Contemporary Social Transformations:

Power, Identity, Culture, and Knowledge in A Changing World

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MERYEM BULUT

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İÇİNDEKİLER

THE CRISES OF MODERNITY AND MODERNISM: A CRITIQUE OF WESTERN-CENTRED EPISTEMOLOGY 1

RECEP BAYDEMİR

CAPITALISM, NEOLIBERAL POLICIES, AND MIGRATION IN THE MODERN AGE 15

RECEP BAYDEMİR

ANDROPHOBIA IN TURKISH WOMEN 33

ÖZNUR YEMEZ

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SUNDAY BREAKFAST: THE CASE OF NEVŞEHIR 42

MELİH İÇİGEN, ERCAN GEÇGİN

DEDELIK IN ALEVISM: SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITARIAN POWER AND RITUAL PRACTICES ..92

MERYEM BULUT, ZEYNEL KARACAGİL, SEHER ÇATALOĞLU, MİNE ÖZTEKİN ALPAYDIN, MELİSA HAZAL BÖZ

THE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 112

İLHAN KARMUTOGLU

BÖLÜM 1

THE CRISES OF MODERNITY AND MODERNISM: A CRITIQUE OF WESTERN-CENTRED EPISTEMOLOGY

Recep BAYDEMİR[1]

Introduction

Modernity is one of the fundamental concepts in the social sciences that signifies both a historical rupture and the reorganisation of social life. Shaped by processes such as Enlightenment thought, scientific revolutions, industrialisation, and the rise of the nation-state, modernity has created a new paradigm of social transformation by placing the individual at the centre of 'reason,' 'science,' and 'progress' (see: Giddens, 2023). This transformation has fundamentally changed, on the one hand, the restructuring of economic and political institutions and, on the other hand, the individual's social position, forms of subjectification, and cultural practices. The innovation and search for rupture that modernism has brought about, particularly in the cultural and aesthetic spheres, has

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offered a critical framework that questions the authority of tradition, in parallel with the intellectual foundations of modernity (see: Harvey, 2020).

However, modernisation is a more dynamic and process-oriented concept that expresses the institutionalisation forms of modernity in specific social structures. Theories of modernisation have interpreted processes such as the spread of the capitalist mode of production, the institutionalisation of bureaucratic rationality, and the adoption of the nation-state form as distinctive elements of modern society's development (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). However, the linear, universal, and Western-centric narrative of progress in modernisation has been the target of extensive criticism, particularly since the second half of the 20th century. Postcolonial studies have emphasised that the ideology of modernisation has produced a field of power relations that legitimises global inequalities and imposes the West's own historical experience as a universal norm (see: Said, 1978). For this reason, modernity faces a crisis today, and this crisis is undoubtedly linked to the questioning of the claims of rationality, progress and universality at the heart of the modern mind. In this sense, Bauman (2000), one of the thinkers who contributes to our understanding of modernity, states that modernity's quest for order, control and predictability has dissolved in late capitalist societies, transforming into a fluid, uncertain and insecure social structure. Similarly, Habermas (1987) argues that modernity is an unfinished project and that rational-critical thinking must be continued in new forms:

> 'With modernism, humans remain in a position of superiority rather than being critical, questioning subjects. This leads to modernism becoming increasingly dogmatic, taking on the form of a rigid ideology. (...) One criticism of modernism is the claim that Western civilisation is the sole representative of civilisation, which lies at the heart of modern perception. The dichotomies created by

modernism—us and them, East and West, traditional and modern—also represent another dimension that is contested, namely the erasure of non-Western cultures or their assimilation into Western culture.' (Kırılmaz & Ayparçası, 2016, p. 40).

Within this framework, an assessment of the historical development, theoretical foundations, and critiques of the concepts of modernity, modernism, and modernisation is important for understanding both the evolution of social thought and the structural dynamics of the contemporary world. In this chapter, I aim to discuss the possibilities, limitations, and crises of the modern social order by approaching modernity not only as a historical process but also as an object of critical analysis. In this section, I discuss what modernity, modernism and modernisation are. I explore the historical and sociological perspectives from which we can examine modern consciousness, the development of modern man, and the crisis modernity has reached today. In this work, I invite you to critically examine the quest offered by modernity and modernism and to think beyond and move beyond the world modernity presents.

What are Modernity, Modernism and Modernisation? A Brief Historical Background

First and foremost, before attempting to define the concepts of modernity, modernism and modernisation, it would be useful to examine the concept of modernity itself, which is the origin of these concepts, and in particular the periods when modernity did not develop. As is well known, the feudal system and Scholastic thought dominated Europe in the 13th and 14th centuries. The feudal system meant that most of what was produced by the productive class, which constituted the overwhelming majority of society, was taken by the feudal lords and given to the state, which was a form of slavery. Scholastic thought, on the other hand, meant that the church and the ideas it represented dominated the political and social life of society. However, this dominance was not based on 'consent' but entirely on

‘force’. The changes and transformations that took place in Europe in the 13th and 14th centuries in the social, economic, technological and intellectual spheres gave rise to radical revolutions such as the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries. As a result of these revolutions, the structure of the state and society in Europe underwent a fundamental change. The new order that was established or sought to be established was based on reason and science. This new state and social order are referred to as modern society and the modern state. However, it is important to note that modern society is composed of modern individuals. In other words, we are referring to a society composed of people who think in a modern way and possess a modern consciousness.

The concept of modernism, whose foundations were laid in the 17th and 18th centuries and which was used in all areas of life until the mid-20th century, derives from the Latin word *modo*, meaning *modernus*. The concept of ‘modern’ was used to distinguish the new situation of Rome, which officially accepted Christianity in the 5th century AD, from the old Pagan period. Subsequently, from the Middle Ages, the concept of ‘modern’ was used to express the process of Europe’s rebirth with a brand-new understanding as it transitioned from the Middle Ages to the modern era. It expressed the West’s unique developmental experience within the historical process (Kırılmaz & Ayparçası, 2016, p. 33; Baran, 2013, p. 59). Based on this, the concept of Modernism ‘is always understood in the sense of becoming contemporary, meaning new, distant from the old, and the concept is used as a synonym for the recent past’ (Kırılmaz & Ayparçası, 2016, p. 33). The concept of modernisation, on the other hand, ‘when considered in all its dimensions, is a matter of the mutual transformation and change of many interacting factors. In short, modernisation refers to a social cultural change’ (Baran, 2013, p. 59). In this case, we see that modernity appears as a

phenomenon, modernism as a movement, and modernisation as a process.

In this sense, the modern human is the human with modern consciousness. That is, it is the human who has mentally detached from the non-modern. Demirhan's statement regarding modern consciousness and the modern human: 'Because modern consciousness runs in the form of informing the human about things they do not need; thus, the human is deprived of the impulses that will transform them and have an external impact. The inner world remains hidden within, in a state of confusion. As a result, it becomes timid towards the outside world. Ultimately, it is transformed into an abstract social entity; it is forced to settle for the abstract definition provided by the status it has acquired: In fact, such consciousness is a consciousness that 'belongs not to the individual existence of man, but to his social and herd-like nature.' (Demirhan, 2004, p. 90) These words are both striking and shed light on modern consciousness and what modern man is.

The Development of Modernity and the Crises Modernity Has Reached Today

When we examine the crisis that modernity has reached today in terms of modern consciousness and the development of modern man from a historical and sociological perspective, we see that it stems from modernity being intertwined with phenomena such as globalisation, capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, neoliberal policies, and most importantly, the 'monoculturalism' sought to be created through 'othering'. However, this also draws its foundation from the core philosophy of modernity:

> 'According to this narrative, being subject to time and history means embarking on a path towards the "modern" goal. Although these paths may differ within these teleological boundaries, there is no other goal, no other destination; our fate is the same.

> Furthermore, it claims sole ownership of the present, the contemporary, both as the defining goal and in the sense of modernity. Therefore, from a modernist perspective, those who are different, those who are "other", have no place in the 'now", in that contemporary space; they do not belong to the contemporary place.
>
> In this respect, modernity has no place for any radical difference and therefore no tolerance for such difference. However, it can be tolerant towards 'others' who are authorised by it, who are subject to its authority and have obtained a licence from it, or who are registered in its population. Moreover, intolerance towards different others is also a moral obligation for it (Bauman, 1992, p. xiv). For example, if we listen to Spinoza, if I know the truth and you are ignorant, it is my moral duty to change your thoughts and your path; to refrain from doing so would be tyranny and selfishness' (Tuğrul, 2006, p. 1).

The phenomenon of globalisation, which presents a dilemma for modernity, also plays a significant role in driving it towards crisis at this point. Indeed, as Demirhan (2004, p. 8) states: 'Beyond this, it can also be said that 'globalisation" has in some way overcome modernity. This overcoming is not in the form of subduing it or producing an alternative to it. Therefore, when traced back to its roots, 'globalisation' is the result of a process that began with modernity. Ultimately, even if it 'all that is solid melts into air' [(see Berman, 1983)], modernity has also created its own solidity.' This solidity of modernity presents itself as one of its greatest handicaps.

As Edward Said insists in his book *Orientalism* (2006), it is the West that makes the East the East. More precisely, it is a result of this perspective that Europe places itself at the centre and labels everything else as the 'periphery' and 'backward places'. This perspective also paves the way for labelling 'others', or in other words, those who are not modern, as 'barbarians', 'those who need to be civilised', or 'uncivilised'. As a result of this labelling, colonisation or imperialism is attempted to be legitimised.

Colonialism and imperialism also form another historical and sociological backdrop to the crisis that modernity has entered. Indeed, as Tuğrul (2006, pp. 1-2) points out, the explanation of the 'white man's burden' that European colonisers used to justify and legitimise their colonialism, claiming that they had actually 'civilised' and 'enlightened' the colonised peoples they had subjugated, and 'put them on the right track of history.' Similarly, the founders of the United States explained their advance into the West by ignoring and eliminating the Native American others as 'a duty imposed on their shoulders by destiny.' Attributing such a duty to themselves is another indication that they were conceived as the ruling subject of history. Consequently, in the book of modernism, there is no such thing as being 'tolerant' of 'difference,' 'leaving the other alone,' or opening oneself to the other, to otherness. There is assimilating the other, domesticating the other, excluding the other, eliminating the other. Therefore, being modern also means being positioned for colonisation, and in this respect, there is nothing surprising or abnormal about the history of modernisation also being a history of imperialism and colonialism.

Just as modernism produced concepts such as the old, the traditional, the non-modern, and the need for civilisation, the Orientalist perspective also created the dichotomy between the West and the 'East,' giving rise to the idea that the East must be subordinate to the West and must progress in order to reach the same level as the West. Through colonialism, exploitation was legitimised, and the 'other' and the 'exploitation of the other' were created. In the Althusserian sense (2005; 2024), ideological formation tools were developed to reproduce this. However, the concept of modernity is a relative one: modern to whom and to what? Because what one person sees as modern, another may not. This can also be categorised as 'decadence,' 'alienation from the essence,' 'destruction of human nature,' or 'technological slavery.' For this reason, which

consciousness is modern and which is not, or in other words, which is traditional, is a matter open to debate. For when we describe a phenomenon or situation as 'modern,' we automatically define and classify other phenomena and situations as 'non-modern' or 'traditional.' If we define modernity as 'advanced' or 'having reached the level of civilisation of the age,' then anything that is not modern is naturally described as 'not advanced,' 'not having reached the level of civilisation of the age,' or, in short, 'backward.' For this reason, since the concepts of modernity and modernisation are mostly associated with the West, i.e. Europe, Europe has become the centre of modernity. All other societies must follow in the West's wake like a 'tail' and strive to become like it. When they catch up, they will have become a modern society or individuals with a modern consciousness.

It is evident that the concepts of modernity, modern consciousness, and modernisation, which Europe has defined by placing itself at the centre, labelling part of the world as 'them' (Western) and the rest as 'Eastern,' 'backward,' etc., are actually manufactured ideas and, in Anderson's (2006) sense, *Imagined Communities.* Perhaps the primary historical and sociological reason underlying the crisis of modernity in our era stems from the fact that it is a fabricated, imaginary concept, much like nationalism. We can say that the ideological foundations of being European were laid with the creation of these concepts. This is precisely why, although the historical and sociological background of the crisis modernity has entered today may seem obscure, it is actually quite clear. It is inevitable that modernity, blended with capitalism, colonisation, neoliberal policies, and of course globalisation and othering ideology, should be driven into crisis today. In this sense, we must emphasise that modernity is, above all, an ideology. Lefebvre offers a radical critique of modernity in his book series *Critique of*

*Everyday Life (*Lefebvre, 1991; 2002; 2008). Lefebvre states the following about modernity:

> 'Today, this unresolved controversy is receding with modernity itself Modernity appears as an ideology -that is to say, a series of more or less developed representations that concealed a practice. Modernity was promising. What did it promise? Happiness, the satisfaction of all needs. This *promesse de bonheur* - no longer through beauty, but by technical means - was to be realized in daily life. In fact, the ideology of modernity above all masked daily life as the site of continuity, by floating the illusion of a rupture with the previous epoch. Now that this illusion has been dispelled and modernity dismissed, discussions about its essence and significance have lost some of their interest. What survives of this period is the general slide from a concreteness derived from nature towards the abstract- concrete as the mode of social existence, something that extends to works of art. The predominance of abstraction in art goes together with the extension of the world of commodities and of the commodity as world, as w ell as the unlimited power of money and capital, which are simultaneously highly abstract and extremely concrete. The art work thus renounces its previous status: proximity to, and even imitation of, nature. It is detached and released from naturalism. This likewise goes together with the short-lived triumph of the most abstract signs- for example, banking and monetary dummy entries - over what remains of concrete reference systems.' (Lefebre, 2008, pp.49-50).

In conclusion, we can quite rightly say that the crisis modernity has entered into cannot simply be described as a 'failure' or 'end'. Rather, this crisis is actually enabling the emergence of new, pluralistic and more modest spaces for thought and action by shattering the ultimate illusion of modernity's singularity, inevitability and universality. Because what is now being questioned is not whether we are 'modern' or not, but what kind of shared life we will build, on what epistemological foundations and within what

ecological limits. For this reason, I believe we must resist modernity and what it imposes on us, and we must approach it critically. Therefore, it is essential to go beyond modernity and evaluate it from a critical perspective.

Thinking Beyond Modernity

As is well known, modernity has long been conceptualised as a Western-centric narrative of progress, a universal project of reason, and an inevitable historical process. However, this narrative is profoundly flawed and problematic. For the multidimensional crisis that modernity is currently undergoing—epistemic, ecological, political, and existential—clearly demonstrates that its fundamental claims are no longer sustainable. First, I must emphasise that modernity is a project, and one of the most fundamental critiques of this project emerges from its inseparable relationship with knowledge and power. Michel Foucault's (1980; 2012) work is highly beneficial in revealing how the modern mind became a technology of surveillance, classification, and discipline through the discourses of rationality and 'normality.' Foucault's analysis shows how modernity's promise of liberation actually masked new forms of domination in which bodies and minds were controlled in more subtle ways. Similarly, postcolonial and decolonial thinkers argue that modernity's claim to universality is in fact the transformation of a specific geographical and historical experience—that of Western Europe—into an imperial universal. For example, strikingly, Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2009) call to *Provincializing Europe* has pointed to the need for historical writing and social theory to break free from their dependence on universalised European categories by moving beyond their own specific contexts. Similarly, Walter Mignolo (2011) proposes 'postcolonial thought' as a way to overcome the epistemic injustice created by modernity and to make alternative forms of knowledge visible through 'epistemic insubordination'.

However, the ecological crisis, in my view, is precisely the ultimate failure of modernity's domination over nature and its dogma of unlimited progress. Jason W. Moore's (2025) concept of *Capitalocene* reveals that the climate crisis is not simply an 'environmental problem,' but rather a product of the exploitative and transformative relationship that modern capitalist civilisation has established with nature. Does modernity's linear understanding of time and its constant expectation of future growth not clash decisively with planetary boundaries (see: Rockström et al., 2009)?

