirical findings. The review draws on peer-reviewed studies in aviation human factors, organizational behavior, and safety science, complemented by technical and regulatory guidance from international aviation authorities. Foundational theories and recent empirical research were integrated to provide an up-to-date and conceptually coherent synthesis of the literature.

The chapter begins by establishing the conceptual foundations of safety in civil aviation through an examination of the relationship between human factors and Crew Resource Management (CRM), highlighting the historical evolution from a

predominantly technical focus toward a human-centered and organizationally embedded understanding of safety. Building on this foundation, the chapter then explores safety culture from an organizational behavior perspective, analyzing how shared values, norms, and behavioral expectations influence safety-related practices and organizational reliability.

The core of the chapter develops an integrative behavioral framework that examines the critical organizational behaviors underpinning safety. Within this framework, each behavioral dimension is systematically examined and evaluated in light of the existing literature, with particular emphasis on its theoretical foundations, operational relevance, and interrelationships with other behavioral dimensions (competencies). The discussion focuses on open communication, crew coordination, situational awareness, fatigue management, leadership, and just culture as core behavioral dimensions of aviation safety. Rather than constituting a discrete checklist of competencies, these dimensions are conceptualized as functionally interdependent layers of organizational defense, where the adequacy of one conditions the effectiveness of the others and collectively reduces the likelihood that latent organizational weaknesses develop into active failures (Reason, 1997). This layered structure aligns with the concept of collective mindfulness in the high reliability organization literature, which holds that sustained safety performance emerges from the continuous enactment of multiple interlocking organizational processes rather than any single competency in isolation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Accordingly, the sequence adopted in this chapter reflects their operational logic: open communication provides the foundation for crew coordination; effective coordination depends on accurate situational awareness, which is undermined by fatigue; the integration of these operational competencies requires leadership; and the long-term resilience of the system ultimately rests on a just culture that sustains error reporting.

A weakness in any dimension can propagate through the system and compromise subsequent layers, underscoring the need to view these dimensions as an integrated whole. Together, they provide the behavioral mechanisms through which aviation organizations strengthen safety performance, organizational learning, and operational resilience.

The first of these competencies, open communication and information sharing, constitutes an indispensable foundation of aviation safety. Communication enables essential human-factor processes, including information exchange, planning, leadership, and decision-making (Nevile, 2006), while communication failures have been identified as a contributing factor in a substantial proportion of aviation accidents (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993; Krifka et al., 2003). Accordingly, organizations must foster an environment in which crew members can openly communicate safety-related information and concerns without fear of negative consequences (Mearns et al., 2001). This is particularly important in high power-distance cultures, where assertive communication by co-pilots and other crew members plays a critical role in maintaining safety (Helmreich & Merritt, 2017; Aktaş & Tekarslan, 2013).

In an environment characterized by open communication, effective teamwork depends on crew coordination and collaboration. While coordination refers to the synchronization of crew members' actions, collaboration reflects the motivational and interpersonal aspects of teamwork. Within the Crew Resource Management (CRM) framework, these complementary competencies facilitate the development of shared mental models and support effective performance, particularly under conditions of high workload and operational uncertainty (Helmreich et al., 1999; Civil Air Patrol, 2026). By strengthening collective problem-solving and decision-making, they contribute directly to safe flight operations (Bienefeld & Grote, 2013; Ko et al., 2021).

Effective crew coordination requires accurate and continuously updated situational awareness. Situational awareness is conceptualized as a hierarchical cognitive process involving the perception of environmental elements (Level 1), the comprehension of their meaning (Level 2), and the projection of future states (Level 3) (Endsley, 1999). As a core determinant of operational performance in aviation, it supports effective workload management, continuous communication, and proactive risk assessment, thereby enabling safe and timely decision-making (Aviation Security Service, 2026).

Fatigue is one of the primary factors that threatens situational awareness and cognitive performance. Resulting from sleep deprivation, circadian rhythm disruption, prolonged wakefulness, or their combination (Caldwell & Caldwell, 2003), fatigue impairs attention, reaction time, decision-making, and risk perception, thereby compromising safety at both the individual and crew levels (Rosekind et al., 1994). Consequently, fatigue should be addressed as an organizational safety risk through systematic Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS), as recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and SKYbrary (SKYbrary, 2026a).

The effective integration of these operational competencies depends on leadership. In aviation, leadership involves the combined application of technical, human, and conceptual skills (Katz, 2009) while maintaining safety as the primary consideration in operational decision-making. Within the CRM framework, leadership extends beyond the captain's formal authority and may be exercised by the crew member best positioned to respond to operational demands (Salas et al., 2005; Pearce & Conger, 2002). Such an approach

reduces hierarchical rigidity, promotes shared responsibility, and strengthens safety-oriented teamwork (Flin & O'Connor, 2017).

Finally, the long-term sustainability of these behavioral competencies depends on an organizational culture that encourages the open reporting of errors and incidents. Reporting behavior is shaped by organizational conditions, while fear of punishment, reputational concerns, and doubts about the value of reporting remain major barriers (Reason, 1997; Morrison & Milliken, 2000). These barriers can be reduced through a just culture, which distinguishes intentional violations from honest errors and promotes a systems-based rather than blame-oriented approach to safety (Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2016). In such environments, reporting, organizational learning, and continuous safety improvement are strengthened (Frankel et al., 2006). Against this backdrop, the following sections examine the conceptual foundations and organizational behavior dimensions that underpin aviation safety, with particular emphasis on the interrelationship between human factors, safety, and CRM.

Safety in Civil Aviation, Human Factors, and Crew Resource Management (CRM)

The civil aviation sector is technologically intensive, globally interconnected, economically significant, and characterized by complex competitive and regulatory conditions (Bakır et al., 2017; Stanton et al., 2019). Aviation can continue to exist as a beneficial transportation system for humanity only as long as the safety element is placed ahead of all other objectives and processes (Erceylan et al., 2024). In essence, today's modern civil aviation sector offers a safe, secure, rapid, comfortable, and efficient transportation option for the carriage of goods and passengers. However, it also inherently harbors numerous risks and hazards. In

this sector, which is dependent on both high technology and human beings, the reality that even minor errors in organizational operations can lead to major accidents must always be kept in mind. Despite technical and technological advances, the human factor continues to be one of the most critical elements of modern aviation, assuming a fundamental role in the safe operation and sustainability of aircraft both on the ground and in the air (Erceylan et al., 2024).

Research has demonstrated that a large proportion of accidents and fatal crashes occurring during flight are attributable to the human factor. The findings have shown that preventing human-caused errors is of critical importance for ensuring airline safety. This awareness has also brought to the fore the necessity of effectively managing such errors (Şekerli, 2006; Bingöllü & Tonus, 2023).

CRM is an error prevention system developed in the late 1970s in the aviation sector with the aim of improving the management skills of flight crews, enhancing operational efficiency, and minimizing human-caused errors. This approach emphasizes not only individual skills but also intra-crew collaboration and collective decision-making processes. CRM addresses and seeks to develop a set of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviors, including situational awareness, effective communication, strategic decision-making, and intra-crew coordination, in an integrated manner to ensure the effective use of resources. It also provides a framework that supports critical thinking and enables crew members to make joint decisions and take coordinated action. In this way, CRM plays a critical role in preventing operational risks and errors in aviation and in ensuring the sustainability of a safety culture (Terzioğlu & Üner, 2024). CRM stands out primarily as an approach aimed at enhancing individuals' cognitive capabilities. While technical knowledge and skills are of course important for the successful accomplishment of a task, non-technical skills, that is, human

factors, also assume critical roles in completing the work effectively and safely (Kern, 2010; Bükeç & Başdemir, 2021). In aviation, these non-technical behavioral skills that encompass human factors, that is, the social and cognitive skills required for interacting with other people and making decisions, as distinct from directly controlling the aircraft, are as important as the skills required to fly the aircraft (Stanton et al., 2019).

In flight operations, such behaviors apply to every crew member involved in operations. For example, a crew member with insufficient situational awareness or deficient time management will be unable to be aware of what they are doing and will fail to complete assigned tasks on time. At a minimum, they may be unable to anticipate or respond to a potential hazard or risk. This is precisely the point at which CRM aims to address and develop to maximize human factors. This is largely dependent on the capacity for teamwork and crew cohesion in aviation operations. Although the final decision regarding the operation is made by the crew leader, the effectiveness of that decision depends on crew solidarity and collaboration. For flight operations to be conducted safely, all stakeholders in the flight chain must be able to share their flight-related information openly and completely, take corrective action through feedback when necessary, and achieve information transfer within the crew. For example, when oversized baggage exceeding the weight limit is delivered to the cabin, if the baggage check-in agent fails to intervene, the ramp agent must refuse to accept the baggage at the gate, and ultimately the cabin crew must notice the baggage and have it loaded in the cargo hold. This example illustrates how critical it is for everyone to fulfill their role during the operation and to transfer information accurately to the next stage. This approach emphasizes not only compliance with written rules but also the importance of effective communication and coordination among crew members (Bükeç & Başdemir, 2021).

In this context, CRM training in aviation encompasses the transmission of fundamental concepts relating to human factors and the provision of the tools necessary for these concepts to be effectively applied in operational processes. By adopting a crew-oriented approach, CRM aims to develop the competencies of crews in collaboration, coordination, and joint decision-making, beyond the individual level. These trainings are not limited to the mere transfer of technical knowledge; they also aim to shape the expected attitudes and behaviors in flight crews, to strengthen organizational behaviors, and to create a safe operational environment and safety climate. Consequently, CRM training stands out as a critical tool in ensuring sustainable safety in aviation, one that optimizes the human factor, enhances crew performance in a safe manner, and aims to establish a safety culture and a set of organizational behaviors within organizations (Kanki et al., 2019; Önen, 2022).

Safety Culture and Organizational Behavior

Safety culture in civil aviation has become one of the most central concepts in modern aviation management, particularly since the sector's transition from entirely technical safety approaches to systemic and organizational perspectives. It has long been recognized that a shared institutional understanding of safety, in which all crew members hold common attitudes and behaviors regarding flight safety, is of great importance for achieving and maintaining flight safety (Turner et al., 1989; Kaynak, 2024). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines safety as "the state in which risks of injury to persons or damage to property are reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management," while defining safety culture as a set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety matters shared by every member of an organization at every level (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2018). This definition emphasizes that safety

culture is not merely a set of formal, written procedures, but rather a collective approach that shapes how safety is interpreted and implemented.

At its most fundamental level, the concept of safety culture is a set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety shared by every member of an organization at every level. In its broader sense, it refers to the degree to which every individual and every group in the organization is aware of the risks arising from their activities and of unknown hazards; is committed to acting continuously to preserve and enhance safety; is willing and able to adapt when confronted with safety problems; is willing to communicate on safety matters; and continuously evaluates safety-related attitudes and behaviors (Piers et al., 2009).

Since aviation operations frequently require decisions under time pressure, economic constraints, and complex coordination among multiple actors, under such conditions an organization's safety culture emerges as an element that ensures employees feel empowered to prioritize safety at all times when unexpected situations and incidents arise. In this respect, safety culture represents the shared values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that prioritize safety at all levels of an organization, shaping how risks are perceived, managed, and mitigated in daily operations. It reflects a genuine commitment to safety, it is not merely about compliance with regulations, rules, and procedures, but about embedding safety as an internal norm and internalizing it. These norms are transformed into a culture within the organization, shaping the way work is done, attitudes, and behaviors (SKYbrary, 2026b).

Because civil aviation is a socio-technical system involving advanced technology, intensive operations, and complex human-machine interaction, safety culture should also be examined through the lens of organizational behavior and the behavioral patterns, relationships, attitudes, and interactions of its members

(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2018; Stanton et al., 2019).

Indeed, safety culture ultimately emerges from and is sustained by patterns of behavior, communication, leadership, and decision-making that occur in the organizational environment and are characterized by the organization and the crew members who constitute it. From an organizational behavior perspective, safety culture can be understood as a particular manifestation of organizational culture that directly influences safety-related attitudes and behaviors. While organizational behavior examines how individuals and groups interact within organizations and how these interactions affect performance and outcomes, safety culture operates through similar mechanisms to shape norms, expectations, leadership practices, and communication patterns in aviation organizations.

Critical Organizational Behaviors for the Sustainability of Safety

Within a civil aviation organization, sustainable safety depends on a set of organizational behaviors associated with CRM and human-factors competencies. These include open communication, situational awareness, crew coordination and collaboration, safety-oriented decision-making, leadership, fatigue management, and fair error reporting (Kanki et al., 2019; Stanton et al., 2019). Each dimension is examined below.