On the other hand, the collapse of modernity's grand narratives does not point to absolute nihilism or simple postmodern scepticism. On the contrary, this collapse paves the way for different worldviews, local knowledge and the pursuit of radical democracy. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2015) defends the idea of 'epistemological pluralism' against the 'epistemic annihilation' created by the dominant epistemology of the modern West. According to him, there is no single path to rationality for understanding the world; it is necessary to listen to and include in dialogue the 'unheard knowledge' that arises from different cultural experiences. This perspective clearly shows that modernity not only marginalises individuals, groups, societies and identities it has 'othered', but also recognises them as subjects possessing knowledge and practices of alternative futures.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that modernity emerged as a historical project shaped by the Enlightenment, scientific revolutions and industrial transformations, centred on reason, progress and universality. Modernism, on the other hand, represented a radical break with tradition in the cultural and aesthetic spheres on this intellectual foundation. Modernisation can be understood as the process of spreading these ideals at the institutional, social and

global levels. However, the narratives of ‘universal’ ‘liberation’, ‘rationality’ and ‘progress’ promised by modernity have also brought with them deep contradictions and crises. The Western-centric epistemological framework has produced a ‘colonial’ and ‘Orientalist language of domination’ that disregards the ‘other’; the discourse of modernisation has presented itself as a ‘uniform’, ‘linear’ and ‘imposed’ model of progress. As expressed in Bauman’s definition of ‘liquid modernity,’ unfortunately, modern societies are increasingly evolving towards an ‘uncertain,’ ‘insecure,’ and ‘fragmented’ structure.

Let us acknowledge that what we call modernity has now evolved into a multi-layered crisis with epistemic, ecological and existential dimensions. Precisely as Foucault pointed out, the relationships between knowledge and power, Chakrabarty’s call to ‘ruralise Europe,’ Mignolo’s conceptualisation of ‘epistemic insubordination,’ and Santos’ proposal of ‘epistemological pluralism’ clearly demonstrate that modernity’s claims to universality are no longer sustainable. Similarly, the ecological crisis also indicates that modern humanity has reached the limits of its domination over nature and its dogma of unlimited growth.

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BÖLÜM 2

CAPITALISM, NEOLIBERAL POLICIES, AND MIGRATION IN THE MODERN AGE

Recep BAYDEMİR[1]

Introduction

> 'The migrant deaths, which have reached near-genocidal proportions and cannot be prevented, must be regarded as a clear violation of the most fundamental human right: the right to life. After all, these deaths did not occur as a result of a natural disaster. So, who is violating the most fundamental human right of migrants: the right to life? Is it only the internal conditions of the countries of which they are citizens that force migrants to embark on a journey of death with their families? Who is responsible for the wars, poverty, and despotic regimes that force these people into migration and death journeys?' (Müftüoğlu, 2016, p.11).

According to data from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), there were 281 million international migrants worldwide at the end of 2024 (IOM, 2024). According to data from the UNHCR/United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, by the end of 2024, there will be more than 281 million migrants

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worldwide; 5.9 million people in need of international protection; 31 million refugees, 73.5 million internally displaced persons and 8.4 million asylum seekers (see: UNHCR, 2016; 2022; 2024) Again, according to UNHCR, "At the end of 2024, 123.2 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations and events seriously disturbing public order." (UNHCR, 2024, p.2).

In the 21st century, as a result of neoliberal policies and capitalism, what is it that leads to people being forcibly displaced due to war, violence and conflict, being put on boats and ferries, and drowning at sea? Who is responsible for these people whose right to life is clearly violated, whose right to life is taken away? And most importantly, are those who enact laws for the legal rights of migrants the same as those who force them to migrate? If so, what advantage could such laws possibly offer migrants? Ultimately, would it be an excessive claim to suggest that the political power of people forced to migrate has been transformed into a tool in the hands of those in power or those aspiring to power?

In particular, migrant deaths in the Mediterranean, along the Mexico-US border, and in Southeast Asia highlight the tragic scale of this phenomenon. We must remember that the deaths occurring along these routes, described by Müftüoğlu (2016) as a 'death corridor' and by Ar as a 'migrant graveyard' (see: Ar, 2025a), are not mere accidents but should be considered systematic human rights violations. For this reason, our quest to answer the question posed in the motto of this study will indirectly lead us to capitalism and neoliberal policies. Below, maps showing the distribution of displaced persons (map 1) and refugees (map 2) by country towards the middle of 2025 demonstrate the globalisation of migration and forced migration on the one hand (see: Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014), while also revealing the relationship between neoliberal policies, capitalism, and migration.

Map 1: *Distribution of forcibly displaced people worldwide by country towards the middle of 2025*



Source: *(UNHCR, 2025).*

Map 2: *Distribution of refugees worldwide by country towards the middle of 2025*



Source: *(UNHCR, 2025).*

In this chapter of the book, which aims to analyse contemporary migration movements within the context of the functioning of the global capitalist system and the spread of neoliberal policies, I argue that migration, refugeehood, displacement and asylum-seeking are among the significant consequences of capitalism and globalisation in the modern era. My fundamental argument is that contemporary migration dynamics are a structural outcome of the historical development of capitalism and neoliberal transformation. Migration is not merely demographic mobility but also a reflection of global economic inequalities, political instability, and social transformations. Considering that Harvey likens the circulation of capital to 'the blood that gives life to the political body of capitalist societies' (Harvey, 2010, p. VI), we can say that migrant labour has also become an indispensable element of this circulation. However, Castles and others, in their work characterising the modern era as the age of migration, have focused on migration movements alongside the phenomenon of globalisation (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014). Yet globalisation itself is not independent of the capitalist system. Therefore, a discussion must also be conducted on what globalisation, capitalism, and neoliberal policies are.

The Historical Course of Capitalism and the Relationship with Migration

Firstly, the birth of capitalism was a process that necessitated the mobility of labour power and means of production. Merchant capitalism, which developed in Europe from the 16th century onwards, initiated the first mass forced migration movements alongside the colonial project. The transatlantic slave trade from Africa to America constituted the darkest chapter in capitalism's primitive accumulation process and forcibly displaced millions of people (see: Williams, 2021). This process represents one of the earliest examples of the circulation of labour power as a commodity.

However, the Industrial Revolution brought about a qualitative transformation in migration dynamics. Internal migration from rural areas to cities became the fundamental dynamic in the formation of the working class. Marx (2024) emphasised that 'free' labour power, separated from the means of production, was essential for capitalist production. Practices such as the Enclosure Movement in England forced peasants off their land and into cities, thereby creating the industrial proletariat (Polanyi, 2001).

On the other hand, the Fordist accumulation regime that prevailed in the mid-20th century aimed to establish a balance between mass production and mass consumption. During this period, the rapid growth in Western European and North American economies during the post-Second World War reconstruction process necessitated planned migration programmes to fill labour shortages. Germany's 'guest worker' (Gastarbeiter) programme, France's recruitment of workers from its former colonies, and labour migration from Turkey to Europe are typical examples of this period (see: Castles, 1970). Indeed, during the Fordist era, migration was seen as a phenomenon that responded to economic needs and was generally assumed to be temporary, under the active control and regulation of nation-states. However, the oil crisis and economic stagnation of the 1970s led to the questioning of these policies, with many 'guest workers' becoming permanent and migration gaining continuity through family reunification.

Neoliberal Transformation and the Globalisation of Migration

As is well known, from the late 1970s onwards, with the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state model, neoliberalism became the dominant paradigm of global economic-politics. Harvey (2005) defines neoliberalism as 'the promotion of market competition in all areas, the liberalisation of trade and finance, the privatisation of state property, and the subjection of public services to market

mechanisms'. In this paradigm, the role of the state is limited to removing barriers to the market and protecting private property rights, rather than regulating markets and ensuring social welfare.

Neoliberal policies were imposed on less developed and developing countries as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, within the framework of the Washington Consensus. The austerity policies implemented under these programmes have led to cuts in public spending, the privatisation of social services and the removal of agricultural subsidies (Stiglitz, 2007). These policies have deepened widespread poverty, unemployment and social inequality, particularly in the Global South, depriving people of their livelihoods and making migration almost the only reasonable option. Moreover, one of the most striking features of the neoliberal era is the vast increase in the international circulation of capital, contrasted with the strict restriction of labour mobility through rigid border controls, visa regimes, and anti-immigrant policies. Sassen (1990) calls this the 'paradox of control': while capital knows no borders, the movement of people is protected as the sovereign domain of nation-states. This asymmetry has reinforced a global division of labour. The shift of production to cheap labour pools has also dismantled traditional economies in these regions. The resulting new situation forced the rural population into cities and international migration. The new situation that emerged also forced the rural population to migrate to cities and abroad. At the same time, the growth of the service sector in Northern countries has increased dependence on migrant labour in low-paid, precarious jobs such as care work, cleaning, construction and agriculture. Migrants have thus formed the 'flexible' and 'low-cost' labour reserve of neoliberal economies (see: Standing, 2011).

The Political Economy of Migration: Capital, Labour and Space

First and foremost, migrant labour in neoliberal capitalism is subject to a double marginalisation. First, their irregular status or temporary work permits deprive them of basic labour rights (minimum wage, social security, unionisation, occupational safety). Second, they face discrimination due to their ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences and are often stigmatised as 'the other'. This situation creates a 'hyper-exploitable' workforce for employers (Massey et al., 1993). Global care chains clearly reveal the gendered dimension of this exploitation mechanism. Female migrants from the Philippines, Sri Lanka or Eastern Europe, while working in jobs such as caring for the elderly, sick and children in Western countries, often delegate the care needs of their own families to other women for lower wages (see: Hochschild, 2015). This chain represents the global commodification of emotional labour and a transfer of value through the bodies of migrant women.

However, Harvey (2002) argues that crises of capital accumulation are attempted to be overcome through spatial transformations. 'The production of space' is a process that absorbs surplus capital and creates new areas of profit. Migration is both the driving force and the result of this process. Mass migrations create demand shocks in housing markets, driving up rents and property prices. As noted in the dossier, while this generates enormous profits for real estate capital, it leaves both locals and migrants facing a housing crisis. The fact that Syrian migrants, in particular, are forced to live in grocery stores, warehouses and tents due to economic conditions is a concrete manifestation of this crisis. Furthermore, the neighbourhoods where migrants typically settle (banlieues, ghettos, shanty towns) become the target of neoliberal urban policies. 'Urban renewal' or 'gentrification' projects transform these areas into spaces that can be revalued for capital, while migrant communities are

pushed further into marginalised areas (Smith, 2005). Migrants are both exploited as cheap labour and displaced from their living spaces in this process.

Moreover, in some of his works (see: Harvey, 2002; 2003; 2007; 2010; 2014), Harvey views 'dispossession' as a feature of capitalism and a contradiction of capital. Harvey (2003) argues that capitalist accumulation relies not only on the exploitation of surplus value but also on the mechanism of 'accumulation by dispossession'. This concept updates Marx's concept of primitive accumulation, explaining the transfer of wealth that occurs today through privatisation, financial manipulation, intellectual property rights, and forced displacement. Forced migration is one of the most obvious forms of this process. In this sense, when considering the issue in the context of migration, it can easily be said that migration and forced migration are direct instruments of dispossession. Leaving behind their homes, cars, vehicles, land, and, in short, their recognisable property and wealth, they abandon their place of origin and enter social life in their new locations as 'dispossessed' individuals. This makes it much easier to integrate them into the capitalist system in their new locations, turning them into an instrument of exploitation for capital.

Wars, conflicts, economic shocks, or mega-projects under the guise of development initiatives (dams, mines, motorways) are forcing people from their lands, homes, and livelihoods. As mentioned in the file, millions of people have become 'propertyless' overnight, as in the case of the Syrian civil war. In the countries they go to, they are again included in social and economic life as propertyless due to lack of legal status, language barriers and discrimination. This situation condemns them to the most precarious and lowest-paid jobs and makes them extremely vulnerable to capitalist exploitation. In this sense, migration is not merely a change

of location, but also a process of profound socio-economic disintegration and re-subjugation.

Politics, Ideology and Migration Governance

Despite its rhetoric of market freedom and individual autonomy, neoliberalism has been observed to be intertwined with authoritarian state practices. Wacquant (2009), while discussing 'the punitive face of neoliberalism,' argues that social problems such as poverty and migration are increasingly being controlled through policing and punitive methods. Migration governance has also taken shape within this framework. The border security industry, detention centres, rapid deportation procedures and biometric control technologies have militarised human mobility under the guise of 'managing' the influx of migrants (Andersson, 2014). In particular, I see Trump's policy of building a wall on the Mexican border or the European Union's patrol activities in the Mediterranean through Frontex as part of a political discourse that frames migrants as an 'invasion' or 'threat'. I believe this discourse serves to externalise economic and social problems within domestic politics and to consolidate the power of populist leaders.

Furthermore, the economic insecurity, social fragmentation and identity crisis created by neoliberal policies have fuelled the rise of far-right movements. Migrants have become an easy target in this context. As highlighted in the dossier, leaders such as Bolsonaro and Trump have defended neoliberal economic programmes (privatisation, deregulation, tax cuts) while simultaneously developing a discourse based on chauvinism, nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment. This paradoxical situation is actually consistent: the social anger caused by deepening inequalities through economic policies is directed towards 'external groups' such as immigrants, while the real economic power relations remain hidden behind the scenes (Brown, 2019).

For this reason, it is not surprising that politicians and leaders who support neoliberal policies are far-right, particularly known for their anti-immigrant stance. Brazil's far-right leader Bolsonaro supports neoliberal policies. Another such leader is Trump. He was a far-right Republican leader who supported capitalist and neoliberal policies. During his presidency, he built a border wall between his country and Mexico to prevent migrants from Mexico and Latin America from entering. Trump is known for his anti-immigrant policies. Therefore, it should not be surprising that politicians and leaders who advocate anti-immigrant policies also defend neoliberal policies. However, this alone gives us a clue about the relationship between immigration and neoliberal policies.

In this sense, migrants are constructed as 'the other' not only in the labour market but also in the cultural and symbolic sphere. "Integration" and 'assimilation' policies often aim, through an assimilationist logic, to erase migrants' cultural differences and incorporate them into the dominant national identity. When they fail, the blame is placed on the 'non-conformity' of immigrants (Kymlicka, 1995). As stated in the dossier, these policies can be seen as the 'first conscious steps' towards assimilation. This process leads to immigrants being subjected to a constant 'test of belonging' and citizenship being redefined as a privilege.

Humanitarian Consequences, Rights, Othering and Exclusion

The international migration regime has created a complex hierarchy of statuses that categorises migrants into various groups: refugee, asylum seeker, conditional refugee, temporary protection status holder, irregular migrant, etc. Each of these statuses offers a different package of rights and obligations. While the 1951 Refugee Convention provides protection to those who fear persecution due to race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, those who migrate due to climate change,

extreme poverty, or a general climate of violence are excluded from this protection. The 'Temporary Protection Status' granted to Syrians in Turkey is an example of this situation. Although this status provides limited access to fundamental rights (health, education), the uncertainty regarding a permanent solution (local integration, resettlement in a third country or voluntary return) keeps individuals in a state of perpetual transience and insecurity (see: İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016). Legal loopholes and arbitrary practices leave migrants at the mercy of states and international organisations. Migrants face a multi-layered mechanism of exclusion in their countries of arrival. Economic exclusion (unemployment, precarious work), spatial exclusion (confinement to ghettos), social exclusion (inability to access social networks) and symbolic exclusion (stigmatisation in the media, hate speech) are intertwined (Castles, 2000). This situation is compounded for the most vulnerable groups within migrant communities. Numerous academic studies have shown how migrants are othered in the perceptions of local communities and are stigmatised and subjected to social exclusion (see: Baydemir & Benek, 2022a; Ar, 2025b).

In his book *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism,* Harvey draws on a metaphor inspired by the work of his namesake William Harvey on the importance of blood circulation for the body, viewing capital as 'the blood that gives life to the political body of capitalist societies' (Harvey, 2010, p. VI). He states that the circulation of capital is a flow, and that this flow is like the flow of blood in the human body. Just as the heart stops and the body dies when the flow of blood stops, the cessation of the flow of capital plunges capitalism into crisis (Harvey, 2010, pp. VI-VII).

Consequently, migrants often find themselves in disadvantaged positions in their new destinations. As they enter their new societies as 'outsiders,' they also 'infect' the economic bloodstreams of these societies. This infection makes the circulation

of capital much easier and cheaper. By joining the cheap labour market in their new locations (which we often see in mass migration), they significantly contribute to economic circulation on the one hand, while on the other hand, they are placed at the centre of social, economic and political problems in their new locations. In this sense, they are always found to be in the wrong in the problems they experience with the local population. In the dilemma between locals and migrants, it is always the locals who win. On the one hand, they are often deprived of many rights, such as being a minority in the places they go to, not being granted work status, citizenship, or refugee status. On the other hand, it is seen that political powers often turn them into campaign material and objects of exclusion in order to win votes in elections. In this sense, all forced migrations appear to be part of a global game played by neoliberal policies and the capitalist system (see: Harvey, 2007; 2010; 2014). Therefore, while migration is used on the one hand as a tool for the circulation of capital and for political powers to achieve their objectives, on the other hand, the crises created by this tool can be interpreted as a crisis of capitalism, which is a combination of both power and capital crises. Consequently, the problems experienced in the modern era concerning migration and migrants appear to be contradictions and crises of neoliberalism and capitalism.

Indeed, migrants can play a pioneering role in changing housing prices in the places they go to. Especially in mass migration events, migrants look for housing to settle in their living space, their home. Increased demand for housing changes housing prices and the amount of 'rent'. This change generally manifests itself as an upward increase. Therefore, this is a situation that facilitates the flow of capital and pleases capitalists. This is because capital is the only party positively affected by the increase in supply and demand. However, there are also those who are negatively affected. Locals, especially migrants, are negatively affected. Migrants struggle to

find homes for sale or rent (usually rent) according to their economic conditions. This is the main reason why Syrian migrants, who struggle to find housing, are forced to live in grocery stores, warehouses, barns, tents, and shacks. Unable to find accommodation within their budget, they struggle to pay the rent when they do find it, and as a result, most are 'evicted' by their landlords. Although the increase in rental prices in residential areas may please capital, this situation soon leads to economic and social problems in society. In this situation, political power, as always, finds itself caught between the local population, migrants and capital. Capital always wins. This is because political powers have always sided with capital. This is necessary for capitalism, as Harvey describes it politically and economically, to generate surplus value. However, the fact that this surplus value and profit margin is directed towards capital, victimising those outside of capital and subsequently causing problems, can be seen as contradictions of capitalism.

On the other hand, one of the consequences of mass migration is the negative change in the socio-economic status of people forced to migrate (see: Baydemir & Benek, (2022b; Türkoğlu & Elmastaş, 2024). This also turns them into cheap labour in their new locations. This benefits capitalism and capital the most.

Conclusion

In the modern era, migration has emerged as a structural component and inevitable consequence of the neoliberal phase of the capitalist mode of production. While ensuring the geographical flexibility of the labour supply necessary for the global circulation of capital, it also represents the movement of those affected by the destruction caused by this circulation (war, poverty, environmental degradation). Migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and forcibly displaced persons occupy a dual position within the system: they are both an indispensable resource ('cheap labour') and a 'threat' that

must be kept under control. This duality is clearly evident in the migration policies of the neoliberal world. On the one hand, this manifests as a structural dependence on migrant labour, and on the other, as the militarisation of borders and internal police control.

Returning to the fundamental questions posed in the motto at the very beginning of this chapter: It is not only civil wars or despotic regimes that violate the right to life of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, forcing them onto deadly journeys. Underlying these is the global capitalist system itself, based on the unequal distribution of resources and wealth, exploitation and structural violence. Does the washing up of the lifeless bodies of people, especially migrant children, on the shore while trying to migrate not symbolise not only the tragedy of a family but also the moral bankruptcy of a civilisation?

Changing the current situation requires a new paradigm that views human mobility not as a threat, but as a natural and historical right of humanity. This requires opening safe and legal migration routes, recognising that human rights apply to everyone, combating the structural causes that trigger migration (such as unequal trade, the climate crisis, and armament) like capitalism and neoliberal policies, and ultimately building an economic system that does not commodify people or plunder the planet. Let us not forget that migration is not a crisis. Migration should be accepted as part of humanity's shared history and future, and collective efforts should be made to build rights-based, fair and solidarity-based policies in this vein. However, we must also emphasise that in the modern era, the phenomenon of migration now stands before us as a significant consequence of neoliberal policies, globalisation, and capitalism.

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BÖLÜM 3

ANDROPHOBIA IN TURKISH WOMEN

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This research note claims that Turkish women have androphobia due to the increasing rate of femicide and gender-based violence. It is estimated that each year, hundreds of Turkish women and girls are murdered by their intimate partners or other family members. It is reported that every year since 2017, more than 400 hundred women and girls are killed intentionally across Türkiye. I assert that due to the epidemic of femicide/feminicide and gender-based violence, Turkish women are severely traumatized and develop androphobia. Women are scared of getting romantically involved with men, marrying or even asking for a divorce in that regard. Over these years, I have come to notice that Turkish women and girls with no history of domestic violence are, too, subjected to this phobia owing to the female homicides and exhibit similar symptoms. In this study, I argue that Turkish women and girls suffer from androphobia and scared of being murdered. To survive, they cope with androphobia in various ways.

Femicide or feminicide, the intentional killing of women and girls because of their gender, is "a violation of some of the most basic human rights, namely the right to life, liberty and personal security"

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(Corradi, 2021: 10) whilst gender-based violence is "a general term used to capture any type of violence that is rooted in exploiting unequal power relationships between genders" (NYC.gov, 2025). Gender-based violence is chiefly manifested as "elder abuse, sexual violence, stalking and human trafficking" (NYC.gov, 2025) whilst femicide exists in various forms and "very often such killings are not isolated incidents but rather the culmination of pre-existing forms of gender-based violence that affect all regions and countries worldwide" (UNODC, 2024, p. 10). Three types of femicide are identified as "intentional homicides of women and girls perpetrated by intimate partners, intentional homicides of women and girls perpetrated by other family members," and, lastly, "intentional homicides of women and girls committed by perpetrators other than intimate partners or other family members and where the killing meets at least one of eight criteria identified in the Statistical framework" (UNODC, 2024, p. 10). The first two forms of femicide are committed mostly in domestic sphere whereas the latter is committed by perpetrators other than family members or partners in places other than home or in public sphere, such as workplace, street, clubs or cafes. "In Turkey, the occurrence of femicide has exhibited a particularly troubling increase since the 2000s, primarily attributed to the escalation of divorce rates" (Akbaş and Karataş, 2024, p. 55), and what is worse, there are no official records of the rate of femicide kept by the government. In the year 2024, precisely 451 women and girls fell victim to femicide perpetrated by intimate partner, family members and males other than family members and partners. In the first six months of 2025, 254 women and girls have been murdered. These numbers are reported by "We Will Stop Femicide Platform". (We Wiil Stop Femicide Platform, 2025) and the rate of femicide in 2025 is expected to be much higher.

Causes of femicide vary across the globe and "Statistics such as these, and other country level data, had already started to fuel the view of femicide and violence against women (and children) more generally, as a global crisis" (Gibbon and Walklate, 2023, p. 239). The most common motive behind femicide across Türkiye is "jealousy/infidelity, followed by altercations, jealousy/infidelity related to separation, envy / honor and custom-related killings"

(Toprak and Ersoy, 2017, p. 11). As for the methods of killing, "edged and pointed weapons and firearm injuries were the most common cause of death" (Toprak and Ersoy, 2017, p. 7). Injury location accordingly varies and "the head was the most common target for firearm wounds" (Toprak and Ersoy, 2017, p. 7) whilst "the thoracic region was the most common target for edged and pointed weapon wounds" (Toprak and Ersoy, 2017, pp. 7-8). As for the characteristics of perpetrators in Türkiye, "the typical perpetrator of femicide is a person with a low level of education, but he is usually employed" (Toprak and Ersoy, 2017, p. 10) even though it should be emphasized that it is not possible to talk about the presence of a fixed type of perpetrator.

Femicide is political "regardless of the victim-perpetrator relationship because the perpetrator holds political power supported by a hierarchical system" (Aldrete et al., 2024) and "It takes many forms depending on cultural, social, and legal contexts, but at its core, femicide is driven by a belief in male dominance and the devaluation of women's lives" (Freitag, 2025, p. 7). We Will Stop Femicide Platform, too, links femicide with patriarchal system, stating that "Patriarchy is the reason behind the loss of so many lives. Rather than acknowledging this social reality and understanding women, men are responding women's quest for rights with violence and putting obstacles in their way" (We Will Stop Femicide Platform, 2025). Males deny the subjectivity of females, regarding them rather as the second sex, objects and commodities and labelling them as the other. This mindset is reinforced by a patriarchal culture which serves to perpetuate female victimisation along with male delusions of grandeur and this is precisely why "The psychological and behavioral patterns of femicide perpetrators reveal a disturbing mix of control, emotional instability, inferiority complex and often hidden violence" (Freitag, 2025, p. 10). This blatant sexism is possible to discern in media portrayals of perpetrators accordingly, as "Women who murder are visible as women, while men who murder are viewed simply as killers" (Gurian, 2011, p. 16). And, more often than not, patriarchy is cited as the exact reason for victim-blaming and perpetrator-justification through the media.

There are countless cases of femicide and femicide-suicide across Türkiye. The most extreme cases of intimate partner femicide are the murder of Emine Bulut in 2020, Ayşe Tokyaz in 2025, Münevver Karabulut in 2009, Sinem Yurdanur in 2010, Güleda Cankel in 2019, Pınar Gültekin in 2020, and Hülya Tortop in 2024. These females were murdered by their (former) spouses, (former) boyfriends and fiancé. Cases of femicide disguised as suicide or accidental death are the killing of Duygu Bölükbaşı in 2022, Rojin Kabaiş in 2024, Gamze Yağlıoğlu in 2021, Tuğba Yavaş in 2025, Duygu Delen in 2020, Esin Güneş in 2010, Semra Baysal and Şule Çet in 2018. These females died by falling from a height, from drowning or by hanging, and they were not alone at the time of the incident. Cases of femicide related with honour and custom are the murder of Güldünya Tören in 2004, Ceylan Soysal in 2011, and Ayşe A. in 2016. Cases of femicide committed by other perpetrators are the murder of Pippa Bacca in 2008, Özgecan Aslan in 2016, Başak Cengiz and Azra Gülendam Haytaoğlu in 2021, and Ceren Özdemir and Ceren Damar Şenel in 2019. Femicide-suicide, along with feminicide, is rife in Türkiye. Femicide-suicide occurs when the perpetrator commits suicide in the aftermath of femicide, and “This usually happens in relationships where the man feels he’s losing control, especially during or after a breakup. These acts are often linked to jealousy, depression, or a belief that the woman "belongs" to him” (Freitag, 2025, p. 7).

Survivors of attempted femicide, children who witness femicide within the domestic setting or/and orphaned by femicidal violence experience post-traumatic stress disorder in the aftermath of the incident. In the vast majority of cases, the women who fall victim to the femicide are also mothers, and yet “Little is known about the number of orphaned children who have instantaneously lost both parents (one from death, the other from incarceration or suicide)” (Ferrara et al., 2015, p. 2). Nevertheless children, like their mothers that fall victim to male violence, are invisible and “As attention is focused on the victim and on the perpetrator of the crime, the couple’s children become the neglected victims” (Ferrara et al., 2015, p. 4). Symptoms they are reported to exhibit due to post-traumatic stress disorder are nightmares, insomnia, flashbacks,

dissociation, eating disorders, anxiety, and "recurring thoughts, images, sound of the moment of murder" (Akbaş and Karataş, 2022, p. 11). Unless treated, post-traumatic stress disorder is aggravated by depersonalization and derealization and neurosis is followed by psychosis.

Females and children who survive the attempted femicide and bystanders who witness the incident are afflicted with post-traumatic stress disorder whilst other females develop androphobia owing to the frequency and quantity of these incidents and constant exposure to male violence in public, on television and in social media. Hence, death anxiety is ingrained in the collective and individual unconscious of females. They are scared of falling victim to male violence as in the cases of femicide portrayed in the mainstream media and this fear triggers androphobia.

As a type of anxiety disorder, androphobia "falls under the category of a specific phobic disorder. This means that you are afraid of, or anxious around, a particular entity (in this case, males). As a result, you may avoid situations involving men or experience strong anxiety when these situations occur" (Cleveland Clinic, 2021). A crucial distinction should be drawn between misandry and androphobia. The former refers to hatred of men whereas the latter to fear of men. Females are particularly prone to androphobia and, more often than not, androphobia is rooted in childhood, but it may intensify during adolescence. Androphobia might be linked to a frightening experience or the presence of a stressful situation as in the case of "child abuse, domestic abuse or other violence; an intimidating or overbearing authority figure or bully (teacher, parent or boss)" and, lastly, "sexual assault, harassment or rape" (Cleveland Clinic, 2021). The female subject might directly experience or simply witness these types of events or situations. At times, these same causes might lead to post-traumatic stress disorder in some individuals.

Manifestation of androphobia varies with each subject and the symptoms, from mild to severe, might be identified as: growing anxiety around men, intense fear, being mentally confused, sweating, "active avoidance of men or situations where you might

encounter men; or feeling intense worry or fear in situations where you encounter men" (Cirino, 2018), irregular heartbeats, feeling short of breath, and trembling. Androphobia has emotional, cognitive, behavioural and physical impact on women and requires therapy and medications. It should be kept in mind that it is "an intense fear of men that is disproportionate to the threat they might pose and that negatively affects a person's ability to function" (Villines, 2024), daily life, and work or school performance, career, and relationships. In this context, I contend that what distinguishes post-traumatic stress disorder from androphobia is the absence of actual experience of gender-related violence or attempted femicide and witnessing such an incident /being present at the time of the incident. I contend that femicide and gender-based violence amplify androphobia and infix a chronic phobia of men in women.

As a woman with no history of domestic violence or gender-related violence and without witnessing acts of femicide or incidents of male violence, I have come to notice that I have developed androphobia due to being constantly exposed to news of femicide on social media platforms as Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, X, Telegram and WhatsApp, and TV Programs. The murder of Münevver Karabulut brought about a traumatic effect on the Turkish females and promoted a heightened awareness of femicide across Türkiye. We, Turkish girls and women, began to experience fear and anxiety about relationships and the external world which did not seem safe and sound. The outside world did not offer a maternal space, but a paternal space which promoted male violence. To open up about my experience, I became more cautious and fearful in the presence of men, reminding myself of the fact that man has the potential to kill a woman at anytime and anywhere without any motive. With the violent murder of Özgecan Arslan, I stopped taking the bus, and buses and male drivers functioned as a trigger for me. Despite the extra expense, I preferred to take a taxi to feel safe. With the murder of Başak Cengiz and Ceren Özdemir, I stopped going out at evenings and felt fearful at dusk, rightfully thinking that a male stranger could approach me behind and kill me with no reason. I experienced attacks of anxiety while returning home from work at evenings and had to look behind over and over to check whether a

male was following me. As an academic, I felt restless and anxious in the presence of male students, particularly at times when I had to invigilate, since I was deeply scared about being killed in the same way as Ceren Damar Şenel. I, either, do not feel at comfort in the presence of male colleagues, especially authority figures who manipulate their powers and position to intimidate me just because I am a more capable and qualified academic. As they are unable to beat me as intellectually, they try to dominate me entirely with their physical capacity and undermine me at academic life. I have learned not to trust male colleagues at a great expense in this regard. With the murder of Ayşe Tokyaz and Pınar Gültekin, I am frightened of getting romantically involved with men and experience attacks of anxiety when a male comes into a direct contact with me, thinking that, in Turkish context, you can get into a relationship with your consent but cannot leave it no matter what without the permission of the male partner. A female cannot leave but is only left by a male. The violent murders of Semra Baysal and Gamze Yağlıoğlu instilled fear in me that a female should never trust a male whether he be her intimate partner who once said he was deeply in love and could not live without her. It furthermore triggered a fear of heights in me and the phobia of being pushed off by a male. With the slaughtering of Emine Bulut and Ayşe Tortop, I began to feel desperately afraid of marriages, keeping in mind that the possibility of a divorce would be the death of me, not the end of our relationship. Even if you safely achieve in getting a divorce, you are still regarded as the object and commodity of your former husband.

I know I do not stand alone regarding my androphobia. There are thousands of Turkish women and girls who share the same fear and anxiety with me and desperately feel the need to be safe at home, on the streets, at cafes and in workplaces. To cope with the fear of femicide and androphobia, we, Turkish women, try to create a homosocial community with the absence of male. We support each other, promote solidarity with women against men and intentionally avoid men to survive. We do not hate men, we just fear them, and imagine a world where we can feel safe forever. We are not the second sex; we are human beings in the first place.