Open Communication and Information Sharing

From an organizational behavior perspective, communication refers to the process by which individuals exchange information, meaning, and understanding within an organizational system (Mearns et al., 2001). Communication is indispensable for organizational success, as well as for organizational and managerial performance and efficiency, in any organizational context, including

aviation organizations. As in every human activity and every organization, communication serves an indispensable function for aviation safety in civil aviation organizations. Because it is generally through communication that other human factors among crew members (such as information gathering and sharing, planning, leadership, decision-making, and the identification and management of errors, situations, and problems) are carried out or rendered possible (Nevile, 2006). From this perspective, conducting aviation activities without open, clear, timely, and accurate communication is not possible. Indeed, many aviation accidents and crashes have originated from communication errors. A common theme across many such cases is human error arising from failures in interpersonal communication (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). In fact, factors related to interpersonal communication are a fundamental factor in a large proportion of all aviation accidents (Krifka et al., 2003). In this respect, open communication is necessary for the safety and efficiency of any flight. Crew members must communicate to transfer information, to relay instructions, to confirm commands, to conduct briefings, to make calls, to report unexpected situations, risks, and hazards, to maintain information sharing, and to ask questions. All of this is critically important, both on the ground and in the cockpit and cabin, for crew members to be able to share a common understanding or "mental model" regarding the nature of events related to the safety and efficiency of the flight (Helmreich, 2000; Krivonos, 2007).

Information sharing is the systematic dissemination and sharing of operational, technical, and safety-related information among individuals, crews, and organizational units. In aviation, this may include the sharing of weather information, aircraft performance data, maintenance records, operational risks, and lessons learned from incidents or near-miss situations. Within effective communication, information sharing enables relevant

information to reach the right people at the right time, thereby facilitating informed decision-making and coordinated action (Adjekum & Tous, 2020).

Communication-related accidents in aviation occur due to problems in the cockpit, communication problems between pilots and controllers, misunderstandings, misinformation about flight rules, incorrect instructions, or failure to provide necessary information (Akça, 2020; Kaya & Ateş, 2023). For this reason, communication in aviation organizations must be structured, timely, open, clear, precise, and reliable due to the critical nature of operations. A communication environment that allows crew members to report hazards, question decisions when necessary, and contribute to safety-related discussions becomes especially important in dynamic flight operations, high-risk scenarios, emergencies, and unexpected incidents. In such an environment, crew members can freely express their information, concerns, and views without fear of negative consequences (Mearns et al., 2001).

Open communication among crew members is of critical importance in aviation, particularly in situations that are urgent and could jeopardize safety. Safety-related matters must of course be shared openly -within a framework of respect and aviation language- because an undisclosed risk could endanger safety. In this regard, situations may arise in which crew members need to be assertive and persistent. Assertiveness here can be understood as the ability to express what one knows and observes in appropriate language, and to stand firmly by those observations (Şekerli, 2006). Crew members must share their observations to maintain situational awareness, question assumptions, and provide continuous feedback. This is particularly one of the most important elements of communication in the cabin and cockpit, that is, during flight. In the context of the interaction between the captain and the first officer, the first officer must, when appropriate, be able to take a firm stand against the

captain on a matter they believe to be correct, regardless of the hierarchical situation. Quite often, a failure to communicate, a hesitation or silence arising from power distance, that is, from deference to a hierarchical superior, is incompatible with the principle of safety priority. In cultures with high power distance, subordinates may be reluctant to challenge authority figures, and this can result in the withholding of critical safety information (Helmreich and Merritt, 2017). Of course, in an aircraft the captain is an unquestionable authority; however, when safety is at stake, in aviation there is safety above hierarchy. Consequently, for safe flight operations, the degree of authority among crew members must be neither too rigid nor too lenient, it must always promote communication and information sharing (Aktaş & Tekarslan, 2013; Kaya & Ateş, 2023).

In aviation organizations, specific attitudes and behaviors are actively promoted to support open communication and information sharing. Organizations that implement CRM principles can generally be said to encourage open communication and assertive conduct at all times regarding safety-related matters, within a framework of hierarchical boundaries and respect. For example, co-pilots and cabin crew members are encouraged to question decisions when they perceive potential risks. Such practices aim to prevent authority hierarchies from suppressing critical information (Metscher and Smith, 2009).

Crew Coordination and Collaboration

Crew coordination and collaboration represent the practical application of the communication principles examined in the preceding section. While open communication establishes an environment for the exchange of information and information sharing constitutes its essence, coordination represents the structured

interaction through which crew members integrate their individual contributions into seamless team performance (Ellis, 2014).

Crew coordination refers to the structural and procedural synchronization of actions among crew members to achieve a specific objective such as the safe completion of flight operations. It is fundamentally concerned with the management of time, tasks, and information. Collaboration, on the other hand, is the motivational and attitudinal component of teamwork: it is the willingness of individuals to work together, share workload, and support one another beyond the requirements of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). In aviation organizations, these two elements are addressed jointly under the CRM framework, a framework designed to optimize interpersonal dynamics (Helmreich et al., 1999).

Collaboration refers to the willingness and ability to work effectively with others in pursuit of shared objectives. It encompasses the interpersonal attitudes and behaviors that make collaborative work possible. These may include building a positive team climate, taking other crew members into consideration, providing support in challenging situations, and resolving conflicts constructively. Collaboration is fundamentally about the relational quality of team interaction, how respectfully crew members treat one another, how they support each other when needed, and how they focus on what is right rather than on who is right. Coordination, in turn, refers to the structured integration of individual activities into a coherent team performance. It involves the clear organization of tasks, the clear assignment of responsibilities, the timing of interdependent actions, and cross-monitoring to ensure that each person’s activities are aligned with those of others. In routine operations, coordination and collaboration fulfill a fundamental function (namely, the formation and maintenance of shared mental models) and are thus recognized as key elements that ensure operational success (Civil Air Patrol, 2026).

Coordination and collaboration are required at every phase of flight; however, they are particularly regarded as behavioral properties of critical importance under conditions of high workload or abnormal situations (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2018). In other words, the importance of being a team becomes especially pronounced in and constitutes a safety-critical mechanism within operational contexts and situations characterized by complexity, time pressure, and uncertainty (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).

Since aviation operations may inherently involve uncertainties and unforeseen situations despite all planning, procedures, and precautions, effective collaboration and coordination among crew members in the face of unexpected events are critically important for ensuring operational continuity, establishing safety, and successfully completing missions. When an emergency occurs during flight, cockpit and cabin crews -despite their differing tasks, roles, and responsibilities- must make rapid and accurate decisions and take correct actions in a dynamic and highly stressful environment. This process requires the simultaneous analysis, assessment, and resolution of multiple pieces of information and problems, as well as the interdependent action of crew members (Bienefeld & Grote, 2014). In the event of an unexpected situation, crews with high coordination and collaboration skills can rapidly identify problems, assess appropriate solution options, and make decisions that ensure the safe continuation of the operational process. These behavioral competencies are directly related not only to individual performance but also to the capacity to work together as a crew. Consequently, for sustainable safety in aviation, it is a critical requirement that crews be competent in non-technical skills such as communication, coordination, task distribution, and collaboration (Ko et al., 2021; Kaynak, 2024).

Situational Awareness

Maintaining a high level of situational awareness is one of the most critical and challenging aspects of a flight crew's work in aviation (Endsley, 1999). Situational awareness encompasses an individual's capacity to accurately recognize what is happening in their environment, to process this information, and to make sense of it. This competency involves not only perceiving the current state of environmental factors but also evaluating the significance of these factors and projecting possible future developments. In other words, situational awareness is a cognitive process that enables the individual both to accurately perceive immediate environmental conditions and to use this information for making operational decisions and anticipating future scenarios (Akyürek, 2024). In the aviation context, this competency is of critical importance for pilots and flight crews to carry out their duties safely and effectively in complex and dynamic environments.

Given the complexity and the numerous factors that must be taken into account for effective decision-making, situational awareness is not a simple task. It involves perceiving environmental elements, comprehending their meaning, and projecting the near-future states of the situation. In this respect, possessing a high level of situational awareness may be regarded as perhaps the most critical aspect of achieving successful performance in aviation. Situational awareness is not limited to the simple perception of data; it depends on a deeper comprehension of the significance of this data. This comprehension is grounded in an understanding of how the components of the environment interact and function, and subsequently on the ability to project the future states of the system. For this reason, situational awareness involves perceiving the critical factors in the environment (Level 1), understanding what these factors mean when combined in relation to the objectives of the flight crew in particular (Level 2), and at the highest level, understanding

what will happen in the system in the near future (Level 3) (Endsley, 1999):

- **Level 1 (Perception of Environmental Elements):** The first step in situational awareness is the accurate perception of the status, characteristics, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment. For a pilot, perceiving critical elements (such as other aircraft, terrain features, system status, and warning lights) and their relevant characteristics is of great importance. In the cockpit, tracking all relevant system and flight data, other aircraft, and navigation information can be quite intensive and mentally taxing.
- **Level 2 (Comprehension of the Current Situation):** The second level of situational awareness requires constructing a coherent picture from the disparate information perceived at Level 1. At this level, it is not sufficient merely to be aware of the current elements; it is also necessary to understand the significance of these elements in relation to the individual's objectives. The flight crew integrates Level 1 data to form a holistic picture of the environment and grasps the significance of objects and events. For example, when warning lights appearing during takeoff indicate a problem, the pilot must rapidly assess how serious this problem is for the aircraft's immediate airworthiness and must decide whether to abort the takeoff, taking into account the remaining runway distance. An experienced pilot may possess similar perceptual information as a novice pilot who could achieve the same Level 1 awareness; however, there may be a significant difference in terms of the capacity to comprehend the situation by integrating various data elements with objectives.

- **Level 3 (Projection of Future States):** The third and highest level of situational awareness involves the ability to project the future movements of environmental elements, at least in the short term. This is achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of elements as well as through comprehension of the current situation (Levels 1 and 2). This projection provides pilots with both information and time for determining the most appropriate course of action to achieve their objectives.

This three-stage structure of situational awareness can be better understood through three fundamental characteristics. First, situational awareness encompasses cognitive processes and working memory, a short-term information store that is quickly forgotten if not rehearsed, rather than direct action or response. That is, good situational awareness can support correct action choices; however, such action is not a direct product of situational awareness. Second, situational awareness concerns dynamic and continuously changing situations; it is therefore distinct from the more static information stored in long-term memory, such as knowledge about how systems work, procedures to be followed, or mental models. Third, the content or product of situational awareness is a concept separate from the process of maintaining such awareness (Adams et al., 1995). A pilot with good situational awareness will be able to rapidly utilize a mental representation of changing environmental conditions. This representation is broader and more durable than what working memory with its limited capacity can retain. For example, a pilot may not always be consciously thinking about the presence of another aircraft alongside them; however, when required to respond appropriately in a sudden situation, they can rapidly and accurately retrieve the information from memory and adapt to the situation (Kintsch & Ericsson, 1995). For this reason, a good level of situational awareness supports the safety and sustainability of

flight operations by enhancing the effectiveness of responses given in unexpected and unforeseen situations in particular (Wickens, 1999; Wickens, 2002).

Situational awareness is not a naturally emerging faculty; on the contrary, it is a skill that requires systematic practice and continuous development. For this competency to be effectively acquired and maintained, the flight crew must manage workload effectively, sustain intra-crew communication, anticipate possible future situations, take precautionary measures by assessing potential risks, and verify the information they have acquired by seeking clarification when necessary. This process enhances both the individual and collective performance of the pilot and cabin crew, thereby strengthening operational safety and safety culture (Aviation Security Service, 2026).

Fatigue Management

Fatigue is one of the most serious and at the same time most prevalent factors threatening human performance in civil aviation. In the international literature, fatigue is defined as a condition arising from the accumulation of one or more of sleep deprivation, circadian rhythm disruption, or prolonged wakefulness, and adversely affecting cognitive and physical performance (Caldwell & Caldwell, 2003).

In the aviation context, fatigue is defined as a state of cumulative exhaustion that significantly impairs an individual's mental and physical capacity, clouds thinking processes, prolongs reaction times, and can transform routine tasks into potential hazards (Constantin, 2025). Unlike the simple tiredness that arises in everyday life, this form of fatigue has far more serious operational consequences (Constantin, 2025). From a cognitive standpoint, fatigue and sleep deprivation pose significant risks both for the safety of aviation operations and for the individual health of cabin

crew. For this reason, sleep and fatigue are of importance as fundamental elements that contribute to the quality of life and psychological well-being of crew members (Chung & Chung, 2009; Wen et al., 2021). In this sense, fatigue must be addressed as a behavioral risk factor.