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BÖLÜM 4

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SUNDAY BREAKFAST: THE CASE OF NEVŞEHIR*

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Introduction

Consumption of food (nutrition) serves as both a physiological requirement for human survival and a socio-cultural occurrence (Simmel, 1997, p.131). From a cultural and social standpoint, dietary habits include personal taste preferences and culinary practices. Consequently, food surpasses its nutritional significance to serve as a medium of social interaction (Mariano-Juárez et al., 2023, p.1). Comprehending the historical and cultural contexts of food preferences and practices necessitates an understanding of the societal preferences, ideologies, practices, and significances linked to them (Medina, 2019). The role of food and eating practices in delineating class distinctions has been thoroughly examined, especially within sociology and anthropology. Bourdieu's

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(1984) foundational research on the dietary practices of 1960s and 1970s France initiated extensive investigations into the correlation between cuisine and social status (Mariano-Juárez et al., 2023, p.1). In his book Distinction, Bourdieu underscores the notion of taste as a domain in which class disparities are perpetuated. The dynamics of class-based inclusion or exclusion concerning food consumption manifest through this concept, positioning taste at the core of class reproduction mechanisms.

In everyday life, food consumption functions as a means of differentiation and delineation, revealing the class-based aspects of food (Utanır Karaduman, 2023, p.112). The ability of food and eating practices to signify class distinctions continues to be pertinent today. Food, as a socially constructed and continually evolving phenomenon, serves as a crucial medium for social differentiation (Mariano-Juárez et al., 2023, p.3). Dietary practices may differ according to socioeconomic status, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions. Food preferences, which delineate social classes, groups, and cultures, also reinforce individuals' status, position, and group identity (Bourdieu, 2015, p.258). In society, numerous tools facilitate interpersonal communication and socialization, with dining emerging as a significant one (Yıldızlar, 2021). Social class significantly impacts individuals' food preferences and eating behaviors, influenced by the intricate interplay of class resources, including economic, cultural, and social capital (Koç, 2024, p.76). From a cultural perspective, communal dining transcends mere sustenance; it also represents the exchange of a way of life (Taşpınar, 2018). The sharing of a meal among family members can positively contribute to the revitalization of their cultural fabric. Historically, family meals have evolved into relics or phenomena that perpetuate shared traditions in specific cultures (Wexelbaum, 2016). Regular family meals can represent collective family existence and function as indicators for the perpetuation of cultural traditions. Collective

dining practices not only physically unite family members but also enhance their mental and social well-being. Meals, whether consumed within the household or externally, substantially enhance social connections among family members (Fieldhouse, 2015, p.11).

Breakfast, as the initial meal of the day, plays a vital role in promoting family socialization and serving various social functions. It functions as a platform for the formation and exhibition of social roles, mirroring age- and gender-specific behavioral norms and practices rooted in the division of labor. Aside from these culturally variable elements, communal dining consistently possesses profound significance (Montanari, 2018, p.46). Meal consumption varies according to cultural contexts, times of day, and geographical locations (Spence, 2017, p.1). Breakfast styles, tempo, and related social interactions or organizations differ according to factors such as rural versus urban environments and historical epochs. Breakfast customs derived from agricultural production have transformed in industrialized or industrializing societies. This evolution signifies alterations in the cadence of professional life, education, and familial structures, encompassing the quantity and age of offspring. Seasonal variations also affect the foods ingested at breakfast and the settings in which breakfast is consumed. The socio-economic and socio-cultural attributes of individuals, along with their geographical context, influence breakfast practices.

Despite an expanding corpus of literature in Turkey regarding culinary culture, the class-based structuring of Sunday breakfast practices remains predominantly unexplored. Current research predominantly emphasizes nutrition, regional cuisines, or gastronomic tourism, thereby creating a significant void in the investigation of quotidian eating rituals as socially stratified phenomena. Heather Arndt Anderson (2013) observes that breakfast has historically functioned not only as a nutritional activity but also

as a culturally and symbolically significant ritual, embodying changing identities and social affiliations.

This research investigates the socio-cultural importance of breakfast in Turkey, analyzing class-based organizational disparities via fieldwork. The objective is to elucidate the cultural aspect of Sunday breakfast traditions in Nevşehir, situated in the core of Cappadocia, a notable tourist destination in Turkey. The Sunday breakfast culture, as a prevalent cultural phenomenon, is examined through ethnography to comprehend its implementation, variations among social classes, and interaction rituals. The researcher aims to illustrate the contemporary cultural landscape while filling a notable void in the literature by revealing the previously unexamined. This research represents a unique ethnographic examination in Turkey that scrutinizes the socio-cultural structure of Sunday breakfasts from the perspective of class stratification. This research enhances both gastronomic and sociological scholarship by analyzing the integration of class within commonplace domestic practices. Furthermore, it utilizes Bourdieu's concept of habitus to examine how food-related behaviors both signify and perpetuate class positions. Blake R. Silver (2020) asserts that cultural similarities or disparities based on class persist in influencing daily rituals into adulthood, a concept evident in breakfast practices. This study contributes to the literature on the interplay between breakfast culture, social class, and interpersonal relations, while also fostering a dialogue between gastronomy and sociology.

Conceptual Framework

On Breakfast

The term "breakfast," derived from the French word "dejeuner," meaning to suppress hunger, evolved into "petit déjeuner" (a light meal taken in the morning) and was adopted in English as "breakfast" in the 15th century (Liu et al., 2013). When

examining the historical evolution of breakfast as a meal, we see that during the Ottoman Empire, both the general populace and the palace elite consumed two main meals a day. These were referred to as *"kuşluk taamı"* (a meal eaten in the early morning) and *"akşam taamı"* (evening meal) (Pedani, 2018, p.82).

The term "kahvaltı" (breakfast in Turkish) emerged after Yavuz Sultan Selim's 1516 Egyptian campaign when coffee was brought to Istanbul. Initially consumed within the palace, coffee later became popular among the public, leading to the creation of the phrase "kahve altı" (literally "before coffee"), signifying light food eaten before drinking coffee (Baysal, 2002, p.258). This practice was mentioned in the 17th century by Evliya Çelebi in his *Seyahatname* as "kahve altı taamı," referring to meals consumed before coffee. The foods consumed during these early morning meals differ significantly from contemporary breakfast items. Over time, the phrase "kahve altı taamı" was shortened and evolved phonetically into "kahvaltı" (Yerasimos, 2011; Kut, 2016).

In Şemseddin Sami's *Kamûs-ı Türkî*, one of the earliest Turkish dictionaries, "kahvaltı" is defined as "a small meal consumed before coffee, meant to avoid drinking coffee on an empty stomach" (Sami, 2019, p.1121).

Cultural differences manifest in the temporal, quantitative, and qualitative aspects of meal consumption. The significance given to breakfast in Turkey is not equally reflected in other culinary cultures. Changes in Turkey, including rural-to-urban migration, industrialization, and evolving work conditions, particularly with the increased participation of women in the workforce, have transformed eating habits and increased the frequency of eating outside the home (Akarçay & Suğur, 2015). Consequently, meal times in urban culture have shifted, impacting breakfast practices. Amid the workweek's busyness, breakfast preparation has become

more challenging, leading to a preference for quick and easy-to-consume options.

Today, breakfast is broadly defined as the consumption of any food or drink between 5:00 AM and 10:30 AM, often involving at least two food groups (e.g., dairy products, meat or meat products, cereals, fruits, or vegetables) (Sormaz & Kaya, 2017). Influenced by modernization and industrialization, breakfast practices in Turkey have also reflected Western trends, with lighter and more practical breakfasts during weekdays and more elaborate meals on weekends (Önay, 2011, p.100).

In her thorough historical analysis, Anderson (2013) elucidates that breakfast has never been a fixed or universally defined meal, but rather one profoundly influenced by religious, economic, and class-related factors. In Western contexts, breakfast transformed from a simple, functional meal for workers into a meticulously arranged domestic ritual, particularly among the upper classes during the 19th and 20th centuries. She contends that this transformation was intricately linked to industrialization, gender roles, and evolving concepts of domesticity and nutrition. In certain cultures, breakfast is a light or utilitarian meal, whereas in others, it serves as a performative act that conveys hospitality, wealth, and cultural identity.

Breakfast is a tradition rooted in certain regions where it is treated as a main meal, featuring staple foods. A typical Turkish breakfast includes regional cheeses, olives, fresh tomatoes, and cucumbers. Historically, tarhana soup was also a staple of Turkish breakfast culture. Today, in addition to conventional breakfast items, certain establishments offer specialty items and soups. Alongside traditional items like clotted cream and honey, hot dishes such as eggs (omelets or fried eggs) and tea are often served. Cultural preferences have broadened breakfast menus to include items like cheese, eggs, butter, molasses, tea, and milk, as well as soup, pilaf,

or liver—foods more commonly associated with lunch or dinner. The richness of Turkish breakfast culture allows for regional variations and specialized offerings.

Social Classes

The concept of class, as we understand it today, was not explicitly used until the late 18th century. The term “language of class,” coined by Asa Briggs in England, gradually gained prominence in the early 19th century. Subsequently, terms such as "lower class," "middle class," and "higher class" entered the lexicon (Beneton, 1991, p.10). During the 19th century, the Materialist Conception of History, developed by Marx and Engels, emerged as a foundational framework for the study of class. This theory informed the workers' movements that began in the late 19th century and continued into the first half of the 20th century, with significant contributions from figures such as Gramsci, Lenin, and Mao (Ziyanoğlu, 2019, p.12).

Sociologists such as Alain Touraine and Daniel Bell have argued that the Industrial Revolution widened class divisions, situating the middle class closer to the upper class in socio-economic terms. In the post-industrial era, the middle class has been reconceptualized within class theory as the “service class,” encompassing managers and office workers employed in the service sector (Edgell, 1998, p.72).

Bourdieu critiques the limitations of defining class solely through economic capital, as seen in the approaches of Marx and Weber. He contends that class should be understood as a structure of relationships between various forms of capital—economic, cultural, and social—shaped by factors such as education, gender, age, and ethnicity. Bourdieu views class as the totality of these interrelations and the effects they exert on practices (Bourdieu, 2015, p.164). In his book *Distinction*, Bourdieu categorizes classes into sub-fractions

based on their respective forms of capital. The dominant class, characterized by substantial economic capital, is internally differentiated by cultural capital, distinguishing intellectuals from business professionals. Variations within class fractions are also influenced by inherited capital. While economic position largely defines class, cultural capital, partially conditioned by economic resources, creates additional class distinctions. Investments in material and cultural resources enable individuals to accumulate social capital, which in turn fosters trust within their social groups (Bourdieu, 2015, p.178–190).

In Turkey, Korkut Boratav developed one of the most comprehensive class schemas using Marxist categories to provide empirical data. Boratav uses the Materialist Conception of History to analyze class and social dynamics. According to him, class divisions can be understood through the redistribution of surplus value. The working class produces surplus value, which is appropriated by the bourgeoisie. The middle class facilitates the exchange of surplus value in the market and includes all intermediate layers, often referred to as the "petty bourgeoisie" (Arslan, 2012, p.59).

Although Boratav's work is predominantly Marxist, Weberian elements are evident in his analysis of urban and rural divisions. In urban social structures, he observes trends of ossification within communities, while factors such as migration, education, and unemployment create both upward and downward mobility. In rural areas, Boratav notes rigid boundaries and limited social mobility (Boratav, 2004, p.19).

In sociological studies, class distinctions are sometimes analyzed in terms of consumption potential in fields like advertising, media, and marketing. Controversial as they may be, socio-economic status (SES) scales have been developed for such analyses. SES is used to classify individuals within a community who share

similar social, cultural, and economic attributes, reflecting their consumption preferences and habits (Akarçay, 2014, p.98).

In efforts to develop a SES index, specific criteria are analyzed, starting with the educational attainment of household members. The total household income is divided by the number of residents to calculate an average income score. Similarly, occupational or job status scores are calculated. Ownership status—whether residents own or rent their homes, and whether they own additional properties or vehicles—is factored into a property score. Finally, household assets such as televisions, DVD players, internet connections, and dishwashers are included. The resulting scores are processed through a formula to calculate SES. Based on this scoring, socio-economic strata are categorized as follows: A (upper socio-economic class), B (upper-middle socio-economic class), C1 (middle socio-economic class), C2 (lower-middle socio-economic class), and D (lower socio-economic class) (Kalaycıoğlu, Kardam, Rittersberger-Tılıç, Çelik, & Türkyılmaz, 2008).

Habitus, Class Habitus, Capital, and Field Concepts

For Bourdieu, the concept of *habitus* occupies a significant place in his theories. Habitus can be defined as a set of internalized structures that guide individuals. Generally, habitus is a system of generative concepts for producing practices (Bourdieu, 2015, p.357). The socio-cultural positioning of individuals is reshaped through their predispositions (*habitus*) (Bourdieu, 2006, p.20).

One of the functions of habitus is to convey a unity of disposition, integrating the practices of the actors or the class of actors with their existence and essence (Bourdieu, 2006, p.21). Habitus allows individuals to interpret and stratify the world they share with various sociological and cultural groups or individuals from different classes, based on their social position and perspective (Yenal, 1996, p.200).

Habitus functions as an interconnected chain link in structuring culture and social relationships within society. It organizes and directs actions. Bourdieu argues that individuals reveal their characteristic tendencies through habitus, enabling them to exhibit behaviors consistent with their status. For Bourdieu, habitus is the meeting point between institutions and bodies. He describes habitus as an open system of dispositions influenced by continuous lived experiences and historical events (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2003, p.133). Defined as a system of dispositions, habitus manifests in various ways, including individuals' general cultural knowledge, food preferences, clothing styles, behavioral reactions in social settings, and tone of voice (Yanıklar, 2011, p.125).

The conditions required for class identity, along with the distinguishing features inherent in a way of life, are encompassed by class habitus. Even basic needs, such as eating, drinking, and clothing, reflect differences that persist in social life and are identified through class habitus (Ünal, 2007, p.149). Contrary to common belief, class habitus is not an abstract concept; it is vividly observed through individuals' daily relationships, practices, and preferences within their surroundings. Through class habitus, tastes enable individuals to perceive their status. It represents the internalization of one's conditions, classifying and conditioning them as a tangible form (Karademir Hazır, 2014, p.245).

Bourdieu identifies four types of capital: economic capital, cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital. Economic capital refers to the material wealth and monetary resources individuals possess, encompassing all assets owned and the utilitarian advantages derived from them. Cultural capital, on the other hand, comprises the elements society deems valuable in relation to class structure. Education and academic qualifications play a significant role in cultural capital, representing a fusion of the

cultural inheritance from one's family with the formal credentials obtained through educational institutions (Bourdieu, 2015, p.41).

Social capital refers to the capacity to readily leverage and derive benefits from relationships and communication networks established within a specific group when needed. Within the framework of social capital, there may be reciprocal economic and cultural interactions among group members. Bourdieu defines social capital as institutionalized relationships characterized by strong connections. In essence, it denotes membership within a group, with the benefits of such membership stemming from the group's foundational solidarity (Bourdieu, 1986).

Symbolic capital, on the other hand, represents the utilization of cultural heritage acquired from one’s family and social environment, where the influence of habitus is most apparent. Symbolic capital encompasses an individual’s prestige, honor, and social standing, shaped by cumulative achievements and gains from the past (Bourdieu, 1986).

According to Bourdieu, economic and cultural capital are transferable forms of capital. While economic capital can be passed on relatively easily through inheritance, the transfer of cultural capital demands a greater investment of time and accumulation. In contrast, social and symbolic capital are significantly more challenging to transmit compared to economic and cultural forms of capital (Bourdieu, 2015, p.175–179).

Each form of capital offers distinct advantages within a social community. Capital fields represent domains of power for individuals, with varying forms of capital gaining prominence within each field. Although every field operates under its own rules, general principles governing all fields also exist. Bourdieu likens fields to games, where rules are shaped by habitus (Kaplan & Yardımcıoğlu, 2020). Social spaces are constructed by relatively autonomous fields,

each characterized by struggles and efforts to legitimize inequalities, ultimately reinforcing dominance (Palabıyık, 2011).

Every class and social stratum has its own unique habitus (Swartz, 2011, p.203). Bourdieu explains that similarities in preferences, tendencies, and behaviors among individuals within the same class can be attributed to class habitus (Tatlıcan & Çeğin, 2014, p.326). The relationships established within a class are crucial for fostering mutual socialization through shared consumption and lifestyle opportunities. Therefore, Bourdieu emphasizes the class-based nature of the socialization process. The linguistic distinctions used in daily life—such as rich/poor or beautiful/ugly—create oppositions and hierarchies of taste. The boundaries in lifestyles and the attitudes or distinct habitus that emerge are shaped by the distances between class positions. Classifications themselves, driven by habitus, define and reinforce these distinctions.