The effects of fatigue on cognitive performance are highly varied and insidious in nature. Among these effects are attentional impairment, prolonged reaction time, degraded decision-making quality, weakened risk perception, and impaired self-assessment capacity. In particular, the inability of individuals to recognize their own level of fatigue can have devastating consequences from a safety perspective (Rosekind et al., 1994).

Beyond its individual effects, fatigue also affects other crew members in the organization and overall organizational performance. The behavioral effects of fatigue within the crew carry the potential to degrade communication quality, reduce empathy and mutual understanding, and cause delays or errors in decision-making processes (Çapan Özeren, 2024). Consequently, rather than viewing fatigue solely as an individual health matter, it must be evaluated as part of crew behavior and collective performance.

Regulatory civil aviation authorities define fatigue within the Safety Management System (SMS) framework as a systemic and mandatory-to-manage hazard, emphasizing its importance at both the institutional and regulatory levels. Within this scope, the principles that airlines are obligated to comply with have been clearly established. Within the framework of Flight Time Limitations (FTL), a regulatory approach aimed at preventing fatigue through the restriction of flight and duty times has been adopted; these limitations define the maximum permissible operating hours for crew members and guarantee the provision of the requisite minimum rest periods before each duty period. FRMS, advocated by ICAO, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA), and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) provides a systematic framework for monitoring, mitigating, and implementing preventive measures against fatigue. FRMS integrates the scientific principles of sleep and circadian biology into operational planning to ensure that duty times are structured in a manner that supports adequate rest and sleep opportunities. These systems can be implemented independently or as a component of the airline's SMS. At the individual level, training is provided on sleep hygiene, strategic napping, and circadian adaptation strategies to enable crew members to effectively manage their fatigue. Such training enables crew members to minimize fatigue risks by taking into account both their own biological rhythms and operational constraints (SKYbrary, 2026a).

At this point, crew members bear responsibilities from an organizational behavior perspective. First and foremost, they must plan in accordance with their sleep hygiene and biological rhythms. Crew members should plan their pre- and post-flight activities with due regard for workload and rest needs, and should organize their nutrition, hydration, and physical activity to maintain balanced personal energy levels. Regular and adequate sleep and rest support circadian rhythms while minimizing the cognitive effects of fatigue (Wickens, 1999). In this context, behavioral interventions such as pre-flight sleep scheduling, strategic short naps, and optimization of the sleep environment are of importance. Individual awareness is also a critical measure. Crew members must recognize the signs of fatigue early and develop appropriate behavioral responses. For example, when fatigue is detected, steps such as reorganizing task priorities, sharing critical decisions with colleagues, or requesting support from the crew can be taken. A fatigued crew member must share the risks they observe during the flight openly and clearly with the crew, and must make active use of feedback mechanisms

(Caldwell et al., 2012; Gaydos et al., 2013; Orasanu, 2017; Banks et al., 2019).

At the organizational level, fatigue and stress management are implemented through working hour regulations, shift design, workload balancing, and psychological support programs. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms is largely dependent on the existing safety culture within the organization. Organizational cultures in which employees can report their fatigue, where withdrawal from duty is regarded not as an abuse but as a responsible behavior, and in which managers respond to such reports in a supportive manner, significantly reduce fatigue risk (Gander et al., 2011).

Leadership

In aviation, leadership is not merely a position or a set of personal characteristics; it is a critical nexus at the intersection of organizational behavior, safety management, and operational effectiveness. However, leadership in aviation organizations differs markedly from general leadership models, because unlike many other sectors, aviation operates in a highly regulated, technologically complex, and safety-critical environment where human decisions can have immediate and far-reaching consequences. The sector's distinctive nature, characterized by high risk, uncertainty, and time pressure, makes it imperative for leaders to demonstrate not only managerial skills but also rapid operational decision-making, risk perception, coordination, and safety-oriented behavior (Williamson et al., 1997). The most fundamental expectation of aviation leaders is that they continuously keep safety at the forefront of every decision and every strategy. The aviation human factors and organizational behavior literature emphasizes that effective leadership is necessary for preserving safety, coordinating crews,

and developing a culture of accountability and communication in aviation organizations (Kanki et al., 2019).

In aviation, where operations are technically complex, human interactions are critical, and strategic foresight is essential, leaders must demonstrate competency in all three domains (Katz, 2009). Technical skill refers to knowledge and proficiency regarding the organization's specific activities, for example, understanding aircraft performance, regulatory requirements, and operational procedures. Without technical competence, leaders will be unable to earn the respect of those they manage or make informed decisions regarding the risks their organization faces. Human skill encompasses the ability to work effectively with people, to understand and motivate individuals and groups, and to build the relationships through which work is accomplished. Since professionals in aviation organizations must coordinate across functional, hierarchical, and cultural boundaries, human skill is essential for creating the conditions in which safety culture can develop. A leader who possesses technical acumen but lacks human skill will struggle to earn the trust and commitment that safety demands. Conceptual skill encompasses the ability to think strategically, to understand how the various parts of the organization fit together, and to foresee how decisions in one area will affect outcomes in another. For leaders, conceptual skill enables them to align operational decisions with institutional strategy, to anticipate emerging threats and opportunities, and to position their organizations for long-term success in a rapidly changing environment (Katz, 2009; Jaqua & Jaqua, 2021; Nuur & Ariyanto, 2024; Wijaya & Puterisari, 2025).

Leaders are responsible for creating an appropriate safety climate in aviation organizations (Patankar & Sabin, 2010). Skills such as responding to sudden changes that may occur in the field and effectively directing communication and collaboration between

crews require a set of behaviors that differs from classical leadership skills. In this context, aviation leaders are expected to be not merely visionaries who set direction and guide crews, but professionals who can simultaneously and effectively employ both technical and behavioral skills, who sustain safety culture, and who can rapidly adapt to changing conditions (Bastola, 2020). For this reason, leadership in aviation can be regarded not merely as an operational necessity but as a fundamental pillar of organizational behavior and sustainable safety.

From an operational perspective, leadership is typically associated with the aircraft captain, who holds legal and operational authority over the flight. International aviation regulations explicitly recognize the captain's responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight, granting ultimate authority over operational decisions (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2018). The pilot holds legal authority and ultimate responsibility with respect to the flight. In this respect, in the cockpit environment, the captain traditionally serves as the formal leader of the flight crew. The captain's role encompasses decision-making, task prioritization, coordination with air traffic control, and oversight of the overall operation of the aircraft. Nevertheless, leadership is not confined solely to the cockpit or to the role of the aircraft captain. Although the captain holds ultimate authority for the safe and secure conduct of the flight, leadership in the aviation system is distributed across various operational roles, including cabin crew leadership. While the captain retains overall command of the aircraft, the senior cabin crew member (purser) exercises operational leadership in the passenger cabin. Typically referred to as the cabin supervisor, senior cabin crew member, purser, or cabin services director depending on the airline and the scale of the flight operation, the purser holds a formal leadership position within the cabin crew. Pursers are responsible for supervising cabin operations, coordinating emergency procedures,

and serving as the primary communication link between the cabin and the cockpit. They are also accountable to the captain for cabin safety. These roles, both in routine and emergency situations, require the ability to manage a crew, distribute responsibilities, monitor performance, and maintain effective communication (SKYbrary, 2026c).

There are many differences and commonalities between leadership styles and safety culture, particularly the safety climate. For example, Kelly et al. (2012) found a positive relationship between transformational leadership and safety climate. Another researcher, DuBrin (2010), noted that transformational leadership is considered one of the best leadership styles for achieving higher organizational performance. Similarly, Bass (1985) agrees that leaders who perform better have a transformational leadership style. A transformational leader always helps subordinates to achieve their organizational goals and obtain better results (Bastola, 2020).

According to the CRM perspective, the leader is the person who possesses the situational awareness or technical expertise required to influence the direction of the group at a given moment (Salas et al., 2005). This perspective allows for "shared leadership," in which authority may remain with the captain but the leadership function can shift depending on the task at hand. In high-risk moments, such sharing of leadership is necessary to prevent the breakdown of crew structure. The demand for leadership is particularly acute during abnormal and emergency procedures. In this sense, leadership emerges whenever an individual, regardless of their position in the hierarchy, influences the behavior, cognition, or motivation of others in pursuit of a shared objective. In this respect, leadership in aviation is a distributed and shared function. For example, a co-pilot who reports a safety-related abnormality and directs the crew's attention to a developing hazard is exercising leadership. A cabin crew member who calmly manages passenger

panic during turbulence is exercising leadership. Consequently, in scenarios involving the assumption of responsibility and initiative, leadership is a matter of shaping the situation and influencing others in relation to the behaviors of crew members, and this is the behavioral essence of leadership (Pearce & Conger, 2002; Salas et al., 2004; Carson et al., 2007; Flin & O'Connor, 2017).

Error Reporting and Just Culture

One of the fundamental factors underlying the improvements made in aviation safety is the capacity of organizations to learn from errors and incidents. The exercise of this capacity depends, first and foremost, on the systematic reporting of errors and incidents. However, reporting behavior is not merely a procedural requirement; it is also a product of deep organizational and cultural processes. Reason (1997), in his multi-layered error framework known as the Swiss Cheese Model, demonstrated that organizations can only identify their latent failures through open and encouraging reporting systems, and that without such systems, incidents penetrate successive defense layers and develop into major accidents.

Error reporting refers to the formal and informal processes by which aviation personnel disclose operational errors, incidents, hazards, or near-miss situations encountered during operations. In civil aviation systems, such reports may come from pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance engineers, cabin crew, dispatchers, or other operational personnel. Such reporting systems constitute a fundamental component of modern aviation safety management because they provide organizations with the data necessary for identifying systemic risks before they escalate into accidents (McCall & Pruchnicki, 2017).

The ICAO Safety Management System framework recommends the concurrent use of voluntary, mandatory, and confidential reporting mechanisms (International Civil Aviation

Organization, 2018). While mandatory reporting systems cover certain categories of incidents, the real challenge lies in systems where employees can voluntarily report minor procedural deviations and safety concerns.

From a behavioral standpoint, the effectiveness of an error reporting system depends primarily on employees' willingness to participate. In environments where an organizational culture encouraging reporting is insufficient, employees avoid error reporting for various reasons. Among these are fear of punishment, concern about reputational damage, skepticism about the utility of reporting, and the perception that inappropriate behaviors are tolerated within the organization (Reason, 1997).

Morrison and Milliken (2000) developed the concept of organizational silence to describe the phenomenon of employees withholding their views, concerns, and knowledge about potential problems from those positioned to act on such issues. Their analysis identified two primary drivers: fear of negative personal consequences and the belief that speaking up is futile, that is, that nothing will change. In aviation organizations, both drivers are well documented. Surveys of pilots, controllers, and maintenance engineers have revealed that individuals have witnessed or experienced safety-significant events that they chose not to report due to fear of disciplinary action, damage to professional reputation, or simple skepticism about whether the reporting system would produce a meaningful outcome (Helmreich, 2000).

To overcome this cultural barrier, the concept of "just culture" has assumed a central position in aviation safety literature. Reason (1997) defines just culture as an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, and even rewarded, for providing essential safety-related information, while also being clear about the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. It refers to a mode of conduct that encourages a questioning attitude, resists

complacency, and supports both personal accountability and institutional self-monitoring in safety matters (GAIN Working Group, 2004). In an organizational context, it can be treated as an organizational approach that distinguishes between intentional violations and honest errors and foregrounds a systemic understanding of the causes of errors rather than the punishment of the individual who committed them (Dekker, 2016). When individuals trust that their reports will be met with a positive response rather than reproach, meaning that a genuine effort will be made to understand the system conditions that made their actions seem reasonable at the time, their motivation to report will change accordingly.

Within the CRM context, which establishes a framework in which human limitations are acknowledged and systematically addressed rather than ignored or punished, responses to errors can powerfully shape whether CRM competencies can be practiced and developed in real situations. Crew members in an organization with a just culture are aware that they can safely report matters relating to their own actions or those of the people around them. In this way, it is possible to feel safe and emotionally at ease even in an intensive and high-risk work environment. Consequently, when crew members are concerned that expected safety levels are under threat, they can openly and without hesitation ask for help. It is important not to hesitate to observe not only oneself but also other colleagues, and to identify excessive workload. In such an organization, every crew member will feel responsible for ensuring safety, with the awareness that they are accountable for their actions (Frankel et al., 2006). The establishment of this trust environment contributes to employees developing a conviction that they will be treated fairly, which in turn encourages them to share knowledge and experience (Dutton et al., 2002). From an organizational behavior perspective, such an environment also reflects psychological safety, in which

employees feel able to express concerns, report mistakes, and question operational decisions without fear of interpersonal or organizational repercussions (Edmondson, 1999). Psychological safety strengthens reporting behavior and supports organizational learning by enabling safety-related information to be transformed into corrective actions, procedural improvements, and continuous learning across the organization. In structures where just culture prevails, crew members openly acknowledge and analyze errors and weaknesses; as a result, learning processes are strengthened and safety performance is improved (Frankel et al., 2006). In increasingly digital aviation organizations, this reporting environment enables the uncovering of latent conditions in the organization and the addressing of unreported incidents, contributing to the identification of potential safety issues (Önen, 2017).

On the other hand, when crew members in the organization receive no feedback on incidents they have reported, observe that proposed corrective actions are not implemented, or feel that their reports have had no effect, they can quickly abandon reporting behavior. For this reason, just culture must be approached not as a one-time organizational reform but as a continuous organizational practice encompassing regular feedback loops, decision transparency, and the dissemination of lessons learned (Syed, 2015).

Importantly, these organizational behavior dimensions should not be viewed as isolated competencies but as mutually reinforcing elements of an integrated safety system. Improvements in communication, coordination, decision-making, leadership, fatigue management, and just culture collectively contribute to measurable safety outcomes, including higher reporting rates, stronger safety culture, fewer operational errors and incidents, enhanced organizational learning, and ultimately improved organizational safety performance.

Conclusion

The sustainability of safety in aviation organizations becomes possible not only through fulfilling specific procedural requirements but also through the internalization of systematic behavioral practices and their integration into everyday workflow. When these practices are examined individually, they may appear as managerial tools; when evaluated collectively, however, it becomes apparent that they constitute an integrated behavioral architecture that shapes organizational culture and safety climate.

The literature addressed in this chapter demonstrates that the sustainability of safety in aviation is largely dependent on behavioral patterns and crew interactions within the organization. The human factors approach and the CRM framework emphasize that non-technical skills (such as communication, decision-making, situational awareness, crew coordination, and stress management) alongside technical skills, are also determinative of flight safety (Kanki et al., 2019; Stanton et al., 2019). This perspective essentially demonstrates that aviation safety is shaped not solely by technical considerations or individual performance but also by collective team performance and organizational culture.

The organizational behavior dimensions examined in this chapter reveal how aviation safety is produced and sustained within daily operations. First and foremost, open communication and information sharing are among the fundamental conditions for the safe conduct of flight operations. When uninterrupted information flow between the cockpit, cabin, and ground operations is not ensured, minor errors can rapidly escalate into cascading risks (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993; Nevile, 2006). For this reason, communication environments in which crew members can openly express potential risks and contribute to decision-making processes are among the critical determinants of safety performance. Similarly, crew coordination and collaboration are the fundamental behavioral

mechanisms through which individual contributions are converted into effective team performance. Particularly under operational conditions involving high workload, time pressure, and uncertainty, coordination among crew members enables early detection of errors and the execution of appropriate interventions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Bienefeld & Grote, 2013). In this context, the capacity to function as a crew in aviation requires not only task sharing but also a culture of collaboration grounded in mutual trust. Situational awareness, in turn, is one of the fundamental cognitive processes enabling flight crews to accurately perceive the dynamic operational environment, to make sense of this information, and to project future developments. Endsley's (1999) three-stage model, which demonstrates that situational awareness consists of processes of perception, comprehension, and projection, explains why this skill is critical for aviation performance. A high level of situational awareness enables crews not only to understand the current situation but also to proactively recognize potential risks and take preventive action. Fatigue is also among the significant behavioral factors affecting human performance in aviation. Long duty periods, irregular working hours, and circadian rhythm disruptions can directly affect crew performance (Caldwell & Caldwell, 2003). For this reason, modern aviation systems treat fatigue not merely as an individual problem but as a safety risk requiring management at the system level, developing approaches such as FRMS (Gander et al., 2011). However, the effectiveness of these systems is largely dependent on employees' awareness and the supportive safety culture within the organization.

Leadership, meanwhile, emerges as a central factor providing organizational-level direction for these behavioral elements. In the aviation environment, leadership refers not only to hierarchical authority but also to the capacity to guide crew members in accordance with safety priorities and to establish a shared

operational understanding (Kanki et al., 2019). Aircraft captains, chief pursers, and other operational leaders play a determining role in shaping how safety culture is lived in practice, through crew coordination, communication, and risk management processes. Finally, error reporting systems and the just culture approach are among the fundamental elements that determine the capacity of organizations to learn from errors. An environment in which errors and incidents can be openly reported enables the early identification of latent risks and the implementation of systemic improvements (Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2016). Conversely, punitive or closed organizational cultures can lead employees to avoid reporting behavior, causing safety risks to remain invisible. In overall assessment, sustainable safety in aviation is closely related not only to the reliability of technical systems but also to the behavioral patterns, communication styles, and leadership practices developed within the organization. The promotion and support of these behaviors at the organizational level in a civil aviation organization contributes to the formation of a strong safety culture within the organization. It must not be forgotten that in aviation, safety can attain a permanent and sustainable character not merely through compliance with procedures and rules, but through the organizational behavioral patterns that internalize, share, and continuously develop those rules.

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CHAPTER 4

Organizational Gossip from a Demographic Perspective: An Empirical Analysis

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INTRODUCTION

Organizations should not be viewed merely as formal structures defined by rules, job descriptions, and hierarchical relationships of authority. Organizational life also encompasses a range of informal processes, including spontaneous social relationships among employees, informal communication networks, and everyday interpersonal interactions (Davis, 1978; Gökkaya et al., 2018). Accordingly, organizational communication should not be understood solely in terms of the formal transmission of information through established communication channels. The exchange of information that occurs through employees' informal relationships and social interactions also constitutes an important dimension of organizational communication. Within this context,

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organizational gossip emerges as a common form of informal communication through which employees exchange information and engage in social interaction in workplace settings (Michelson & Mouly, 2002; Noon & Delbridge, 1993; Kurland & Pelled, 2000).

Organizational gossip can broadly be defined as the informal exchange of information, opinions, or evaluations concerning individuals who are not present. Although gossip is often viewed as an undesirable form of workplace communication, its consequences are not necessarily negative (Waddington, 2012; Noon & Delbridge, 1993). Depending on its content, context, and manner of circulation, gossip may serve certain social and informational functions within organizations by facilitating the exchange of information, reducing uncertainty, and strengthening interpersonal ties among employees. Conversely, when gossip is predominantly negative in content or becomes widespread within the workplace, it may undermine interpersonal trust, foster conflict and social exclusion, and negatively affect the organizational climate (Michelson et al., 2010).

The emergence and circulation of organizational gossip may be shaped by a range of organizational factors, including communication practices, managerial approaches, organizational culture, the climate of trust, and the quality of interpersonal relationships. Gossip is more likely to emerge and circulate in organizational environments characterized by high levels of uncertainty, ineffective communication channels, and limited opportunities for employees to express their views openly. From this perspective, organizational gossip should not be considered solely as an individual-level behavior; rather, it may also reflect broader communicative, relational, and cultural dynamics within

the organizational environment (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Tebbutt & Marchington, 1997; Kurland & Pelled, 2000).

Within the management literature, organizational gossip has traditionally been viewed primarily as a dysfunctional form of workplace behavior. However, Kurland and Pelled (2000) and Michelson and Mouly (2002) draw attention to its potential informational and social functions, conceptualizing gossip as an informal mechanism for sharing information, particularly when formal communication channels are inadequate or insufficient. From this perspective, efforts by management to suppress gossip entirely may not necessarily eliminate informal communication networks; rather, they may drive such networks underground, making them less visible and more difficult to observe (Kurland & Pelled, 2000; Michelson & Mouly, 2002). Accordingly, organizational gossip should not be understood as inherently beneficial or detrimental. Its functions and consequences may vary depending on the organizational context in which it occurs, the content being communicated, and the purposes it serves.

Previous empirical research also suggests that organizational gossip is associated with a range of employee- and organization-level outcomes. Maruf and Bayram (2026) investigated the relationship between perceived organizational gossip and revenge intentions among healthcare workers, with particular attention to the mediating role of forgiveness. Their findings indicated that both perceived work-related and non-work-related gossip were positively and significantly associated with revenge intentions, with non-work-related gossip exhibiting a comparatively stronger association. Furthermore, the forgiveness of others dimension was negatively associated with revenge intentions and was found to mediate the relationship between perceived organizational gossip and revenge intentions. These findings suggest that the implications

of organizational gossip may extend beyond interpersonal communication and may be related to employees' behavioral intentions and responses in the workplace.

In another study, Yıldız and Tamer (2025) examined the relationship between gossip and organizational trust. Their findings revealed negative and statistically significant associations between the individual and organizational instrumentality dimensions of gossip and all dimensions of organizational trust. In contrast, the individual benefits dimension of gossip was positively and significantly associated with trust in colleagues and trust in the organization. These findings indicate that the relationship between organizational gossip and trust is not uniform but varies according to the particular dimension of gossip under consideration.

Similarly, Hafen (2004), drawing on a qualitative study of four organizations, conceptualized organizational gossip as a "revolving door" between regulation and resistance. The findings suggested that the boundary between gossip and information is not fixed but is continually negotiated according to the hierarchical position of the communicator and the purpose for which gossip is employed. When initiated by management, gossip may acquire organizational legitimacy and serve functions related to control and regulation; when initiated by employees, it may instead function as a form of resistance to organizational authority. From this perspective, gossip can be understood as a multifunctional communicative practice whose meaning and function are shaped by the organizational position of the actor, the purpose of the communication, and the context in which it occurs.

Akduru and Semercioöz (2017) examined the relationship between organizational gossip and workplace loneliness and found that employees' gossip tendencies were associated with both social and emotional loneliness. The authors further suggested that such forms

of loneliness may have implications for job satisfaction and productivity, potentially undermining organizational effectiveness. In this context, they emphasized the importance of establishing clear communication channels, fostering organizational norms based on mutual respect, and implementing practices that promote employees' social integration. More recently, Mut and Kurnaz (2026) examined the relationship between organizational gossip and organizational alienation and reported a positive and statistically significant association between the two constructs. Both work-related and non-work-related gossip were significantly associated with organizational alienation, with the latter showing a comparatively stronger association. The authors therefore argue that gossip should be considered not only as a form of informal communication but also as a phenomenon that may be associated with weakened psychological attachment to the organization. Taken together, these findings reinforce the view that organizational gossip is a multidimensional and context-dependent phenomenon whose implications may vary according to its content, form, and organizational context, rather than being uniformly dysfunctional.

Although previous research has primarily examined the functions and organizational consequences of gossip, employees may differ in how they perceive and interpret informal communication in the workplace. Individual characteristics, including gender, age, marital status, and work experience, may contribute to differences in employees' social experiences and perceptions of communication within organizations. Indeed, gender has increasingly been examined as a factor associated with organizational processes and outcomes at different levels, ranging from employees' workplace perceptions to board composition and sustainability performance (Önal, 2026). Examining organizational gossip from a demographic perspective may therefore extend the existing literature by revealing whether perceptions of different

forms of gossip vary systematically across employee groups. Such an approach does not assume that demographic characteristics directly cause or determine gossip; rather, it seeks to identify whether meaningful differences exist in employees' perceptions of work-related and non-work-related gossip across demographic groups.

Despite the growing body of research on organizational gossip, previous studies have primarily focused on its functions, consequences, and associations with broader organizational outcomes. Comparatively limited attention has been devoted to whether employees' perceptions of different forms of organizational gossip vary systematically across demographic groups. In particular, distinguishing between work-related and non-work-related gossip may provide a more nuanced understanding of whether demographic characteristics are associated with differences in perceptions of specific forms of informal communication. Against this background, the present study examines whether employees' perceptions of work-related and non-work-related organizational gossip differ according to gender, age, marital status, and work experience among employees in the education sector in Mardin Province. Rather than assuming that organizational gossip is perceived uniformly across employees, the study focuses on demographic variation to provide empirical evidence regarding the heterogeneity of perceptions of organizational gossip.

1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The main objective of this study is to examine whether perceptions of work-related and non-work-related organizational gossip differ significantly according to gender, age, marital status, and work experience among employees in public educational institutions in Mardin Province.

The study population consisted of employees working in public educational institutions in Mardin Province, and the sample was selected using convenience sampling. A questionnaire was used as the data collection instrument. The questionnaire is a standard instrument used in social science research to systematically measure individuals' opinions, attitudes, and perceptions regarding a particular subject (Karasar, 2012; Kurnaz et al., 2024; Ergin et al., 2024). Questionnaires were administered face-to-face to employees who were accessible during the data collection period and voluntarily agreed to participate. A total of 250 questionnaires were distributed, of which 218 were returned. After excluding 14 questionnaires due to missing or unusable responses, 204 questionnaires were included in the final analysis. The sample size was determined with reference to the commonly used participant-to-item ratio of 10:1 for questionnaire and scale-based research (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). As the Organizational Gossip Scale consists of 20 items, this ratio indicated a minimum sample size of 200 participants. Thus, the final sample met the recommended minimum sample size.