Methodology

This study employed a qualitative research methodology based on an interpretivist paradigm, emphasizing the comprehension of individuals' lived experiences and the meanings they attribute to their social environment. This research aims to investigate class-based experiences through quotidian practices, thus a qualitative approach was considered most suitable. An ethnographic research design was chosen, allowing the researcher to engage with participants in their natural environment and observe social practices in context (Creswell, 2013, p.90; Punch, 2016, p.155). Ethnography examines the collective behaviors, values, and cultural practices of a community. This study utilized a focused ethnographic design, investigating breakfast practices among participants from three socio-economic strata: lower, middle, and upper class, rather than striving for a comprehensive portrayal typical of traditional ethnography. The researcher, as the primary author, engaged in

Sunday breakfasts and examined interactions, rituals, and spatial configurations within diverse households. According to Agafonoff (2006) and Creswell (2013), this design enabled the researcher to discern behavioral and emotional components inherent in daily life, including symbolic meanings, gestures, and habitual actions that frequently remain overlooked. Although ethnographic design in the classical sense requires the researcher to spend a long time in the field, this study was able to apply an ethnographic design within a more limited framework. The main aim of the research is to reveal breakfast culture according to class differences through on-site observations and interviews. Therefore, an ethnographic design was used within this limited scope.

Fieldwork was performed over a four-month period in 2021 across various sites in Nevşehir province, encompassing the city center, the districts of Ürgüp and Avanos, as well as the towns and villages of Ortahisar, Uçhisar, Mustafapaşa, and Özkonak. These regions were selected for their cultural heterogeneity and enduring habitation patterns. The city's robust integration of traditional and tourist influences created a fertile setting for examining class-based disparities in breakfast customs.

Participant observation and comprehensive interviews constituted the principal data collection methods. Adhering to ethnographic principles, the researcher functioned as a participant-observer, actively participating in breakfast gatherings to cultivate trust and observe participants' authentic behaviors. This position facilitated the documentation of both verbal and non-verbal communication, interaction rituals, spatial utilization, and the aesthetic configuration of the table.

The Niğde Ömer Halisdemir University Ethics Committee granted ethical approval for this study (Date: 05.02.2021, Decision No: 17027). Participants, aged 27 to 69, were chosen using purposive and maximum variation sampling to guarantee

representation across social classes and household configurations. A total of 14 participants (12 women and 2 men) engaged in the study. The researcher visited residences or gardens based on seasonal conditions, recorded meticulous observational notes, and conducted interviews subsequent to each breakfast event. In certain instances, multiple visits were conducted, as participants became more forthcoming in later meetings—frequently yielding more profound narratives and insights during the second or third interaction.

The observation process concentrated on participants' preparations, table arrangements, culinary selections, dialogues, physical behaviors, and symbolic manifestations. Audio recordings were supplemented by handwritten notes. Focus was directed towards both the tangible components (e.g., ingredients, tableware, spatial configurations) and the intangible aspects (e.g., nostalgia, intergenerational memory, emotional nuances). The research sought to reveal the embodied aspects of class through commonplace domestic practices.

The interview process incorporated both unstructured and semi-structured questions aimed at eliciting practices, memories, and significances related to breakfast. Sample inquiries comprised (comprehensive list in Appendix A):

"What significance does Sunday breakfast hold for you?"

What were breakfasts like during your childhood? What is their comparison to the present day?

"Who is responsible for preparing breakfast items?"

"Do your breakfast practices vary with the seasons?"

"What is your opinion on conversing at the breakfast table?"

Socio-economic classifications were established utilizing the framework of Kalaycıoğlu et al. (2008), which encompasses indicators such as household income, educational attainment,

employment sectors, and property ownership. Supplementary economic data from TÜİK (2020), TÜRK-İŞ (2021), and Memur-Sen (2021) were employed to validate the poverty thresholds and income levels in Turkey.

Demographic data of participants (gender, age, location, income level) and social class distributions are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. To uphold ethical standards, pseudonyms and participant codes (K1–K14) were employed to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality during the study.

Table 1 Socio-demographic information of participants

Participant Code	Age	Occupation	Residence
K1	48	Housewife	Nevşehir/Ürgüp District
K2	37	Industrial Designer	Avanos/Özkonak Town
K3	60	Housewife	Avanos/Özkonak Town
K4	27	Accountant	Nevşehir/Ürgüp District
K5	46	Nurse	Nevşehir Center
K6	44	Chef	Nevşehir/Uçhisar Town
K7	49	Yoga Instructor	Nevşehir Center
K8	69	Housewife	Ürgüp/Mustafapaşa Village
K9	46	Tradesperson	Nevşehir/Avanos District
K10	45	Tourism Professional	Nevşehir/Avanos District
K11	52	Housewife	Nevşehir/Ürgüp District
K12	45	Housewife	Ürgüp/Mustafapaşa Village
K13	42	Housewife	Ürgüp/Ortahisar Town
K14	36	Business Owner	Nevşehir/Ürgüp District

Table 2 Socio-economic status (ses) distribution of participants

Participant Code	Average Household Income (TL)	Number of Employed Household Members	Highest Education Level in Household	Property Ownership/Count	Income Group
K1	8,5	1	Associate Degree	Yes / 1	Middle Class
K2	15,000+	2	University/PhD	Yes / Multiple	Upper Class
K3	20,000+	Retired Senior Civil Servant	University	Yes / Multiple	Upper Class
K4	9	2	Associate Degree	Yes / 1	Middle Class
K5	10	2	University	Yes / 1	Middle Class
K6	5,5	2	Primary School	Rent	Lower Class
K7	20,000+	3	University	Yes / Multiple	Upper Class
K8	2	Retired Agricultural Worker (Bağ-Kur)	Primary School Dropout	Yes / 1	Lower Class
K9	10	2	High School	Yes / 1	Middle Class
K10	9	1	High School	Yes / 1	Middle Class
K11	20,000+	1	High School	Yes / Multiple	Upper Class
K12	8	1	High School	Yes / 1	Middle Class
K13	Minimum Wage	1	Primary School	Rent	Lower Class
K14	10	1	Associate Degree	Yes / 1	Middle Class

This table presents the socio-economic characteristics of participants based on their average household income, number of employed members, education level, property ownership, and income group classification.

This research is based on examining breakfast culture and social organization according to the local class structure. Given that the findings of this qualitative research cannot be generalized to all three specified classes, we have only revealed certain trends.

Data Analysis

The gathered data were examined utilizing thematic analysis, adhering to the methodology established by Braun and Clarke (2006). This encompassed multiple phases: data familiarization, initial code generation, theme development from coded data, theme refinement, and integration with theoretical frameworks.

The analysis utilized both inductive and deductive methodologies. Themes emerged organically from participants' narratives (inductive) and were also analyzed through a theoretical framework (deductive), specifically utilizing Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, capital, and field.

The phases of analysis encompassed:

Repeatedly reviewing transcripts and observation notes

Creating preliminary codes (e.g., "togetherness," "effort," "picnic")

Classifying codes into overarching themes (e.g., "Rituals," "Seasonal Variations")

Investigating the interconnections among themes

Connecting themes to the conceptual framework

To maintain authenticity and voice, direct quotations from participants were utilized frequently. Local dialect and simplified vernacular expressions were preserved during transcription but subsequently revised for clarity in presentation.

Results and Discussion

These findings align with contemporary sociological research that perceives food not solely as a nutritional requirement but as a practice imbued with cultural and social significance. Karaduman (2023) posits that culinary practices are intricately associated with class, identity, and social structure, serving as a tangible manifestation of collective memory and symbolic demarcations. Similarly, Macit and Kıran (2024) underscore the significance of food in perpetuating class distinctions via quotidian rituals and material culture. This is especially apparent in our study, where the arrangement and presentation of Sunday breakfasts illustrate class-based habitus, gendered divisions of labor, and symbolic representations of taste. Ramos (2023, 2025), referencing the Portuguese context, elucidates how cultural capital is expressed through nuanced variations in dining environments, nostalgic affiliations, and inclinations towards authenticity—trends that resonate in the breakfast customs of upper- and middle-class families in Nevşehir. These correlations emphasize the integration of food within class hierarchies and its function in perpetuating social stratification.

During the research process, a portion of the collected data was used to identify commonalities and develop specific themes, presented in Table 3 The findings, based on observation and interview data, were categorized into thematic areas. The prominent categories include: *"The difference of Sunday breakfast from other breakfasts," "Sunday breakfast in the past," "Breakfast products in Nevşehir by socio-economic class distinctions," "The importance of Sunday breakfast for the lower class," "The importance of Sunday breakfast for the middle class," "The importance of Sunday breakfast for the upper class," "Preparing the breakfast table," "Sunday breakfast by season," "Organization of the breakfast process," and "Rituals performed during the breakfast process."*

Table 3 Classification of themes and sub-codes developed in the analysis section

Themes	**The Difference of Sunday Breakfast from Other Breakfasts**	**Sunday Breakfast in the past**	**Preparing the Breakfast Table**	**Seasonal Sunday Breakfast**	**Rituals Performed During Breakfast**
Sub-codes	Coming Together	Past and Present	Özen	Summer	Enjoyment
Sub-codes	Time	Yesterday to Today	Organisation	Picnic	Turkish Coffee
Sub-codes	Özen	From Past to Present	Vanity	From Past to Present	Being Together at the Table
Sub-codes	Enjoyment	Natural	Diversity		Prayer
Sub-codes	Family	Homemade	Cleaning/Hygiene		
		Ready Made Products	View		
		Longing for the Past	Healthy Products		

Explanation of Themes and Sub-Codes

The Difference of Sunday Breakfast from Other Breakfasts: Emphasizes the gathering aspect and the unique care devoted to Sunday breakfast compared to daily routines.

Sunday Breakfast in the Past: Reflects nostalgia and highlights the transition of breakfast practices over time, including a preference for natural and homemade products.

Preparing the Breakfast Table: Focuses on the aesthetic and hygienic effort made during the setup, with differences in preferences for homemade versus store-bought products.

Sunday Breakfast by Season: Shows the influence of seasonal changes, such as outdoor picnics in summer or the variety of seasonal foods included.

Rituals Performed During the Breakfast Process: Highlights cultural and social rituals like enjoying Turkish coffee, gathering around the table, and expressing gratitude through prayers.

This classification provides a structured understanding of how Sunday breakfast practices reflect cultural, social, and class-based nuances.

The Difference of Sunday Breakfast from Other Breakfasts

This theme, *"The Difference of Sunday Breakfast from Other Breakfasts,"* was developed based on data gathered through observations and interviews to reflect the distinctiveness of Sunday breakfasts compared to weekday breakfasts within the specific context of participants and Nevşehir. Unlike weekday breakfasts, which are often limited by the time constraints of daily routines, Sunday breakfasts offer a more relaxed setting, as facilitated by the availability of time on Sundays. During the analysis process, sub-codes were identified to structure the findings. While visiting families for breakfast, I explored their responses to the question, *"Is there a difference between weekday and Sunday breakfasts?"* through both casual conversations and direct interviews.

It was observed during the interviews that words such as *"togetherness," "time," "effort," "enjoyment," and "family"* were frequently emphasized. The reflections shared by the participants mirrored their cultural imagery and habitus, effectively expressing, *"This is who we are."* For this reason, I found it appropriate to categorize the responses based on socio-economic status.

Regarding the difference between Sunday breakfasts and other breakfasts, the perspectives of participants from lower socio-economic classes were as follows:
Lower Socio-Economic Class participants from the lower socio-

economic class highlighted the collective nature of Sunday breakfasts:

K8 (Lower Class): *"At least 5-6 people come together, including grandchildren. It's complete. The difference is the presence of children and grandchildren."*

K13 (Lower Class): *"We have Sunday breakfast as a family. Nothing changes in our lives; it's the same for us."*

Their breakfast tables typically feature staples such as cheese, olives, and eggs, supplemented with items like *menemen*, pottery cheese, fried potatoes, *gözleme*, *pişi*, *tarhana soup*, and *tandır bread.* This highlights their emphasis on affordability and nutritional value.

Middle Socio-Economic Class participants from the middle class expressed a greater emphasis on preparation, variety, and enjoyment:

K1 (Middle Class): *"Of course, there's a difference. On Sundays, the children are at home. It's prepared more carefully because we have more time. Sundays are definitely different."*

K10 (Middle Class): *"The difference is that the breakfast table is set carefully, and I can enjoy it without rushing. Sundays allow me to experience the pleasure of a leisurely breakfast, which I miss during the week."*

K5 (Middle Class): *"Yes, there's a difference. Weekdays are lighter and simpler, while weekends are more elaborate. I think we also prefer higher-calorie foods on weekends."*

K14 (Middle Class): *"I think the privilege is being able to have a long breakfast. I wish every day could be like a Sunday breakfast. It's not just about the time spent leisurely, but also the variety on the table."*

Middle-class breakfast tables include items such as *hamursuz*, *pişi*, tahini pita, meat pita, cheese pita, pottery cheese, *keskiç*, *tandır bread*, *yufka* bread, molasses, *çiğleme*, Nevşehir bagels, flatbreads, spicy sauces, roasted peppers, and fruit jams. The effort in table preparation and the extended time spent at the table indicate that Sunday breakfast becomes a pleasurable and bonding family activity, reflecting the habitus of the middle class.

Upper Socio-Economic Class, participants from the upper class emphasized variety, external dining preferences, and leisure:

K2 (Upper Class): *"For us, breakfast is important every day. Sunday breakfast, for me, often means going out for breakfast. It's about going out, enjoying a rich breakfast spread, and leaving without having to clean up. At home, it's still more relaxed and lasts longer on Sundays."*

K7 (Upper Class): *"There is a difference; we dedicate Sundays to ourselves and have breakfast as a family."*

The upper-class habitus reflects their access to economic resources, allowing for broader choices in breakfast locations, products, and even the division of labor during preparation. This practice transforms Sunday breakfast into a symbolic representation of their status, as noted by Bourdieu (2015, p.281), who argued that food choices reflect the social class and its influence on physical and cultural capital.

While the lower class focuses on nourishment and affordability, the middle class highlights effort, enjoyment, and time, and the upper class emphasizes leisure, diversity, and symbolic status. Upper-class participants often note the extensive variety of foods on their tables, distinguishing their practices from the other groups.

Sunday breakfast is not merely a meal but a cultural symbol and a medium of social communication. It allows for family bonding and reflects class-specific preferences. As Bourdieu (2015, p.281) suggests, food preferences and their impact on the body, along with the associated cultural distinctions, create hierarchies that differentiate social classes. The emphasis on product variety and the habitus of the upper class illustrate the broader availability of resources and the symbolic significance of their breakfast practices.

This differentiation highlights how Sunday breakfast practices function as a cultural and social mirror, reflecting the values, resources, and aspirations of each class.

Figure 1 Upper class breakfast photo 1

Looking at the table, it is clear that its purpose extends beyond mere sustenance or visual appeal to a display of abundance aimed at satisfying the eye. At the center of the table, a platter featuring pastırma (cured beef), dried figs, and various cheeses serves as a symbolic structure, revealing the status of the household.

Adjacent to this, a plate brimming with golden fried potatoes, complete with a serving tong, emphasizes the theme of sharing. The deliberate placement of culturally significant items on larger plates also holds special importance, further enhancing the symbolic narrative of the breakfast.

When drawing attention to the differences between the upper and lower-middle classes, several notable elements emerge. The upper class prioritizes organic and healthy food choices, alongside an extensive variety of tomatoes, cucumbers, cheeses, and olives. The table is further enriched by an array of jams and marmalades, as well as dried and fresh fruits. Additionally, a selection of indispensable regional specialties includes molasses, bazlama (flatbread with butter), fried dough, içli ekmek (stuffed bread), flatbreads with potatoes or cheese, various types of pita, Nevşehir bagels, tahini bagels, yufka bread, and tandır bread.

K3 (Upper Class): *"For me, there's no difference. It's routine; every day, the breakfast table is set, and we diversify it according to our taste or mood that day. We don't have an extra culture of Sunday breakfast. Breakfast is a constant in our lives; it's never lacking."*

The response of K3 highlights that sunday breakfast cannot be generalized as a universal practice. It reveals a lack of homogeneity, emphasizing that, for this participant, breakfast is a routine activity rather than a distinct cultural or symbolic event. The act of sitting at the breakfast table with family, regardless of whether it is a weekday or Sunday, is maintained as a consistent element of daily life without being imbued with special cultural significance or symbolic meaning.