Data were collected using a two-part questionnaire. The first part included items assessing participants' sociodemographic characteristics, including gender, age, marital status, and work experience. The second part consisted of a standardized scale measuring participants' perceptions of organizational gossip. Perceptions of organizational gossip were measured using the Organizational Gossip Scale developed by Kuo et al. (2015). The scale consists of 20 items across two dimensions: work-related gossip and non-work-related gossip. Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with total scores ranging from 20 to 100. Higher scores on each dimension indicate higher levels of perceived work-related or non-work-related gossip, respectively.

Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS. First, Cronbach's alpha coefficients were calculated to assess the internal consistency of the scale. Subsequently, frequency and percentage distributions were calculated to describe the participants' demographic characteristics. Finally, independent-samples t-tests and one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to examine whether perceptions of organizational gossip differed significantly across demographic groups. The statistical significance level was set at $p < .05$.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the hypotheses developed within the scope of the study are as follows:

H_1: Work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by gender.

H_2: Non-work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by gender.

H_3: Work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by marital status.

H_4: Non-work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by marital status.

H_5: Work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by age group.

H_6: Non-work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by age group.

H_7: Work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by work experience.

H_8: Non-work-related gossip perceptions differ significantly by work experience.

2. FINDINGS

This section presents the findings of the analyses conducted to address the study's research questions. First, the reliability of the Organizational Gossip Scale is assessed, followed by a description of the participants' demographic characteristics. The section then reports the results of the independent-samples t-tests and one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) examining whether perceptions of organizational gossip differed significantly across demographic groups.

Table 1. Reliability Analysis of the Organizational Gossip Scale

Scale	Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
Organizational Gossip Scale	0.932	20

As shown in Table 1, the reliability analysis of the Organizational Gossip Scale yielded a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .932 for the 20-item scale. This value exceeds the commonly accepted threshold of .70 for acceptable internal consistency in social science research (İslamoğlu & Alnıaçık, 2019; Polat et al., 2024; Uncu & Eroğlu, 2026) and indicates a high level of internal consistency in the present sample (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Accordingly, the scale demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency for use in the present study.

2.1. Demographic Characteristics of Participants

Frequency analyses were conducted to describe the distribution of participants according to gender, age, marital status, and work experience. The study included a total of 204 participants. In terms of gender, 117 participants (57.4%) were female and 87 (42.6%) were male, indicating a relatively balanced distribution, with women constituting a slight majority.. With respect to age, the

largest proportion of participants was in the 25–30 age group (43.6%; n = 89), followed by the 31–35 age group (25.5%; n = 52) and the 36–40 age group (24.0%; n = 49). Participants aged 18–24 accounted for 5.4% (n = 11) of the sample, whereas those aged 41–45 accounted for 1.5% (n = 3). Overall, the sample was concentrated primarily in the 25–40 age range.

With respect to marital status, 107 participants (52.5%) were single, while 97 (47.5%) were married, indicating a relatively balanced distribution. The distribution of participants by work experience showed that the largest proportion had 1–5 years of experience (41.7%; n = 85), followed by those with 6–10 years (27.0%; n = 55), 11–15 years (15.7%; n = 32), and 16–20 years (12.3%; n = 25). Only 3.4% of participants (n = 7) reported 20 or more years of work experience. Overall, 68.7% of the participants had 1–10 years of work experience.

2.2. Tests of Differences Across Demographic Groups

Additional statistical analyses were conducted to examine whether perceptions of organizational gossip differed across demographic groups. Independent-samples t-tests were used for demographic variables with two categories, whereas one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for variables with more than two categories. Organizational gossip was examined across two subdimensions: work-related gossip and non-work-related gossip. Accordingly, difference tests were conducted separately for each subdimension to provide a more detailed assessment of whether perceptions of work-related and non-work-related gossip differed across demographic groups. The statistical significance level was set at $p < .05$.

Table 2. Independent-Samples t-Test Results by Gender

Variables	Gender	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	t	p
Work-Related Gossip	Female	17	2.979	0.97	-2.32	.021
	Male	7	3.298	1.11		
Non-Work-Related Gossip	Female	17	2.334	0.86	-2.44	.016
	Male	7	2.624	0.88		

Table 2 presents the results of the independent-samples t-tests examining gender differences in perceptions of organizational gossip. A statistically significant gender difference was found in perceptions of work-related gossip ($t = -2.32$; $p = .021$). Male employees reported higher mean scores ($M = 3.298$, $SD = 1.11$) than female employees ($M = 2.979$, $SD = 0.97$). A statistically significant difference was also observed for perceptions of non-work-related gossip ($t = -2.44$; $p = .016$), with male employees reporting higher mean scores ($M = 2.624$, $SD = 0.88$) than female employees ($M = 2.334$, $SD = 0.86$). These findings indicate that perceptions of both work-related and non-work-related organizational gossip differed significantly by gender, supporting H_1 and H_2. Table 3 presents the independent-samples t-test results by marital status.

Table 3. Independent-Samples t-Test Results by Marital Status

Variables	Groups	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	t	p
Work-Related Gossip	Married	97	3.155	1.07	0.341	.734
	Single	107	3.105	1.02		
Non-Work-Related Gossip	Married	97	2.377	0.98	-1.431	.154
	Single	107	2.568	0.92		

Table 3 presents the results of the independent-samples t-tests examining differences in perceptions of organizational gossip by marital status. No statistically significant difference was found in perceptions of work-related gossip between married and single employees ($t = 0.341$; $p = .734$). The mean scores were similar for married employees ($M = 3.155$, $SD = 1.07$) and single employees ($M = 3.105$, $SD = 1.02$). Similarly, perceptions of non-work-related gossip did not differ significantly by marital status ($t = -1.431$; $p = .154$). Married employees reported a mean score of 2.377 ($SD = 0.98$), compared with 2.568 ($SD = 0.92$) among single employees. Accordingly, neither H_3 nor H_4 was supported. Table 4 presents the results of the one-way ANOVA examining differences across age groups.

Table 4. ANOVA Results for Organizational Gossip Perceptions by Age

Variables	Age Groups	N	F	p
Work-Related Gossip	18-24	11	5.336	0.000
	25-30	89		
	31-35	52		
	36-40	49		
	41-45	3		
	Total	204		
Non-Work-Related Gossip	18-24	11	2.270	0.063
	25-30	89		
	31-35	52		
	36-40	49		
	41-45	3		
	Total	204		

Table 4 presents the results of the one-way ANOVA examining differences in organizational gossip perceptions across age groups. A statistically significant difference was found in perceptions of work-related gossip across age groups ($F = 5.336$; $p < .001$). This finding indicates that perceptions of work-related gossip varied significantly among the different age groups. In contrast, no statistically significant difference was found in perceptions of non-work-related gossip ($F = 2.270$; $p = .063$). Although the p-value

was relatively close to the .05 significance threshold, it did not reach the predetermined level of statistical significance. Accordingly, H_5 was supported, whereas H_6 was not supported. Table 5 presents the ANOVA results by work experience.

Table 5. ANOVA Results for Organizational Gossip Perceptions by Work Experience

Variables	Work Experience	N	F	p
Work-Related Gossip	1-5 years	85	2.142	0.076
	6-10 years	55		
	11-15 years	32		
	16-20 yıl	25		
	20+	7		
	Total	204		
Non-Work-Related Gossip	1-5 yıl	85	1.120	0.965
	6-10 yıl	55		
	11-15 yıl	32		
	16-20 yıl	25		
	20+	7		
	Total	204		

Table 5 presents the results of the one-way ANOVA examining differences in organizational gossip perceptions across work experience groups. No statistically significant difference was found in perceptions of work-related gossip across experience groups ($F = 2.142$; $p = .076$). Although the p-value was relatively close to the .05 significance threshold, it did not reach the predetermined level of statistical significance. Similarly, perceptions of non-work-related gossip did not differ significantly across work experience groups ($F = 1.120$; $p = .965$). Accordingly, neither H_7 nor H_8 was supported.

3. CONCLUSION

This study examined whether perceptions of organizational gossip among education-sector employees in Mardin Province differed according to gender, age, marital status, and work experience. Overall, the findings indicate that demographic differences were not uniform across the examined characteristics or dimensions of organizational gossip. Gender differences were statistically significant for both work-related and non-work-related gossip, with male employees reporting higher levels than female employees. Although gender differences in workplace gossip have been discussed in the organizational literature, previous research has not established a consistent gender-based pattern (Michelson et al., 2010; Waddington, 2012). The present findings therefore underscore the importance of examining gender differences empirically rather than assuming that organizational gossip is predominantly associated with women.

Age revealed a differentiated pattern across the two dimensions of organizational gossip. Perceptions of work-related gossip differed significantly across age groups, whereas perceptions of non-work-related gossip did not. This finding indicates that age-related variation was evident for work-related but not non-work-related gossip. The distinction between the two dimensions further suggests that different forms of organizational gossip may exhibit different patterns across demographic groups and therefore should be examined separately rather than treated as a single, undifferentiated construct. Although differences in work-related gossip may reflect variations in employees' organizational experiences across different stages of their working lives, the present study does not provide sufficient evidence to establish the mechanisms underlying these differences.

No statistically significant differences were found in perceptions of either dimension of organizational gossip according to marital status or work experience. The absence of significant differences across these characteristics suggests that employees' perceptions of organizational gossip may not be adequately understood through demographic characteristics alone. Instead, organizational and contextual conditions may also be relevant to how informal communication is experienced and perceived in the workplace. Factors such as information flows, managerial openness, and opportunities for employees to express their views through formal communication channels may shape the emergence and circulation of organizational gossip (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Kurland & Pelled, 2000).

This study makes several contributions to the literature on organizational gossip. First, the study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that gender differences in perceptions of organizational gossip may vary across organizational and contextual settings. The higher levels of perceived work-related and non-work-related gossip reported by male employees in the present study, together with the limited evidence of a consistent gender-based pattern in previous research (Michelson et al., 2010; Waddington, 2012), highlight the value of examining gender differences within specific organizational contexts. In this respect, the findings from public-sector employees in Mardin Province support a more context-sensitive understanding of gender differences in organizational gossip.

Second, the findings contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of distinguishing between work-related and non-work-related gossip when examining demographic differences. The different patterns observed across age groups indicate that these two dimensions should not necessarily be treated as interchangeable constructs. From a measurement perspective, the

findings underscore the value of examining work-related and non-work-related gossip as distinct dimensions rather than relying solely on aggregate scores. Future research could further investigate how career stage and related organizational experiences may contribute to age-related differences in perceptions of work-related gossip.

Third, the absence of significant differences according to marital status and work experience suggests that perceptions of organizational gossip may also be shaped by organizational and contextual conditions beyond individual demographic characteristics. Factors such as communication climate, information transparency, and managerial openness may be relevant to how informal communication is experienced and perceived in the workplace (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Kurland & Pelled, 2000). These findings therefore support a broader perspective that considers organizational conditions alongside demographic characteristics when examining perceptions of organizational gossip.

From a theoretical perspective, the findings contribute to understanding organizational gossip as a multidimensional and context-sensitive phenomenon. The differences observed across gender and age, together with the absence of statistically significant differences across marital status, work experience, and educational level, indicate that perceptions of organizational gossip do not vary uniformly across demographic characteristics. The distinction between work-related and non-work-related gossip further highlights the importance of examining different forms of informal communication separately.

From a practical perspective, the findings suggest that organizations should not rely solely on demographic characteristics when seeking to understand or manage organizational gossip. Greater attention should instead be given to the broader

communication environment, particularly the clarity, consistency, and transparency of organizational communication, managerial openness, and employees' access to reliable and timely information. Clear formal communication channels may help reduce uncertainty and limit reliance on informal information-sharing and speculation. Accordingly, managers and human resource professionals may benefit from evaluating their communication practices and ensuring that employees have access to accurate and timely information. At the same time, organizational gossip need not be viewed solely as an undesirable form of communication, as it may also provide insight into employees' communication experiences and perceptions of the organizational environment.

Several limitations of the present study should be acknowledged. The sample was drawn from public educational institutions in a single province, Mardin Province, which limits the generalizability of the findings to other regions, sectors, organizational settings, and employee populations. Future research could address this limitation by examining organizational gossip across different sectors and contexts using larger and more diverse samples. The sample size and uneven distribution of participants across some demographic categories may also have limited the statistical power to detect relatively small group differences. Future studies could therefore employ larger samples with more balanced demographic representation.