This perspective underscores that class habitus is not an abstract concept; it manifests in individuals' practices, preferences, interactions, ways of speaking, behaviors, and tendencies. The

practices and characteristics of different classes are vividly reflected in Sunday breakfast routines. These differences are deeply influenced by variations in economic capital, as well as accumulated cultural and symbolic capital.

From my observation notes, I particularly noted that all three socio-economic classes use Sunday breakfast as a means of socialization, but the significance and approach to this practice vary widely. For the upper class, as exemplified by K3, the continuity and normalization of family breakfasts demonstrate a departure from the distinctiveness of Sunday breakfasts seen in other classes.

The process of preparing breakfast itself reveals class distinctions, encompassing the selection of products and the reasons for those choices. These differences illuminate the interplay of economic resources, cultural capital, and symbolic values, illustrating how breakfast practices are both shaped by and reflective of class-specific habitus. The emphasis on being together as a family during breakfast further highlights the socio-economic distinctions that define the meaning and execution of this practice.

Sunday Breakfast in the Past

One of the most intriguing aspects of this research was exploring participants' memories of breakfast tables from their childhood. During the interviews, participants were asked, *"What did you eat for breakfast during your childhood? What has changed? Are there any differences?"* The responses led to the identification of sub-codes such as *"past and present," "from past to today," "homemade and natural," "ready-made products," and "nostalgia for the past."*

K6 (Lower Class): *"In my childhood, we had breakfast at home every day. My parents were farmers. We were usually at the table by 7 a.m.; we would wake up for prayer and never go back to bed. Back then, there was a sense of togetherness, happiness, and*

peace as we had breakfast as a family. Now, because of work demands, if one of us is home, another is often absent. In my childhood, we would prepare pastries in the morning, but we cooked them on the stove. We made our own pottery cheese and butter. Molasses used to be a staple on the table."

K6's response highlights the family's routine of starting the day together and gathering around the same breakfast table. The depiction of happiness reflects the unity and sense of sharing at the table. It also reveals the participant's upbringing in a culture where traditions, customs, and religious practices were strongly intertwined. Growing up in a farming family, this individual experienced a direct connection between effort, production, and consumption. Their recollections provide a vivid contrast between the past and present, emphasizing the changes brought by modern work-life demands and the shift away from self-sufficient food production.

K1 (Middle Class): *"There's not much difference from my childhood. I try to do the same things I saw my mother do. My mother used to make a wonderful hamursuz. I make it too. This is a special pastry from the Ürgüp region. Hamursuz is made with leavened dough. The dough is rolled out thin, brushed with oil, and optionally sprinkled with walnuts. It can also be made plain, or with potatoes or cheese. It makes a wonderful pastry. In other regions, it's called sarı burma, but we call it hamursuz. The oily version is flattened and rolled out with a rolling pin, then stuck to the walls of the tandır (traditional oven). It's cooked in the tandır. The plain one is delicious when eaten with grape molasses."*

K1 emphasizes the continuity of traditions by maintaining the practices observed in their family, particularly the preparation of hamursuz, a local specialty of the Ürgüp region. The description of the tandır oven, a significant cooking tool and method in rural areas of Central Anatolia, highlights its cultural importance. Even though

not every household owns a tandır, the shared use among community members illustrates its role as a communal resource. This reflection underscores the participant's efforts to preserve cultural heritage in contemporary life, showing how culinary practices link past and present.

K14 (Middle Class): *"There was always unity and togetherness, but as a child, it felt different being with the elders. I don't recall any emphasis on Sunday breakfast. What I remember, and what hasn't changed, is being at the table as a family. We usually ate pastries my mother made, jams, cheese, and olives."*

K11 (Upper Class): *"Cheese pide, fried potatoes, sucuk, dried minced meat, molasses, eggs, clotted cream, various cheeses, homemade butter, and jams. We used to produce most of our food ourselves. Nowadays, we have to buy everything."*

It can be noted that participants from the upper class emphasized product variety when describing the differences between past and present breakfasts. Similar to the lower and middle classes, they also mentioned that in the past, their breakfasts primarily consisted of self-produced items.

A particularly striking point is the upper-class participants' mention of specific breakfast items not noted by participants from other socio-economic groups. While molasses was a common feature across all classes, items such as fried potatoes, eggs, various types of pide, sucuk (spiced sausage), and clotted cream were exclusively highlighted by the upper class.

Breakfast Products of Nevşehir According to Socioeconomic Class Differences

As societies undergo transformation and change, their cultural characteristics and culinary traditions are also shaped. While exploring the culture of Nevşehir, the question *"What are the unique*

breakfast items of Nevşehir?" has been posed to examine its gastronomy and shed light on its social dimensions. Cooking methods and tools specific to the culture, such as the tandır oven, provide a snapshot of the society, reflecting the shared culinary practices of those living in the region. Table 4 illustrates the distribution of breakfast products based on socioeconomic status (SES) differences.

Table 4 Distribution of breakfast products according to socioeconomic class differences

Socioeconomic Status (SES)	**Unique Breakfast Items of Nevşehir**	**Breakfast Items Unmatched by Class**
Lower Class	Menemen, Clay Pot Cheese, Fried Potatoes, Gözleme (Stuffed Flatbread), Tahini Pita, Dry Minced Meat Pita, Fried Dough (Pişi), Tarhana Soup, Tandır Bread	Menemen, Tarhana Soup
Middle Class	Unleavened Bread (Hamursuz), Fried Dough (Pişi), Tahini Pita, Minced Meat Pita, Cheese Pita, Clay Pot Cheese, Keskiç, Tandır Bread, Flatbread (Yufka), Molasses, Çiğleme, Nevşehir Bagel, Bazlama (Thick Flatbread), Spicy Paste (Acılı), Menemen Sauce, Grilled Peppers, Pelver	Hamursuz, Acılı, Çiğleme, Pelver, Menemen Sauce, Cheese Pita, Grilled Peppers, Keskiç
Upper Class	Molasses, Bazlama with Butter Sauce, Fried Dough, Stuffed Bread (İçli Ekmek), Potato or Cheese Bazlama, Pita, Nevşehir Bagel, Tahini Bagel, Flatbread (Yufka), Tandır Bread	Bazlama with Butter Sauce, Fried Dough, Stuffed Bread, Tahini Bagel

The products highlighted in the table clearly reflect the distinctions brought about by socioeconomic class differences.

Specifically, the inclusion of tarhana soup in the lower class can be interpreted not only as a traditional habit passed down through generations but also as a consequence of the cultural and economic capital characteristic of this group. For the middle class, it is notable that nearly all breakfast items classified as regional specialties are represented. This broader range of products can be explained by the intermediate position of this class, affording them access to a wider variety.

The upper class, distinguished by their consumption of all types of pita, particularly stands out with tahini pita, a relatively expensive item. Generally, the region's reliance on locally available and cultivable products becomes evident. It is apparent that pastries, from general to specific, are consumed across all social strata. While economic conditions play a role, it can be observed that products requiring difficult access or those not locally produced are absent from the diets of all classes.

Additionally, baking and frying techniques emerge as the most preferred cooking methods. Across lower, middle, and upper classes, baked pastries and fried potatoes demonstrate a shared cultural tradition, indicating a culinary practice shaped within the same cultural framework.

The Importance of Sunday Breakfast for the Lower Class

Based on responses provided by participants during individual interviews, sub-codes were formed around the keywords *"family," "time," "conversation," "togetherness," "pleasant moments," "holiday," "effort," and "sharing."*

K8 (lower class): *"We are all together. I don't see them much during the week, but it's nice when it's a holiday."*

K13 (lower class): *"The importance is, of course, that it's a holiday. No school, no work, no obligations—so we're together at breakfast."*

K6 (lower class): *"I can be with my spouse and children. For this reason, I pay more attention to Sunday breakfast."*

K6, a private sector employee, also mentioned the struggle to align weekly days off with their spouse. K6's spouse emphasized that if they manage to arrange their days off on Sunday, the entire family can gather together.

Figure 2 Lower-class breakfast photo 1

The overwhelming pressure of work life appears to be so significant that no mention of work was observed during breakfast. The frequent emphasis in responses on the connection between

having a holiday and gathering for breakfast gave the impression that the entire week was leading up to this moment. It is essential to note that this situation is not related to an unwillingness to work or the act of going to work itself.

The Importance of Sunday Breakfast for the Middle Class

The middle class's perspective on Sunday breakfast shares similarities with that of the lower class. In addition to the frequent emphasis on *"family" and "holiday"* seen in lower-class responses, sub-codes such as *"time," "conversation," and "pleasant moments"* were also identified.

K1 (middle class): *"It has a unique importance. There's plenty of time, a variety of food, and while we chat, laugh, and talk, we have a great time."*

K10 (middle class): *"Its importance lies in being together, chatting during breakfast, and sharing."*

K12 (middle class): *"It is important; it's a more attentive breakfast that we enjoy as a family."*

Figure 3 Middle-class breakfast photo 1

For the middle class, it can be observed that the process of socialization often begins with Sunday breakfast. I can repeatedly attest to how breakfast tables are transformed into spaces of great enjoyment. Around the table, extended conversations are often accompanied by cheerful laughter, creating a lively atmosphere.

In the homes where I was a guest, the middle class's inclination to utilize their inherited cultural capital was evident. I experienced the depth of conversation, warmth, and genuine smiles from the very first breakfast table. Through interactions with all members of the household during breakfast, I observed that the joyful moments were not exclusive to that day alone. My observational notes also highlight how I received confirmation of this from both the youngest and the eldest family members.

The Importance of Sunday Breakfast for the Upper Class

When considering the importance of Sunday breakfast for the upper class, similarities with the lower and middle classes can be observed. They emphasized the value of having breakfast together with loved ones, highlighting *"togetherness"* and *"sharing"* as key elements, with breakfast serving as a medium for these experiences.

K2 (upper class): *"I would describe it as a time of beautiful sharing with my loved ones, free from time constraints."*

K7 (upper class): *"It's the time when we gather as a family, have conversations, and enjoy ourselves."*

K11 (upper class): *"Its importance lies in meeting with our elders every Sunday at breakfast."*

The recurring theme of *"sharing"* during table conversations reveals the role of breakfast as a communication tool that facilitates socialization and fulfills its societal functions. Sunday breakfast is preferred as a space where individuals, leveraging the benefits of the socialization process, aim to escape the stresses and challenges of daily life. It also serves as a source of energy, strength, and motivation for the week ahead.

Figure 4 Upper-class breakfast photo 2

While Preparing the Breakfast Table

As a social practice, breakfast involves an organizational aspect starting from its preparation stage. To uncover this, participants were asked, *"What do you pay attention to when preparing a breakfast table?"* The responses revealed dominant key codes such as *"care," "order," "presentation," "variety," "cleanliness/hygiene," "appearance,"* and *"healthy products."*

K6 (lower class): *"I usually pay attention to cleanliness and hygiene. I make sure everything is present on the table. I focus on product variety. I include items my children and spouse like, and I don't add things they don't enjoy just to fill the table. I add things that will be eaten."*

K5 (middle class*):* *"Whoever I'm having breakfast with, I prioritize what they like. Plus, I ensure a nice table layout. A*

comfortable seating arrangement is important because we want to sit at the breakfast table for a long time, so I pay attention to that."

K2 (upper class): *"It's important that the table appeals visually with a variety of items. Special attention should also be paid to using healthy products. Whether hosting guests or not, the presentation must be meticulous."*

Figure 5 Upper-class breakfast photo 3

It would not be an exaggeration to describe the breakfast organization as a practice that transforms into a visual feast. Each class fraction emphasizes the importance of order, harmony, and presentation at the table within their own context.

Table 5 Gender-based division of labor in sunday breakfast

Stage	Lower Class	Middle Class	Upper Class

Production Stage	Only women handle kitchen tasks.	Only women handle kitchen tasks.	Both women and men participate in the kitchen. Men prepare the items they choose.
Setup Stage	Children in the household assist.	Men assist unless elders visit the home.	Women and men set the table together.
Consumption Stage	Women serve the men.	Generally, women serve the men. Men handle simpler tasks (e.g., toasting bread, spreading butter).	If a household helper is present, they serve; otherwise, women generally serve the men.
Cleanup Stage	Men provide minimal assistance.	Men assist unless elders visit the home.	If a household helper is present, they handle it; otherwise, women and men clean up together.

The table clearly illustrates the gender-based division of labor within households according to class differences. Each class distinctly reflects the cultural heritage, habitus, and cultural capital inherited from their families through their behaviors. While the influence of modernization on lifestyles is apparent, the persistence of traditional roles in the division of labor is also striking. Regarding the cultural construction of gender, it is evident how gender roles vary according to class and cultural capital. In line with the cultural capital structure of the upper class, a relatively more egalitarian approach is observed. However, in structures where cultural capital accumulation is weaker, more traditional gender roles are prevalent.

Sunday Breakfast by Season

To explore the variations in breakfast practices and content based on the seasons, I asked participants, *"Are there breakfast habits or contents that change with the seasons? If so, what are they?"* The responses resulted in sub-codes such as *"summer," "picnic," "tradition," "tomato," "cucumber," "pepper," "fried food," "winter,"*

"molasses," "clay pot cheese," "dried minced meat," "sucuk," "pastries," and *"fried potatoes."*

K13 (lower class): *"We prepare for winter by making molasses and sauces. In summer, tomatoes, peppers, and cucumbers are common. Picnics were common in July and August."*

K10 (middle class): *"We see differences; in winter, products like molasses and pastries are more common. In summer, lighter foods are preferred during picnics."*

K11 (upper class): *"In winter, I prefer heavier items like clay pot cheese, dried minced meat, and sucuk. In summer, I go for lighter options with plenty of greens."*

Observations and interviews reveal that social practices around breakfast vary by season. Particularly for the lower class, the absence of opportunities for outdoor breakfasts has been compensated by the experience of preparing and consuming homemade items during picnics. A notable clarification is that these picnics often take place in fields or gardens, where breakfast is followed by agricultural activities such as irrigation, cultivation, and cleaning. Socialization, relaxation, or recreational activities are absent in these contexts.

An important observation about picnics is that both the lower and middle classes tend to prepare food using ingredients available in their homes, sharing these in outdoor settings. Conversely, for the upper class, picnics often involve purchasing ready-made items from markets beforehand, with their main activity focused on grilling.

Given Nevşehir's climatic characteristics, seasonal variations in breakfast practices are natural. During winter, as people spend more time indoors due to the cold, there is a focus on consuming high-fat or energy-dense foods that help maintain body warmth.

As the weather warms, there is a notable increase in outdoor breakfast practices at restaurants and hotels, particularly among the middle-upper and upper classes. Middle-class individuals often prioritize venues with diverse breakfast options that are reasonably priced and less tourist-oriented. In contrast, the upper class places greater emphasis on the venue's alignment with their social status, favoring menus that prioritize organic products. For the upper class, comfort, flavor, and hygiene quality are the most critical factors in their choice of venue.

The Organization of the Breakfast Process

When examining the organization of Sunday breakfast and reviewing the notes I took during conversations, a distinct operational mechanism emerged.

The first step in the process is deciding where the breakfast will take place. In the winter, the lower class typically prefers their own homes or the homes of close relatives or friends. For the middle class, if the breakfast is a family affair, it is likely to take place at home, while gatherings with friends are more likely to occur outside. For the upper class, the season does not significantly influence this decision. However, during spring or summer, the preference for outdoor venues increases across all classes, with gardens or orchards being the first choice for those who have access to such spaces.

The second step involves determining who to invite or where to go. Among the lower class, there appears to be little advance planning for inviting or visiting others. As participants often mentioned, "family, relatives, or neighbors come over, or we visit them." This reflects a continuation of the "we make do with what we

have" mindset. In contrast, middle-class participants follow a more structured plan, frequently expressing statements such as “Next week, we will host so-and-so” or “We will visit them at this time.” For the upper class, economic comfort and the need to maintain social status often dictate participation in organized breakfasts. When breakfast is held at home, it is typically well-planned and organized.

The third step is setting up the breakfast table. Considering gender-based roles within households, it is evident that women are primarily responsible for preparing breakfast. While women handle most of the preparation, men are often tasked with shopping for missing items, particularly larger purchases. For smaller items, such as bread, bagels, or pastries, this responsibility is often given to the family’s male child. In lower-class households, women generally do not receive help during food preparation. Once the food and beverages are ready, men rarely assist with setting the table, though they occasionally help, depending on the family structure. Children, if present, often assist with setting and clearing the table.

In middle-class households, women also lead the food preparation process, while men are typically responsible for shopping. The middle class makes a conscious effort to share responsibilities during table setup. Tasks such as arranging plates, bringing items from the kitchen, slicing bread, or pouring tea are often shared among family members. After breakfast, men assist with clearing the table, but their role usually ends there, while women continue with cleaning, dishwashing, and preparing Turkish coffee to conclude the breakfast.

In upper-class households, although gender roles in housework are still evident, men’s interest in the kitchen often leads them to take charge of specific dishes, such as omelets or scrambled eggs with sucuk. Participants noted that these contributions, particularly when serving close friends, are considered a form of

social value. Beyond these specific dishes, men also assist with table setup and cleanup.

The final step is post-breakfast habits. Breakfast is not only a meal but also a social practice. This practice often continues beyond the meal itself, with conversations around the table accompanied by Turkish coffee. In lower- and middle-class families, breakfast typically transitions into a cleanup phase, followed by coffee. In upper-class families, the detail that stands out is the continuation of conversations and coffee drinking around the same table where breakfast was served. This habit seems to influence the culture of maintaining communication at the same table during breakfasts held at outdoor venues as well.

Rituals Performed During the Breakfast Process

In daily life, we often engage in behaviors that become habitual over time. These habits, which can take on the form of rituals, may have religious foundations or reflect the cultural values of the society in which they occur. Regular repetition of these actions is essential for them to be considered rituals.

Consciously or unconsciously, we perform certain actions before, during, or after meals. To explore this, participants were asked, *"Are there any rituals performed before, during, or after breakfast?"* Responses revealed subcategories such as *"enjoyment," "Turkish coffee," "being together at the table,"* and *"prayer."*

K6 (lower class): *"Before breakfast, during my childhood, we would pull apart çörek (a type of bread) and eat it. After the meal, we always pray. We have prayers in the morning and evening, but not at noon."*

K4 (middle class): *"After breakfast, we usually have coffee with my family for enjoyment. Since they smoke, we can linger over coffee for 30–45 minutes."*

K11 (upper class): *"After breakfast, there's the enjoyment of Turkish coffee."*

Beyond the habit of drinking Turkish coffee, another notable area of interest was whether participants engaged in conversations around the breakfast table. To delve into this, participants were asked, *"Do you prefer to converse as a family during breakfast? Is talking at the table considered inappropriate or sinful (is there such a belief)?"* Responses generated subcategories such as "*prohibition," "sin," "daily life," "past and present," "routine," "planning," "taboo,"* and *"agenda."*

K8 (lower class): *"It's forbidden—silence. There was no talking. Now the kids talk a lot, and I sometimes scold the grandchildren, saying, 'Say your prayers, fill your stomachs, and then talk.' In the past, we were very afraid of our father. We would pray, eat, and no one could speak."*

K10 (middle class): *"When I was very young and my grandfather was alive, talking at the table was considered sinful, and they would tell us to eat in silence. My father was more lenient. Now we talk as a family. We discuss what happened during the week and talk about everything."*

K11 (upper class): *"In our childhood, it was considered sinful, and out of respect for our elders, we wouldn't talk. But it's not like that anymore. We talk, summarize the day, and discuss the news."*

Conclusion

This study's findings indicate that food practices are not simply habitual actions of daily life, but are profoundly influenced by class-based habitus and types of cultural capital. Karaduman (2023) asserts that food possesses complex social significances that extend beyond its physiological role, intertwining with identity,

class, and culture. Macit and Kıran (2024) contend that food serves as a functional medium for conveying cultural heritage and perpetuating social inequalities. In this context, various elements—spanning from the breakfast offerings to the table's arrangement—clearly signify participants' class positions, both symbolically and materially. Utilizing the Portuguese context, Ramos (2023; 2025) illustrates how variations in food preferences and consumption are intricately linked to cultural and economic capital, a trend reflected in the breakfast practices noted in this study. Nostalgic attachments to the past, tensions between processed and traditional foods, and spatial preferences (e.g., home, outdoor settings, picnics) vary according to individuals' social class and internalized habitus. Consequently, the results of this study corroborate existing literature by demonstrating that food constitutes a class-coded domain where embodied habitus is manifested—especially through breakfast practices—and functions as a powerful mechanism for perpetuating social distinctions.

This study, conducted with 14 volunteers and their families from three different social classes in Nevşehir, examines the relationship between Sunday breakfast practices and social class. Using observations and in-depth interviews, the research identifies themes such as the differentiation of Sunday breakfasts from weekday meals, the cultural significance of these gatherings, and the influence of class-specific social structures on breakfast organization and rituals. The findings highlight significant distinctions among classes in terms of cultural and social capital. For lower-class families, who face economic and time constraints during the week, Sunday breakfasts hold social importance as they provide an opportunity for family gatherings. These breakfasts are characterized by simplicity and practical approaches, often held in gardens or fields. Middle-class families approach Sunday breakfasts as carefully planned events, representing a balance between leisure and

tradition. Gender roles are more balanced compared to the lower class, with men contributing to table setup and cleanup. Middle-class breakfasts often emulate upper-class practices, reflecting a mix of influences. Upper-class Sunday breakfasts are distinguished by their emphasis on variety, presentation, and shared experiences. Often held in upscale venues or outdoor settings, these breakfasts showcase abundant and meticulously prepared items, symbolizing both economic and cultural capital. The inclusion of luxury items such as pastırma and the use of specific serving tools demonstrate refined dining practices. Seasonal variations also affect breakfast practices. In winter, meals are consumed indoors, with heavier food choices, while summer breakfasts are lighter and often held outdoors. Venue preferences differ by class: the upper class prefers restaurants, the middle class alternates between picnics and restaurants, and the lower class organizes home-prepared meals in open spaces. The study reveals that breakfast practices not only reflect but also reinforce the habitus and capital accumulation of each social class. While historical practices exhibited similarities across classes, modern breakfast habits show notable class-based distinctions. Additionally, cultural transformations are evident, such as the normalization of table conversations and the evolution of Sunday breakfast traditions. In conclusion, Sunday breakfast emerges as a significant cultural practice fostering family time and socialization across all classes in Nevşehir. This research provides a foundation for further ethnographic studies on the interplay between food practices and social structures, contributing to the understanding of cultural dynamics in other regions.

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BÖLÜM 5

DEDELIK IN ALEVISM: SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITARIAN POWER AND RITUAL PRACTICES

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Introduction

The institution of *dedelik*, along with other components of customary law such as *düşkünlük* (ostracization) and *musâhiplik* (ritual kinship), is a cornerstone of social organization in Alevism (Martens, 2009:10). Throughout history, this institution has played a central role in both religious and social functions (Bal, 2002: 67). On the one hand, the institution of *dedelik* is associated with the

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shamanistic traditions of pre-Islamic Turkish culture; on the other hand, it was legitimized in the post-Islamic period by being linked to the lineage of the Ahl al-Bayt (Melikoff, 1998: 31–36). In this respect, the institution of dedelik represents a multi-layered form of authority that carries both historical depth and contemporary functionality.

This study adopts Max Weber's typology of authority as a theoretical framework to analyze the structure of the *dedelik* institution within Alevism. The traditional and charismatic forms of authority in Weber's (1978) tripartite classification of authority help us understand how the position of *dede* is legitimized within its social and cultural context. The institution of *dedelik* embodies traditional authority through its lineage-based inheritance structure and charismatic authority through its characteristics shaped by sacred lineage, divine favor, and spiritual guidance. These two forms of authority enable *dede* to maintain influence over the community at both the structural and symbolic levels.

We address the issue of symbolic representation with reference to Victor Turner's theory of ritual. According to Turner (1969), rituals function as social dramas that both make visible and regulate conflicts, relations of belonging, and authority structures within society. Symbols are at the center of these dramas; complex, abstract meanings are concretized through certain symbolic behaviors and transmitted to community members. The authority of the institution of *dedelik* is established and reproduced not only through religious or lineage-based legitimacy but also through symbolic behaviors in ritual practices. For example, in *Cem* ceremonies, practices such as kissing his hand and giving him priority at meals are symbolic representations of authoritarian power. These representations reinforce the legitimacy of the *dedelik* institution in the eyes of the community and reproduce the sense of belonging at the collective level.

This research was designed to cover all the villages in the Dikili district of Izmir. We began fieldwork in February 2016, and the interviews and village visits continued until 2018. Even though we witnessed various rituals and celebrations and had a chance to experience some of the rituals with the community, we couldn't attend all of the rituals. Especially in certain rituals that represent the collective identity of the village and reproduce belonging within the community, participation as an outside observer was not possible due to the internal dynamics of the community and the limits of privacy.

In this research, one of our intentions was to explain the *Görgü Cemi*, however, it was not possible to observe this ritual directly due to the internal dynamics of the ceremony and the conditions of participation, hence, we waited for about three years to observe it. We learned that only married people who live in the village can participate in the ceremony. Nevertheless, it was also expressed in the interviews that a person with a Sunni religious identity can be accepted into the *Görgü Cemi* ceremony with the approval of the Alevi community if they are married to an Alevi person, while those who are Alevi and married but cannot obtain the community's approval cannot participate in the ceremonies. It was also determined in the interviews that those who are not married and do not have an Alevi identity can participate in the *Birlik Cemi* instead of the *Görgü Cemi*. On March 29, 2018, although we were unable to directly participate in the *Görgü Cemi* in Deliktaş village, we observed practices such as food preparation and the performance of the sacrifice. In addition, we were informed that the *Görgü Cemi* ceremonies lasted for about a week and that meat consumption before the ceremony was forbidden.

Although we were not able to attend the *Görgü Cemi* ceremonies as observers, we conducted a comprehensive interview with Dede Bektaş Piroğlu, who led these ceremonies in the village of Deliktaş, without taking visual recordings at his request. We

continued to communicate with Dede Bektaş Piroğlu by phone several times after the interview. Approximately 8 months after our interview, 80-year-old Dede Bektaş Piroğlu passed away on 2 October 2018, in Turgutlu district during the *Görgü Cemi* ceremonies and the *aşure* (ashura) ceremony held after the Muharram fast.

Alevi Chepnis

We conducted this fieldwork among Alevi communities living in the Deliktaş and Demirtaş villages of the Dikili district of Izmir, who identify themselves as *Çepni* (Chepni). These two villages in the Dikili district are distinguished from other villages as "Alevi villages". In most of the narratives of the Chepni people about the past, it is stated that they trace their ancestry back to their ancestors who migrated to Deliktaş from the Balıkesir region and that this settlement has a history of approximately two hundred years (Bulut, 2019: 98).

Chepnis, which is shown as one of the 24 tribes of Oghuz, is one of the Turkmen tribes in Anatolia (Demir, 2012 :78). In the 16th-century Tahrir books, they are ranked ninth among twenty-four tribes with forty-three place names (Sümer, 1992: 15). Although there are individuals with both Alevi and Sunni beliefs among the Chepnis, this situation is generally not welcomed within the Alevi community. However, this religious diversity does not directly lead to discrimination or marginalization within the community.

Although there is a common cultural structure around the Alevi belief, the practices of differentiation within the community provide important examples of how identity boundaries are constructed. For example, the distance felt towards the presence of Chepnis with Sunni beliefs shows that the "us/them" distinction is not only sectarian, but also related to a sense of cultural purity within the community. However, in-depth interviews and observations have

revealed that some Alevi individuals were uncomfortable with this situation, and there are clear views that it is not in line with the Alevi identity. The Chepnis living in Deliktaş village trace their origins to Central Asia:

"We are from the Oğuz tribe, Oğuz Khan has a son named Sefa, and we are the descendants of his children. Most of the Yörüks are Alevi, but later they became Sunni. These are all Oghuz, Yörüks. The Chepnis are the twenty-second tribe of the Oghuz, that is, the Yoruks, the largest. In other words, we are from the Üçoks in the Oghuz tribe." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

The Chepnis living in the village frequently emphasize the similarities and differences between themselves (Bulut, 2019: 98). This situation is not only limited to highlighting common features, but also serves to clarify the boundaries of identity by highlighting dissimilar elements. In this sense, the "us/them" dichotomy is structured not on the basis of equality in the context of cultural belonging, but rather as a hierarchical perception. This distinction is more clearly manifested in a distant stance towards Alevi individuals with a Sunni identity and becomes visible in social practices. In this context, the outsider represents the exclusion and removal of those who are different within the same cultural structure. The outsider is the one who differs within the same cultural boundaries. This concept is frequently used in Alevi communities to indicate cultural boundaries (Okan, 2014: 29–33). According to Okan, Alevis use the term "outsider" to describe people they perceive as outside the community. The outsider is the one who is outside the Alevi community, especially those with Sunni beliefs (Okan, 2016: 42).

According to anthropologist Fredrik Barth (2001), ethnic identities are essentially defined through boundaries. The essence of identity is related to the establishment and maintenance of borders that separate that identity from "others," rather than to cultural content. In the villages of Deliktaş and Demirtaş, these boundaries

operate not only through the Sunni–Alevi distinction but also through distancing from other Alevi groups with discourses such as "we are Turkish Alevis" and "we are Chepnis." This shows that identity is a line drawn not only against external others but also against internal differences.

Stuart Hall's (1997) view of identity as a continuous, reconstructed, processual, and relational structure is illuminating in this context. According to Hall, identity is not based on a specific origin, but on a specific narrative. Communities that express themselves through different religious identities choose certain names or refrain from giving certain names to their children to make their beliefs visible. According to Şahin (2017), religious communities in Antakya also refer to the "other" and to social memory beyond themselves through the naming of their identities. In these communities, different religious authorities may influence the choice of names (Şahin, 2017: 39–40). While those living in the village emphasized that there is an avoidance of certain names among Alevis, as in Antakya, they frequently mentioned that they do not avoid the names that other Alevis avoid. We can interpret this emphasis as a sign that they are trying to position themselves separately from other Alevis living in Turkey:

"Alevis generally do not name Selim. We still have the name Selim. Here we are Turkish Alevis and we are very attached to Turkish names. For example, we have many names like Ertuğrul, Cem, Selim. Polat, we still have such names. Old Turkish names are very common among us. Generally, this Islamic aspect of ours is not so dominant. In general, we always have Turkish names. Muhammad, Ahmet, Ali, of course there are also these. Hüseyin, Hasan, these are also predominant, but generally we have Turkish names." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

Amin Maalouf's (2008) approach to the multi-layered nature of identities provides an important theoretical basis for

understanding the dynamics of identity formation in the region. According to Maalouf (2008), individuals construct their identities not through a single belonging, but through multiple-layered identity elements. The Chepnis define themselves as both "Alevi", "Yörük", and "Türk". However, when this plurality works in tandem with an exclusionary border policy, the definition of "we" can position both Sunnis and other Alevis groups as the potential "others." In this framework, the interaction of the plural nature of identities and exclusionary borders plays a decisive role in both the internal struggle for identity and the reshaping of social belonging.

While the Chepnis emphasize that they are different from both other Alevi groups in Turkey and Sunnis, Dede Bektaş Piroğlu defines his lineage as distinct from the Chepnis. Although they perform religious rituals in the same place, the fact that the Dede is considered a spiritual authority among the Chepnis leads to the establishment of a hierarchy based on identity between the parties, which highlights the differentiation within the community: “I'm not a Chepni. We are serving today as the sons of Seyyid-i Saadet, who are descendants of the Twelve Imams.” (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

Another noteworthy element in this discourse is that Dede distinguishes himself with a symbolic distance, despite sharing the same belief practices with the Chepnis. The phrase "I am not a Chepni" implies that the authority of dedelik is legitimized by a relationship established not only within the community but also through the community. Thus, Dede frames his relationship with the Chepnis in terms of a kind of “consent production”: he is superior on the basis of lineage and morality, while they occupy the position of accepting this authority. The fact that the Chepnis express their acceptance of the Dede by calling him “our *pîr*” shows that they internalize this hierarchy and produce a form of consent toward the Dede. As a result, identity among Alevi Chepnis is not fixed and

monolithic; it is a structure that is constantly renegotiated through past narratives, cultural preferences, religious practices, and external relations.

Dedelik Institution

According to Alevi tradition, the institution of *dedelik* is based on Islam, and the origin of *pîrlik* is attributed to Hz. Ali (Atalay, 1999: 136). However, Ali Yaman argues that the origin of the institution of *dedelik* cannot be explained solely by Islam (1998: 51). According to Yaman (1998), to understand the origin of *dedelik*, it is necessary to focus on the functions of the *dede*.