The cross-sectional design provides a snapshot of employees' perceptions at a particular point in time and does not permit conclusions about changes over time or causal relationships. Longitudinal research could provide further insight into how perceptions of organizational gossip develop in response to organizational conditions and events. The study also relied on self-reported perceptions, which may not fully capture the content,

frequency, functions, or interpersonal dynamics of gossip and may be subject to common method and social desirability biases. Future research could combine self-report measures with qualitative interviews, peer reports, observations, or other organizational data.

Finally, the study focused primarily on demographic differences and did not directly examine organizational and contextual factors that may shape perceptions of organizational gossip. Future studies could incorporate factors such as organizational culture, communication climate, organizational trust, and managerial openness. Qualitative and mixed-method approaches could further illuminate how gossip emerges, circulates, and is interpreted by employees, as well as the informational and social functions it may serve within organizations.

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CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A DECEPTIVE LEADERSHIP SCALE

ALDATICI LİDERLİK ÖLÇEĞİNİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ

Murat Ozpehlivan

Abstract: Leaders with their guiding and directing features are personalities who have important effects on the progress or backwardness of organizations and societies. In this research, the type of leadership that deceives the members of the organization or society and thus provides individual benefit has been investigated. Assumptions, definitions and similar statements about this type of leadership, which have not been mentioned before in the literature, have been researched and important or similar findings for the development of the concept have been revealed. In addition, a scale consisting of 25 items and 5 different dimensions, which is thought to measure deceptive leadership in measuring the concept, was developed. The developed scale was sent to 747 companies that are members of the Union of Exporters of Istanbul Leather and Leather Raw Materials, and 423 scales, which were received and used in the research. The validity and reliability tests of the scale were confirmed in the analyses made using the SPSS.25 program, and it was concluded that the scale measures the concept of deceptive leadership.

JEL: M120

Key words: Organization, Leadership, Deceptive Leadership

Öz: Yönlendirici ve yöneltici özellikleri ile liderler, örgütlerin ve toplumların ilerlemesinde veya geri kalmışlığında önemli etkileri olan kişiliklerdir. Bu araştırmada, örgüt veya toplum üyelerini aldatan ve bu sayede bireysel fayda sağlayan liderlik türü araştırılmıştır. Bu liderlik türü ile ilgili literatürde daha önce adı geçmeyen varsayımlar, tanımlar ve benzeri ifadeler araştırılmış ve kavramın gelişimi için önemli veya benzer bulgular ortaya konmuştur. Ayrıca kavramı ölçmede aldatıcı liderliği ölçtüğü düşünülen 25 madde ve 5 farklı boyuttan oluşan bir ölçek geliştirilmiştir. Geliştirilen ölçek, İstanbul Deri ve Deri Hammaddeleri İhracatçıları Birliği üyesi 747 firmaya gönderilmiş olup, alınan ve araştırmada kullanılan 423 ölçek bulunmaktadır. SPSS.25 programı kullanılarak yapılan analizlerde ölçeğin geçerlilik ve güvenirlik testleri doğrulanmış ve ölçeğin aldatıcı liderlik kavramını ölçtüğü sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Örgüt, Liderlik, Aldatıcı Liderlik

1.Introduction

Leaders are people who affect society and individuals, unite them around certain goals and direct them towards the desired goal. Social orientation towards a specific goal occurs with the personal characteristics of leaders and their ability to direct their audience. The ability of the organization to move towards the desired goal is directly related to the leader's power of influence. While an organization is programmed to progress towards its goal in accordance with the principles of its establishment, this phenomenon occurs faster and more intensely with the influence

of the leader. The leader is a person who, can renounce his/her own resources when necessary and thus increase his influence over the group he/she manages. It can be said that with the acceptance of the leader in the society, he is taken as a behavioural role model. A leader is a person who uses his power of influence with his directing and discourses and thus manages to lead the society together and towards a common goal. However, it is not possible to say that the leader is a true leader in cases such as the leader's individual interests, the intention to favour his own group and clan, the purpose of gaining profits for the group he works with, or the fact that he keeps his personal goals ahead of social interests. Such leaders, who are the subject of our research, are the people who deceive the society on which they have influence, with behaviour models based on fake and lies, and thus cause the group to which they belong to gain unfair profits in this process, while providing individual benefits. It is a person who has leadership characteristics, the power to influence people, the ability to direct the society, and the person who bases his personal characteristics on deception of the organization or society he leads. Although deceptive leaders seem to think about the society and prioritize the interests of the society, they actually use the society to realize their own interests. The leader influences other members of the society thanks to his distinctive features and puts his real goals into practice by hiding behind the behavioural model he has launched. There are great differences between the leader reflected in the society and the real characteristics of the leader. The leader aims to reach individual ideals and personal interests by using his personal characteristics.

2. Definition of Deceptive Leadership

Every society needs a leader who will lead it to mass goals. The right leader is the person who leads the group, organization or society to reach their general goals and needs and also meets their expectations in the vision of the future (Graen et al., 1972; Limbare, 2012; Aronson, 2019). Such leaders are accepted by the society and their principles are quickly adopted (Franco et al., 2017; Mayan et al, 2005; Liridon et al, 2017; Mary et al. 2014). As a result of the level reached, a sense of satisfaction and appreciation towards the leader develops in the society. Deceptive leaders do not differ from such leaders during the time until the ultimate goal of the society, on the contrary, they may even appear more progressive in terms of discourse and action (Mohammed et al., 2018; Michallinos, et al., 2010). Deceptive leaders have a mission that they hide from the audience they lead, and they use their leadership qualities to achieve these hidden goals (Dana et al, 2017; Rodney et al, 2009). For them, leadership is a method they use to realize their own personal interests, rather than a tool they will use to move the organization forward (Liridon et al, 2017; Stefan et al., 2011). It can be said that the leader is a deceptive leader if he favors his relatives such as his social environment, his own network and family members, but uses the audience he leads while doing this (Anastasios et al., 2010; Maria et al., 2019). It is one of the characteristics of the deceptive leader that he frequently talks about moral principles and ethical rules, especially in the stages of directing the audience, while ignoring these concepts in his own individual life. A deceptive leader is a person who maintains his image by highlighting the issues that the members of the organization and society will be sensitive to and that they are basically sensitive to, and realize his own personal interests while doing this (Leon, 2010; Rodney et al, 2009; Yaseen, 2010). A deceptive leader is a person who reveals his skills as soon as he shows weakness in meeting the expectations of the individuals he directs and takes advantage of this by creating a constant conflict

environment (Mohammed et al., 2018; Mayan et al., 2005). While protecting his own interests, he constantly draws the attention of the audience to other points, prevents the arrows from turning to him, and thus realizes his individual goals without the audience noticing (Franco and Seth, 2017; Stefan and Petros, 2011). The crowd, who thinks that their leader works for them, works hard and makes an intense effort, will continue to support their leader without realizing that they are being deceived. The deceptive leader, while expressing that he prioritizes the interests of the organization or the mass, and fights intensely for this, actually fulfills the interests of himself and his close circle (Dana et al, 2017; Michallinos, and Sotiroula, 2010; Aronson, 2019). The deceptive leader, who turned into a showcase in order to cover up the inconveniences of his group while he was the leader of the society, does not hesitate to use the power he has acquired to clinch his position. A leader who sets out to realize the ideals of the organization, directs the group he belongs to with his team and fellow travelers, and adheres to this ideal in his discourses, but basically benefits himself and the group close to him, can be defined as a deceptive leader (Franco et al., 2017; Limbare, 2012). Deceptive leaders sometimes use their leadership characteristics for their own interests and sometimes just to protect their status and position (Dana et al, 2017; Rodney et al, 2009). They can use it to cover up their own incompetence, to satisfy their ego, to serve different channels, or to mislead the organization into their own predictions.

3. Deceptive Leadership Orientation of the Individual

The individual's desire for self-actualization is a phenomenon that emerges as a result of his inner impulses and is at the highest level of the person's feelings of satisfaction. In terms of human physiological characteristics, the stages of satisfaction differ from person to person and change according to the developing situations of the individual (Limbare, 2012; Victor et al., 2005). In this respect, it seems likely that a person with leadership qualities will come to the fore among people with the acceptance of the members of the organization and the society (Leon, 2010; Mujahid et al., 2016). While the leadership process of the individual, which begins to affect the society with the influence of his individual characteristics, begins, the process turns into deceptive leadership, which is related to the weaknesses of the person (Mary et al., 2014; Maria et al., 2019). Considering the birth, development and progress processes of leadership, the stage of deceiving the group led by the leader can develop mostly in periods when the belief of the mass in him rises (Dana et al, 2017; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014; Aronson, 2019; Yaseen, 2010). If the leader has deceptive features, he tests the belief of the people in him over time and can use this process for his own interests within acceptable gaps (Mohammed et al., 2018; Rodney et al, 2009). Although there is no change in the discourses, especially at the beginning and at the end, the leader can take care of his own interests in his own behavior and practices. We can summarize the main reasons why an individual tends to deceptive leadership as follows:

- The unconditional acceptance and adoption of the leader by the organization, group or mass
- Assuming all the statements of the leader to be correct, having a high level of belief that he will not make mistakes
- Attribution of superhuman characteristics to the leader by the mass, the idea that he is different from the individuals in the society
- Belief in the perception that the leader sacrifices himself and his whole self for the sake of the organization's future

- Ignoring the deceptive activities of the leader towards the mass by the mass
- The leader's effort to position himself at the highest level by showing himself as an ordinary person in the organization

As a result of the leader's behaviour and the reactions of the members of the organization, the leader considers himself different and thus can see himself as justified in the mistakes he has made (Limare, 2012; Maria and Alvaro, 2019; Aronson, 2019). An individual who does not have any reservations about deceiving people in himself can position himself as a person of different status, with the guidance of the mass. He believes in this and may expect people to believe in these superior features (Mohammed et al., 2018; Leon, 2010; Mujahid et al., 2016; Rodney et al, 2009). With the effect of the tendency to attribute superiority to the leader, which exists in societies, the leader defines him in a very different way (Anastasios et al., 2010; Mary et al., 2014). However, while doing this, he realizes the attitude of reacting against the dishonest behavior of the leader, which the society is willing to ignore, and thus begins to deceive the society (Graen et al., 1972; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014; Liridon et al, 2017). As this deception tendency is not noticed, ignored or accepted by the society, the leader starts to make this tendency permanent. Thus, the leader, who displays a fair, egalitarian, impartial and unpredictable stance before the society, becomes the leader of a structure that actually serves the interests of himself and the interest group.

4. Dimensions of Deceptive Leadership

While deceptive leaders manage the group they lead, they affect this group in many different sub-dimensions (Franco et al., 2017; Mujahid et al., 2016). While directing the audience, they manage to hold them in different sub-dimensions and with different methods (Dana et al, 2017; Rodney et al, 2009; Muhammad et al, 2017; Victor et al., 2005). While assuming that society and organizational members are progressing in line with the goals of the group, the deceptive leader affects the society in many different ways in this process, in which the leader is actually the material of interest relations.

4.1 Appearing Honest

The leader is often seen as a character that is appreciated by the individuals in the organization who chooses him as honest, fair and keeps organizational interests in the foreground. It is thought that the leader will be honest and open to individuals who believe in him and choose him as their leader (Leon, 2010; Mayan et al., 2005). While the leader is a person who dedicates himself to the organization or society he manages and makes sacrifices for this cause, he is mostly expected to be honest and fair in social issues (Franco et al., 2017). When some exemplary events occur in this regard, the deceptive leader tends to use this situation and comes forward in order to prove himself to the audience. (Anastasios et al., 2010; Maria et al., 2019; Aronson, 2019). The members of the organization who are already inclined to believe him are affected by the deceptive leader's rhetoric and their belief in their leader is reinforced. Especially at the beginning of the leadership process, the deceptive leader does not hesitate to use the concept of honesty, which the society shows weakness, frequently. In this way, it further strengthens the belief and commitment of the organization to him. Integrity, which is one of the most essential values for a leader, can be seen as one of the most special arguments used by the deceptive

leader in order to realize his individual interests (Dana et al, 2017; Rodney et al, 2009; Yaseen, 2010). He tries to convince the audience that this concept, which he constantly puts forward in his discourses, is one of the most important principles he uses in every moment of his life, from his lifestyle to his business and organizational practices (Mujahid et al., 2016; Limbare, 2012). When the threshold for the members of the organization to believe in the honesty of the leader is exceeded, everything the deceptive leader says will be accepted and thus he will be able to realize his ambitions for himself, his group and his relatives one by one (Dana et al, 2017).

4.2 Acting as a Group

While leadership is a phenomenon that emerges on its own, the importance of a team that stands by the leader and performs certain tasks while accompanying him cannot be denied (Mohammed et al., 2018; Franco et al., 2017; Mayan et al, 2005). Leaders manage the members of the organization, whom they direct and direct towards organizational goals, with a certain upper team. The deceptive leader acts with a group that will accompany him while achieving his goals and can benefit from the resulting benefit together. Although the leader uses the existing team to achieve the goals in line with the interests of the organization, in deceptive leadership, this group aims to serve the common interests of the leader and themselves (Limbare, 2012). Deceptive leaders act with a group that will support them, increase their popularity in difficult times and support it in any case, and they place this group at the centre of their self-interest-oriented systems (Franco et al., 2017; Muhammad et al, 2017). People who take sides with deceptive leaders often benefit from this situation and rise as the leader develops, advances and becomes better individually (Leon, 2010; Michallinos, et al., 2010; Rodney et al, 2009; Liridon et al, 2017; Aronson, 2019). Deceptive leaders choose to share the achievements with their groups or reward them while advancing towards the ideals of gaining benefits, which are their real goals in the management processes of the society (Anastasios et al., 2010; Stefan et al., 2011). This is an action aimed at mutually sharing the benefits they have earned, and thus allowing the subjective gains of the leader to reach their immediate circle (Mary et al., 2014, Victor et al., 2005). Thus, the leader manages to maintain a mass that unconditionally adheres to him through the interests they have acquired, as well as the mass that believes in him (Graen et al., 1972). This group helps him influence the audience as unconditional support in cases where he has difficulties, when members of the organization begin to question him or when his image is damaged, thus gaining benefits.

4.3 Creating a Sense of Altruism

Organization members who believe in deceptive leaders generally think that their leaders are sacrificing their lives for them, and therefore they think that they owe him a debt of gratitude (Mayan et al, 2005; Anastasios et al., 2010). According to Nanjundeswaraswamy et al. (2014), the deceptive leaders' display of behaviours that emphasize self-sacrifice reveals him as a top personality who makes self-sacrifice for the interests of the organization before the members of the organization. Especially in societies where traditionalism predominates, the altruism attributed to the leader is one of the behaviour types that the deceptive leader tends to use most (Leon, 2010; Rodney et al, 2009). According to Dana et al. (2017), the deceptive leader, who does not hesitate to seize this opportunity in the face of an audience who

is ready to believe that he is making a sacrifice, solidifies his position in this way. Appearing and being perceived as a person who acts selflessly and makes great sacrifices in order to fulfil his responsibilities towards society and organization members are the most important characteristics of a deceptive leader (Franco et al., 2017; Liridon et al, 2017; Mary et al., 2014). Deceptive leaders want to create the perception that they are committed to their organization. In this way, they expect the members of the organization to maintain a positive viewpoint and individual image (Graen et al., 1972; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014; Stefan et al., 2011). Sacrificing individual expectations on behalf of the organization is one of the important methods used by deceptive leaders to achieve their personal interests. When the loyalty and belief of the members of the organization in them is at the highest level, the opportunities to take initiatives for the interests of the individual or the narrow group they belong to increase (Mohammed et al., 2018; Anastasios et al., 2010; Michallinos, et al., 2010). In this way, the members of the organization find the opportunity to realize their personal interests without being aware of it.

4.4 Relative Development in the Organization

Deceptive leaders know that as soon as there is no development in their organization, the audience they lead will hold them accountable, and therefore they strive to move the organization forward, albeit relatively (Limbare, 2012; Aronson, 2019). They do this because they get the opportunity to realize their personal ideals (Mujahid et al., 2016; Mayan et al, 2005). In the process of managing the organization, the fact that the organization does not progress, does not move towards its goals or regresses will lead to the questioning of the leader, and deceptive leaders are very sensitive to avoid such a situation. According to Dana et al. (2017), their basic principle is to protect the interests of individuals or close circles by making maximum use of the sense of satisfaction arising from the relative progress of the organization. Deceptive leaders use the partial development of the organization as a front to achieve their goals (Rodney et al, 2009; Maria and Alvaro, 2019; Muhammad et al, 2017; Victor and Malcolm, 2005). While the members of the society or organization are focused on this change and development, they can realize their own plans more easily (Graen et al., 1972; Michallinos, and Sotiroula, 2010). In this respect, the relative development of the society they lead is essential for deceptive leaders. They work with all their might to achieve this. In this way, the development of the organization is very important for them, as they can reach their personal interests (Franco and Seth, 2017; Aronson, 2019). Otherwise, since the first person the society will question is the leader, deceptive leaders feel obliged to provide a development that the society will be pleased with at the minimum level (Limare, 2012). This movement, which the organization has achieved in reaching its goals, will reinforce the trust, respect and belief of the members of the organization in the leader, and in this way, the deceptive leader will find himself a room for manoeuvre. Again in this way, he will gain superiority in discourse and action against his opponents, and will take the first step of the way that will lead him to loneliness in a kind of leadership position.

4.5 Creating a Conflict Environment

Deceptive leaders constantly support conflict in order to keep the society and members of the organization alive, increase their excitement, reinforce their belief in themselves, and create the perception that they are moving towards a common goal (Leon, 2010; Mohammed and Wang, 2018; Liridon et al, 2017). He usually tries to

create this conflict environment between the members of the organization following him and his opponents. In this way, it aims to increase segregation and division, and to reduce communication and interaction between individuals and turn the mass towards itself (Graen et al., 1972; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014; Stefan and Petros, 2011; Yaseen, 2010). The hostile attitudes and approaches that will occur between the groups as a result of nurturing the conflict environment within the organization make the leader stand out as the person who triggers the process. Deceptive leaders constantly support the conflict environment within the organization in order to consolidate their position and implement projects aimed at their interests (Franco et al., 2017; Mohammed et al., 2018; Rodney et al, 2009; Mary et al., 2014). The existence of opposing, quarrelling and constantly conflicting groups within the organization pushes the masses to focus on the hostile feelings towards the other side rather than seeing the mistakes of the leader (Maria et al., 2019; Aronson, 2019). Thus, the mistakes of the leader in the organization are not questioned and possible mistakes are attributed to the other party at the beginning of the process. In this respect, deceptive leaders fuel the on-going and ever-renewing conflicts within the organization and create reasons for its continuation (Mujahid et al., 2016; Muhammad et al, 2017). The regular and frequent occurrence of conflict environments within the organization is an important camouflage tool for deceptive leaders to cover up their personal interests (Leon, 2010; Michallinos, et al., 2010). Deceptive leaders use this method to drag the organization into groundless and illogical conflicts and thus enable them to turn the focus of the society on meaningless events instead of themselves (Dana et al, 2017; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014).



Figure 1. Dimensions of deceptive leadership

5. The Effects of Deceptive Leaders

Deceptive leaders have a direct impact on organizational developments due to their positions that manage, direct, and administer the organization (Rodney et al, 2009; Limbare, 2012; Muhammad et al, 2017; Mary and Holly, 2014; Maria and Alvaro, 2019). While this effect is primarily in the form of collecting the organization, bringing it together and directing it towards the same goal, over time it turns into a system that they use as a tool to achieve their individual goals rather than moving the organization towards the desired goal (Franco and Seth, 2017; Liridon et al, 2017; Victor and Malcolm, 2005). Deceptive leaders reach their goals by going

through certain basic stages in this process. First of all, it is in their interest for the organization to act together and in a coordinated manner. Because in this way, the organization tends to a specific purpose and gets rid of it's scattered and fragmented structure (Dana et al, 2017). Afterwards, a phase process progresses towards the desired goal (Anastasios and Panayiotis, 2010; Mohammed and Wang, 2018; Maria and Alvaro, 2019). In this context, the deceptive leader plays an important role because the development and progress in the organization has an important effect that strengthens his individual position (Rodney et al., 2009). In later processes, deceptive leaders take advantage of the organization's full focus on the target and use its own rising image to transform this progress into an interest mechanism developed for their own ideals (Graen et al., 1972; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014; Limbare, 2012). While the organization thinks that it is moving towards its own ideals, it has actually taken on a structure that serves it within the plans of the deceptive leader (Dana et al, 2017). Deceptive leaders make radical changes in the basic principles of the organization by linking the internal functioning, traditional structure, functionality and walking mechanisms of the organization in order to consolidate their position (Franco and Seth, 2017; Liridon et al, 2017; Aronson, 2019). While doing this, their aim is not to make the organization more dynamic, but to hope to appear indispensable by making the processes dependent on them (Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014; Leon, 2010; Mayan et al, 2005). In order to preserve their individual positions and carry them to the future, they take the risk of completely changing the skeleton structure of the organization and developing a unique systematic. Because the less the operability of the organization decreases, the more the subordination to the deceptive leader will increase. Knowing this, they do not hesitate to overturn all structural models. Although his supporters perceive this as a radical change within the organization, the main purpose of the deceptive leader is to make the organization dependent on him (Mohammed et al., 2018; Anastasios et al., 2010). Thanks to its own practices and sharp changes, the new point of the organization has become an apparatus that is disconnected from the past of the organization, its understanding and purpose is different from the past of the organization, and it has connected its ideals to the centralist policies of the leader (Graen et al., 1972). At this point, it is possible to think that the deceptive leader will act without hesitation to lead the organization to a radical destruction for his own interests (Dana et al, 2017; Michallinos, and Sotiroula, 2010; Stefan et al., 2011).

6. Consequences of Deceptive Leadership

Although the interest-oriented and ambitious nature of deceptive leaders gives a temporary impetus to the organization, it can be said that they push the organization into a process that is disconnected from its core values, without an identity, without a target, and unsuccessfully. Deceptive leaders want to destroy the values, myths, habits and traditions of the organization in order to consolidate their leadership and start a new era for the organization. Instead, they create a set of organizational behaviour models that they developed and started with. In this way, an organizational value from the past will not remain in the organization outside of themselves, and the beginning of the leadership process on behalf of the organization will be considered a milestone for the organization (Mohammed et al., 2018; Leon, 2010; Mayan et al, 2005). It can be seen that organizations acting under the management of deceptive leaders will link all their operations to the leader's instructions over time, and the organizational definition will become identified with the leader's characteristics and business techniques (Franco et al., 2017; Limbare,

2012; Liridon et al, 2017). While the organization acts under the leadership of the leader, after a while, the perception that the organization will disappear or disappear if there is no deceptive leader develops. This perception is conveyed to the members of the organization, especially by the leader and his close circle, and they are made to believe in this phenomenon (Aronson, 2019; Yaseen, 2010). Thus, a kind of sanctification of the leader occurs rather than being an individual of the organization. The organization and the leader turn into an intertwined systematic that complements each other, and this situation is easily accepted by the individuals (Mujahid et al., 2016; Michallinos, et al., 2010; Mary et al., 2014). While the deceptive leader is an individual who benefits and benefits from the organization, at the last stage, it turns into a matter of existence and absence for the organization by the members of the organization (Dana et al, 2017; Nanjundeswaraswamy et al., 2014). There comes a time when the members of the organization ignore the leader's abuses, rule violations, individual practices and benefits, and even begin to justify his extraordinary and unfair initiatives.

6.1 Internal Results

It can be thought that the members of the organization are negatively affected by this situation in organizations that continue to live within the administrative functions of deceptive leadership. We can explain these effects as follows.

- Intensification of organizational members' hopelessness for change
- The emergence of division and polarization within the organization
- Hostile attitudes of the parties within the organization to each other
- Proliferation of authoritarian understanding in organizational management
- The emergence of shallow policies in organizational practices
- Partial development within the organization turning into stagnation and regression
- The marginalization of its members by producing aggressive policies of the organization
- The proliferation of partisan ideas within the organization
- Organization's progress stalling while setting higher goals
- Increasing the power of influence in the eyes of the members despite the regression in the organization
- The emergence of unconditional acceptance of organizational policies
- Disabling appeal mechanisms available to members of the organization
- Transformation of organizational understanding into organizational conflict
- Appreciating opposition to the culture of tolerance within the organization

6.2 Consequences at the Out-of-Organization

It can be seen that in organizations led by deceptive leaders, problems in relations with the external environment occur over time (Franco and Seth, 2017; Mohammed et al., 2018; Yaseen, 2010). It can be said that deceptive leaders deviate from the target in order to keep the organization they manage alive and vigorous, and thus they develop attitudes that harm relations towards external factors (Mujahid et al., 2016; Mayan et al, 2005; Limbare, 2012). In this way, while they want to keep the factors within the organization together, they also aim to strengthen their own positions (Leon, 2010; Michallinos, et al., 2010; Rodney et al, 2009; Muhammad et

al, 2017). It is possible to discuss the possible developments in the external environment of organizations acting under the management of deceptive leadership under the following headings.

- The organization's relations with its external environment are tense and fragile
- Partial isolation of the organization from its external environment
- Development of negative attitudes towards the external environment within the organization
- Establishing meaningless friendships or hostilities with the external environment of the organization
- Intensification of leader influence in the organization's relations with its external environment
- Establishing emotional bonds between the organization and the external environment rather than strategy
- Seeing the ups and downs of the external environment in organizational relations
- Organization members are too concerned about external relations
- Partially putting organizational interests in the background in relations with the external environment
- The organization's constant pursuit of new foreign relations
- Making strategic mistakes in the organization's relations with its external environment
- Leaving the relations of the organization with its external environment to the initiative of the leader
- The immediate effect of the internal functioning of the organization on the developments in the external environment
- Damage to the reputation of the organization towards the external environment

7. Methodology

7.1 Research Goal

The validity and reliability tests of the deceptive leadership scale we developed in this study were conducted.

7.2 Item Selection, Data Collection and Sample Characteristics

The questionnaire preparation system was carried out in six different parts: (a) the actual definition; (b) basic preparation of concept; (c) creating the items; (d) downscaling; (e) data collection; (f) testing the main scale. After defining the concept of deceptive leadership, we conceptualized five different dimensions of deceptive leadership by using face to face meetings with academics who works in management and 15 company executives, each graduated from university and have business experience. In the item creation section, items related to deceptive leadership have been used in recent studies (Michallinos and Sotiroula, 2010; Franco and Seth, 2017; Mohammed and Wang, 2018; Stefan and Petros, 2011). These findings were used in the draft version of the scale through an extensive literature check. All the items were double checked to the “turn, translating” procedure by the academicians from both of the languages (Brislin, 1970). The draft scale was revised and the number of variables was reduced through interviews with the same academics and business managers. In addition, in the pre-test part of our study, we discussed possible semantic shifts and narrative deficiencies with the

administrators and determined whether there were semantic shifts or misinterpretations. As a result, 25 items in five dimensions were created by using deep literature review. A Likert-type scale was applied and the options for every questions were 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=undecided, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree.

Turkish leather garment exporters were selected as the research universe. Leather jacket manufacturers, which are a sub-branch of this sector, were contacted with the Union of Exporters of Istanbul Leather and Leather Raw Materials, which is the leading NGO of Turkey's leather sector, and the biggest players of the industries were selected and random sampling process was used as selection method. In this context, 471 questionnaires, whole of which were filled by online system, were received from 747 companies. When 48 of the questionnaires were examined, it was observed that there were incorrect or invalid answers and they were cancelled.
As a result, 423 questionnaires, which were analysed and we think that healthy feedback was received from the companies, were the subject of the research. To create the data set, we first entered all the data obtained from the questionnaires into the SPSS.25 program. All the questionnaires filled out using the online system were transferred automatically since all data were prepared by the Google system and we had to be in the form for analysis. We did not see any statistical significance between company age, company sizes and other averages among the surveys that were eliminated and used.

According to the results obtained from the data collection, 76.2% of the respondents from Turkey are male and 23.8% are female.

7.3 Analyses for Measurement Validity and Reliability
Evaluating the construct validity and reliability of the instrument we have developed in this research, the following analyzes adviced by Bagozzi and Phillips (1982) were taken into account: a) we applied factor analysis b) then we started reliability studies c) we examined unidimensionality processes d) convergent validity was checked e) we checked for discriminant validity.

Content validity is evaluated in all methods mainly connected to the statements that make up the scale for researchers. Content validity is considered as general judgments on the sampling structure of test content. General judgments about the test content's ability to meet the sample can be viewed as a method of determining the scientific strength of a measurement. These antecedents show the extent to which the content portions of the administered test are represented by the test items. In this way, general harmony between the definition of a measurement management and the actual process designed is achieved (Cronbach, 1971). The same opinions among the researchers show how well these items cover the aims of our study and the subjects to be measured, and to what extent they show the content validity of the scale. Reliability is systems that detect that the measurements are free of random errors and that they measure the construct consistently. Measurement theories are generally accepted as statistically accepted as follows: unidimensionality, that is, the main degree in which the items that make up the scale represent one and only one latent variable of the scale (Garver et al., 1999). Convergent validity, on the other hand, is related to the general degree of consistency between applications made with different methods to achieve the same goal (Rao et al., 1999; Llusar et al., 2002).

Differential validity states that the dimensions of the concept should be clearly and independently different from each other (Bagozzi et al., 1991). It's about the other side of the view that the structure gives us different results every time we check for different variables.

We added all 25 variables to the analysis to create a deceptive leadership scale survey. When the validity of the scale was first examined, the Cronbach's alpha coefficient saw a high value of 0,989. The dimensions of 25 items were analyzed using varimax factor analysis, and the eigenvalues of five factors were greater than one at the end of varimax rotation. Variables with a factor load of 0,500 and above were taken into account in the data reduction process. Five basic components of deceptive leadership were obtained as a result of PCA. Next, we aimed to test the construct validity of the scale and obtained 5 components of deceptive leadership using 25 variables estimated from the deceptive leadership scale in the light of to the results of exploratory factor analysis. We we consider the exploratory factor analysis results, findings regarding factor loadings in the range of 0,702 – 0,913 were obtained. It shows unidimensional validity, provided that the factorial components are loaded onto the predicted factors using 25 variables.

After the exploratory factorial analysis results, data from 423 questionnaires were analyzed using Maximum Likelihood estimation to validate. According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results, which should be used to test the normality of the distribution, the t_{min} value of each variable was above 4,771. This finding confirms the normal distribution of our scale at 0,001 probability.

After this step, we started our work on model fit. Our analyzes are shown in Table-1. In the light of the findings obtained, the suitability of the model we first put forward and the model obtained was evaluated. The regression weights obtained, showing the factor loads on the variables, appeared between 0.823 and 0.968. This range is considered sufficient in terms of statistics. If we talk about convergent validity; despite the opinions that these figures should be greater than 0,700 in terms of statistics, they are not fully accepted by the researchers. After investigating the error variance, we noticed that the existing variables with results of high error variance were not seen in this research.

Table 1. Model fitness values of primary confirmatory factor analyses

X2 /df	GFI	NFI	IFI	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
4,678	0,914	0,938	0,874	0,962	0,813	0,064

When we pass the primary confirmatory factor analysis model, structural equation modeling was performed with secondary confirmatory factor analysis to test whether the factor components were suitable for the upper deceptive leadership factor structure. Results show us that, five factors formed in the primary factor analysis were combined in the secondary factor analysis. According to the deceptive leadership structural factor, 25 variables and 5 components are placed. Factor loads are close to each other (0,743 to 0,908) and very high values are obtained. The results are statistically significant ($p<0.001$). As seen in Table-2, the model fitness values are of sufficient value and very close to the primary confirmatory factor analysis. For this reason, the 5 factorial components that make up the scale have been determined as the factors that make up the general dimension of deceptive

leadership. In addition, there is a statistically significant relationship between all components of deceptive leadership.

Table 2. Model fitness values of primary secondary factor analyses

X2 /df	GFI	NFI	IFI	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
4,774	0,983	0,971	0,931	0,970	0,880	0,078

When the very close values of the model fit coefficients are compared, the initial and final model coefficients obtained during our study show the fit of the obtained model with the initial model. The small differences between the model fit coefficients are due to the difference in the coefficients of freedom of the scaled models. By testing the internal validity of the deceptive leadership components, it was found that the correlation coefficients and validity coefficients between the variables when the variables were excluded, and the correlation between the internal validity of the model obtained in the secondary factor analysis and the adjusted variables, 0,759 and 0,938. The internal validity of the coefficients of the model was found as a=0,901. Thus, the existence of the convergent validity of the structural deceptive leadership model has been demonstrated once again. The integrated validity coefficient (Werts et al., 1974), which was recommended to be evaluated together with the Cronbach's alpha coefficient in the scale validity process, was calculated as p_c=0,974, which is well above the recommended threshold value of 0,70 (Bagozzi et al., 1988).

When the model fit indices belong to the final model obtained through the testing process and the internal validity of the coefficients are evaluated together, it is seen that the constant correlation coefficients of each dimension are greater than 0,30, and alpha values of 0,60 are sufficient for the first applied research (Churchill, 1979).

The overall recommended value for reliability was greater than 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978) and none of the multiple correlation coefficients distorted the model fitness. The values we have obtained from this study are above the acceptable values suggested by Price and Mueller (1986). The integrated internal reliability coefficient value (a= 0.901) and the combined validity coefficient value (pc= 0.974) support the acceptance of the obtained scale as a deceptive leadership scale.

8. Conclusions and Discussions

In this study, it is aimed to measure the concept of deceptive leadership, which has examples in many organizations and societies. Deceptive leaders are personalities who realize the leader deficiencies in societies and fill this gap and provide benefits for themselves (Aronson, 2009; Leon, 2010). The main purposes of such leaders can be discussed as increasing their own reputation by providing partial development within the society and the organization and thus providing individual and group benefits (Dana et al, 2017; Lrindon et al, 2017). The relative development they provide within the organization is a curtain for their illegal work (Michallinos and Sotiroula, 2010). In this way, while they bring themselves to the forefront with the right work they do in the society and the organization, they also manage to hide their behaviours that the society will not adopt.

The main goals of deceptive leaders are not to benefit the organization or to achieve the goals of the organization. They aim to reach their individual ideals by using these goals and the members of the organization who believe that these goals will be realized under the leadership of the leader. Individuals who are under the influence of partial change and development in the organization reinforce their belief and loyalty to their leader and evaluate every work he does as valid and acceptable. Since the deceptive leader is aware of this, he sometimes acts recklessly and insensitively and carries out his own interests without hesitation of being disclosed (Victor and Malcolm, 2005; Mohammed and Wang, 2018). He knows that even if his own mistakes are reflected in the organization, there will be no loss in the organization's belief in him; on the contrary, he will even be able to raise his own reputation by playing the victim role in such situations. For this reason, deceptive leaders do not hesitate to see the members of the organization as a tool in achieving their goals (Mary et al., 2014).

One of the most important features of deceptive leaders is that they act with a group of people who are close to them and benefit from the personal benefits obtained as a group (Lrindon et al., 2017). When deceptive leaders are in a difficult situation, these people appear and they make statements that will affect the society in order to raise the image of the deceptive leader. In this way, they hope that their position before the leader will be strengthened and thus their profit will increase (Michallinos et al., 2010; Rodney et al, 2009). In this mutual win-win model, the losing people and groups are usually the members of the organization who are deceived by their leader, lose their values and waste their social gains.

Considering the emergence processes of deceptive leaders in organizations, it can be seen that they are mostly people who have grown up in the organization, know the organization, know the organizational values well, and are committed to the achievement of the organization's goals. The most important power of these people, who gain individual gain while deceiving the organization, comes from knowing the organization and the individuals in the organization very well (Victor and Malcolm, 2005; Dana et al, 2017). Deceptive leaders who analyse the sensitivity measures, reactions and resistance levels of the organization very well, rise thanks to this valuable information and individual talents and make the people around them benefit from the gains they have achieved (Leon, 2010; Limbare, 2012).

In this study, how deceptive leaders emerge in organizations and societies, what kind of practices they do, what they do to protect and strengthen their position and the results of these processes are mentioned. In addition, a scale with validity and reliability tests has been developed in order to detect the existence of deceptive leaders in organizations and societies. The emergence of the concept of deceptive leadership with this research also necessitates further enrichment of the concept in literature. It would be beneficial to test the scale in different sectors and cultures in order to reveal the concept more clearly in subsequent studies.

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Deceptive Leadership Scale						
1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Neither agree nor disagree, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly agree						
Appearing honest		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1	My leader exhibits honest behavior					
2	My leader constantly repeats that he is honest					
3	My leader reiterates that he values honesty					
4	My leader tries to appear honest					
5	My leader cares about honesty					
Acting as a group		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
6	My leader acts as a group					
7	My leader has a group very close to him					
8	My leader works with his group in every case					
9	My leader is concerned with his close friends					
10	My leader has a group that stands by him in every difficulty					
Creating a sense of altruism		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
11	My leader makes sacrifices for society					
12	My leader tells the members of the organization about the sacrifices he made					
13	My leader has sacrificed himself to society					
14	Our society has reached this level thanks to the sacrifices of our leader					
15	My leader does not hesitate to show his sacrifices to the public					
Relative development in the organization		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
16	There was a partial development in the organization after my leader positioned					
17	My leader has developed the organization					
18	My leader's contribution is noticeable in the organization					
19	There has been improvement in the organization compared to before my leader					
20	My leader partly improved our organization					
Creating a conflict environment		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
21	My leader supports conflicts within the organization					
22	My leader constantly scolds his opponents in the organization					
23	My leader uses harsh words to keep his followers together					
24	My leader does not make concessions to his opponents					
25	My leader is the source of conflicts between group members					


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