The primary responsibility of the *dede* is to guide Alevi rituals and he acts as a mediator and judge in the community (Dressler, 2014: 273). According to Yaman (2020), *dedelik* is a status associated with the concept of *ocak* and it is the *ocak* that establishes the connection with Ahl al-Bayt (:10). *Ocak* means "home, family, nest" and refers to the lineage to which the *dede* belongs; this lineage is endowed with holiness (Korkmaz, 2005: 523). According to Shankland (1999), the institution of *dedelik* is recognized as both a religious and a social authority in the daily life practices of believers. This authority is reciprocated not only with deep respect or fear but also with material offerings (Shankland, as cited in Okan, 2014: 47). In Deliktaş village, it was determined that during the week-long *Görgü Cemi* ceremonies, one family sacrificed each evening, while another family paid for the Dede's leadership of the ceremony. According to Shankland (1999), *dede*, who assumes the leadership role in ceremonies, also acts as a mediator or religious counselor with the final word in disputes (cited in Okan, 2014: 47). As Shankland argues, *dede* resolves conflicts among Alevis.

The functioning of *dedelik* authority can be analyzed within the framework of the traditional and charismatic authority typologies defined by Max Weber (1978). The requirement that the *dede* be a

descendant of the Ahl al-Bayt institutionalizes traditional authority by establishing him as a hereditary figure (Dressler, 2014: 273). At the same time, the miracles attributed to *dedes*, along with their roles in guidance, judgment, and social reconciliation, reflect elements of charismatic authority. This dual structure allows the *dede* to function both as a maintainer of social order and as a spiritual leader (Yaman, 2020: 18).

This authority is established not only through responsibilities but also through symbolic representations. According to Turner's (1969) theory of ritual, structures of authority are reproduced not only through institutions but also through symbolic behaviors in ritual practices. Practices such as kissing the hands, special positioning during rituals, and priority during meals are significant practices that symbolically produce consent and thus reinforce authority. These practices allow the *dede* to be internalized not only as an "authoritative" but also as a "legitimate" figure.

Identity and Belonging in the Institution of Dedelik

Identity, as a fundamental point of reference for the individual, links the past and the future while encompassing multiple layers of meaning. Moreover, it is a dynamic construct that shapes not only how individuals define themselves but also the boundaries, belongings, and outward positioning of communities. According to Hall (1997), identity is not based on a specific essence; it is a narrative form that is constantly told and reconstructed. These narratives serve the individual to make sense of their social position, to develop belonging to their group, and to set boundaries between them and others. Identity not only defines the individual but also ensures their acceptance into community groups. According to Chambairs (2005: 14), formations are transferred to future generations by adding new sets of meanings to identity and belonging. In the process of acquiring a community's identity, the

focal point of cultural identity is the community's bonds to its history and common ancestry (Bayart, 1999: 43). These bonds are maintained through repetition and turn into a sense of belonging.

According to Maurice Halbwachs (2016), memory is a structure shaped by social relations rather than an individual mental process. People do not recall their memories in isolation but together with the community in which they participate, because a memory can only be remembered if it is shared and reiterated by other community members. As observed in the Alevi community in the village of Deliktaş, common narratives about the past are passed down from generation to generation, and these narratives are reproduced as community members come together. While members refresh their memories through repetition and storytelling within the group, they also reconstruct their identities on the basis of collective belonging. Thus, individual memories are shaped by the perspective of the community and gain visibility through collective memory (Halbwachs, 2016: 16–19). In this framework, each narrative through which collective memory is reproduced becomes a practice of belonging that not only preserves the past but also reinforces the community's identity.

Identity is important as a social structure that allows individuals both to recognize themselves and to be defined by others. Identity is shaped according to the group to which one. This sense of belonging enables individuals to find a place in the social world and to produce meaning. The group identified through identity is compared with other groups, revealing similarities and differences (Demirtaş, 2003). Barth’s approach to ethnicity demonstrates that identity is constructed through boundaries, which remain intact even when cultural content changes (2001). This theoretical framework is useful for understanding the identity practices observed among Alevi Chepnis.

Dede Bektaş Piroğlu defined himself in terms of his father's identity and his connection to the lineage to which he belonged, expressing his position through an identity rooted in patriarchal ancestry. In defining his identity, Dede takes his father's lineage and blood ties as a reference, demonstrating that his social position is shaped through a patriarchal structure. According to Nagel (1994), ethnic identity is a construct involving both external and internal processes, including individuals' self-identification as well as externally attributed characteristics. Individuals take positions according to their audience and may even choose to express themselves with different ethnic identities (Nagel, 1994). Identities do not remain static; they exhibit a dynamic structure with subjective and process-oriented features (Hall, 1997). People who encounter categories of belonging in the social environment define themselves based on various situations and classifications, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, language, and social class, each of which corresponds to a different aspect of identity (Bayri, 2011: 22–30).

It is evident that social categories such as ethnicity, religion, and language play a significant role in the formation of identities and the definition of belonging. According to Maalouf (2008: 16), a person's identity is not limited to official records but also includes many other elements. Barth argues that social and historical events are decisive in shaping boundaries (Eriksen, 2002). Barth's (2001: 23) approach to ethnicity is relational and processual: while the culture and social organization of an ethnic group may change, its boundaries are preserved. These boundaries are maintained through ongoing interactions between different groups (Eriksen, 2002). The identity of a community cannot be derived solely from what the community says about itself; rather, identity is constructed through narratives about individuals' shared characteristics and origins (Leichter, 2012). According to Eyerman (2003), collective memory fosters solidarity, and memory is always transindividual.

Globalization has brought with it the expression of identities in more flexible and multilayered forms rather than fixed and singular structures. The dominant cultural perspective with spatially national and politically demarcated boundaries has been replaced by plural identities and multiculturalism (Aydın, 1999: 11). This transformation has led to significant changes in the way individuals define and live their identities. Identities are plural structures. Individuals have a consciousness of belonging to a particular community and being separate from other communities (Özbudun, 2003: 329-332). In this respect, identities are actually like a ticket for the subject to enter the community.:

"Well, now, okay, we went with Islam, but half of our traditions are almost from Shamanism. We have also adopted Alevism under the name of Islam. We have also adopted Bektashism under this name. But most of our customs are from Shamanism. Our laments, weddings, funerals and so on. Most of these behaviors are from Shamanism." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

In the Alevi community, the institution of *dedelik* functions not only as a religious guide in this identity construction, but also as a control mechanism that determines the boundaries of identity. *Dedelik*, with its structure based on patriarchal lineage-based structure, is the representative of a belonging that the individual acquires at birth (Sökefeld, 2002: 165). However, the institution of *dedelik* is not only a hereditary authority but also a position assumed by individuals who have educated themselves, are accepted in society and have reached a certain level of moral competence (2002 :165). Dede Bektaş Piroğlu states that they have gone through many tests and that they have brought their beliefs to the present day despite being subjected to a lot of pressure:

"There have been many massacres, many extinctions, many disappearances, many exiles to the mountains, many of us lying in

caves, but now we have not lost in many ways. Although we have maintained the same rituals and beliefs throughout history, we have been accepted as a society that has dealt with our beliefs in secret." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

He stated that holding the position of *dedelik* requires not only blood ties but also personal development. In the interviews, it was particularly emphasized that, in order to become a *dede*, one must possess a social status and prestige appropriate to the position, in addition to the genealogical connection:

"It is necessary to reach the level of *dedelik*. First of all, he has to be an *ocâkzade*, and where you are an *ocâkzade*, he has to be a person who has educated his surroundings with knowledge and "dört kapı ve kırk makam". He must be capable of responding to many problems in the world, because a person who is an *ocakzâde* has now given up the pleasures of the world and has dedicated himself to the truth. At the same time, he needs to educate himself. He should know our generation, he should know the principles and thoughts of his grandfather and father, if he knows, he will grow up well, he will be educated, and come to that position, but if he doesn't know, he will pass away from the world." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

However, even if a person has obtained the institution of *dedelik* through bloodline, he may not accept this status: "He can say he will not be a *dede*. He has the right to say that. He is a descendant of *ocak*. Let me explain myself. I am a son of a father, my grandfather did it, my father did it, and I was my father's son, but I used to come to this region but we only had the opportunity to write letters. We are separated from our child for six months." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

Piroğlu stated that those within the institution of *dedelik* perform sacrifices. He explained that, due to the nature of his

lineage, he feels a sense of responsibility toward society and, as a result, makes compromises in his private life. In daily life, the most important requirement for a *dede* is to avoid behaviors that are unworthy of the institution of *dedelik*, that could undermine his dignity, or that would be inappropriate for the authority of *dedelik* in society:

"You ask yourself why I am separated from my children, why I am traveling so far. With us, if you have pleasure, if you have a world, go and sit down, but you have devoted yourself to the society. If we have come from this generation, we have to say welcome to the difficult ones, either you will not sit on the *post* (sacred seat) or if you sit on that *post*, you will know the justice, law, consciousness and thought. You're going to educate yourself; the only way is to educate yourself, and this time it's going to be attached to you. For example, I came here in 1962." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

The Authority of Ritual

Rituals are not only forms of worship in the collective life of communities, but also social practices in which authority, belonging, and identity are symbolically produced. According to Turner (1969), rituals are "social dramas" that function to resolve conflicts that arise during periods of crisis in the social structure, to re-establish normative order and to reinforce a sense of belonging. The symbols at the center of these dramas make abstract social relations visible and enable individuals to internalize these relations. In this context, Alevi rituals have not only a religious, but also a symbolic-ideological function.

The power of the ritual is manifested in its repetition, in the taboos and restrictions it contains. For example, the prohibition of meat consumption before the *Görgü Cemi* emphasizes the disciplining effect of the ritual on the community. Such prohibitions

indicate that ritual is not only a form of worship, but also a discipline that shapes the body and everyday life. As a result, ritual is not just a practice of faith but a social mechanism that makes the authority of the *dedelik* visible, symbolically affirms it, and constructs a collective sense of "we" among community members (Akın, 2019). In this context, the authority of *dedelik* remains a sacred, culturally legitimate and reproducible force as long as rituals last. However, the content and practice of these rituals may vary between congregations and regions. Since Alevism is a unique interpretation of Islam, its traditions and rituals also differ from other Islamic sects. An example of this is the *Turna Semahı*.

The *Turna Semahı* is an important ritual that demonstrates the symbolic power of the institution of *dedelik*. It is not only a religious dance but also a mythological and symbolic narrative that conveys the Alevi perception of nature, sacredness, and unity. By synchronizing the collective body of the congregation through its rhythmic structure, this *semah* facilitates the bodily and visual reproduction of the *dede's* authority, alongside his guiding position. At the same time, the *semah* is a ritual practice rooted in the origin narrative, centered on the figure of the crane, which is considered sacred in Alevi belief. In this context, the *Turna Semahı* both mediates the spiritual purification of individuals and serves as a performative space for identity construction, where historical and cultural belonging is collectively experienced:

"We have a *Turna Semahı*, now that this crane has come to our *semah*, we have been inspired by those birds in the sky. We have learned ingenuity from them, we have been inspired by them, now one of them beats a wing, we beat a wing. They all hit a wing, they all become a right, they all become a left. We have also brought it to our *Cem*, since we have brought it from the family since the Twelve Imams, so this time we will also have the *semah* in this *Cem*. What will the *Turna Semahı* be like? It will be like those birds. It will

inspire like them, it will take wings like them, it will raise an arm like them and lower the other like them. They will also adapt to it." (Piroğlu, personal communication, March 29, 2018)

Conclusion

This study focuses on the institution of *dedelik* in Alevism not only as a religious structure but also as a socio-cultural regulator that operates through the symbolic representation of authoritarian power. In the villages of Deliktaş and Demirtaş, which were the focus of the fieldwork, the institution of *dedelik* serves a multi-layered function, ranging from the determination of social norms and ritual order to the demarcation of identity boundaries and the transmission of collective memory (Akın, 2019: 95). The institution of *dedelik* has the capacity to adapt to historically changing conditions. Authority, by its very nature, persists by transforming its form according to time, space, and social patterns, and the institution of *dedelik* is no exception to this process.

This structure, which can be analyzed through Max Weber's typologies of traditional and charismatic authority, represents a form of leadership that is reconstructed through charisma, holiness, and religious knowledge, while maintaining its legitimacy based on lineage. This authority is reinforced not only through words but also through symbolic actions in ritual practices. Within the framework of Victor Turner's (1969) ritual theory, the authority of *dedelik* is both visible and reproduced through performative actions such as spatial placement in rituals, kissing hands, and conducting rituals.

As observed particularly in the case of the Alevi Chepnis, the institution of *dedelik* not only provides religious guidance but also functions as a cultural center that defines the boundaries of identity and reproduces its legitimacy. Within the framework of Fredrik Barth's ethnic boundary theory, the institution of *dedelik* acts as a border guard, defining in-group belonging, distancing itself from

out-groups, and symbolically maintaining these boundaries. Statements such as “We are Turkish Alevis” or “I am not a Chepni, I am a son of Seyyid-i Saadet” are not merely transmissions of lineage; they also constitute authoritarian discourses of cultural superiority and separation.

Although processes such as modernization, migration, urbanization, and the formation of the nation-state seem to have reduced the direct impact of *dedelik* (Dresser, 2014: 274), it still holds an influential position in community life, particularly through its functions of spiritual guidance, social problem-solving, and moral regulation. In their daily lives, community members avoid behaviors that directly contradict the institution of *dedelik* and internalize its symbolic authority. In this context, the institution of *dedelik* serves as a symbolic center that sustains both the belief system and cultural identity in Alevi communities today.

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BÖLÜM 6

THE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

İlhan KARMUTOĞLU[1]

Introduction

Social movements have played an important role in people's lives since the early periods of human history. Therefore, historical research shows that these movements have continued in various forms of resistance since the beginning of social life and have become an indispensable part of social life. Social movements first emerged as a reaction to the adversities experienced by individuals in the lower strata of society. Initially, these forms of resistance were underestimated and even viewed as "rabble-rousing." However, with the formation of modern society and, in particular, the proliferation of social media, the public has been able to organize much more quickly and has begun to attract the attention of the elite class. These movements, which developed under the leadership of the working class, expanded to include farmers, women, and other rights-based groups from the late 19th century onwards (Bozkurt and Bayansar, 2016, p. 277).

Numerous theoretical approaches have been developed to explain the conditions and reasons for the emergence of social movements and how they developed. Although intellectual efforts regarding these movements, which include different forms of resistance and conflict, have existed in every period, systematic analyses began to be made with the development of modern social sciences from the 19th century onwards. , influenced by globalization, these social movements have undergone significant changes in terms of form, organization, and purpose. Particularly with the 1968 wave of protests, formations known as "new social

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movements" emerged, bringing social issues to the attention of broad masses through their forms of action. Unlike movements centered on class conflict and economic structure in the classical sense, these new movements focused on cultural change, quality of life, and the values of everyday life. In other words, new social movements were shaped on the basis of ethical and universal principles rather than defending the interests of a specific social group (Bozkurt and Bayansar, 2016, p. 277). The 1968 wave of protests, with broad participation ranging from students to ethnic groups and LGBT individuals, had a global impact and created a turning point that changed the direction of social struggles. This wave also paved the way for the development of environmental awareness, and environmental movements underwent political transformation starting in the 1970s. Environmental groups, which organized at the local level and held widespread protests, succeeded in drawing public attention and influenced political decision-making mechanisms (Sulak, 2018, p. 39).

Although environmental problems are not new, they are increasingly attracting the attention of societies and accelerating the search for solutions because they threaten the sustainability of life. Problems such as the rapid depletion of natural resources, global warming, and food and energy crises have led to a renewed debate on the relationship between humans and nature. Actors at different levels, from local to global, are striving to reverse the increase in environmental problems; civil society organizations and social movements play a key role in raising environmental awareness and developing environmental policies in this context (Paker and Baykan, 2008, p. 4). Industrialization and urbanization, which accelerated as a result of neoliberal policies implemented since the 1980s, have brought with them environmental problems such as air and water pollution, deforestation, drying up of wetlands, and environmental issues caused by energy investments (hydroelectric, thermal power plants, mines, etc.), parallel to the increasing level of prosperity. (Eryılmaz, 2018, p. 2). This study examines how environmental movements emerged in Turkey, their similarities and differences with environmental movements around the world, and the extent to which these movements have been successful through a literature review; the findings are presented from a sociological perspective.

Environmental Movement

Social movements have become a phenomenon recognized by all societies and have undergone a comprehensive transformation process since the 1980s. Social movements, which have become an alternative ideology within the current value system , have been referred to as

"New Social Movements" in many societies in order to distinguish themselves from traditional movements such as labor movements. These new social movements, which encompass alternative, feminist, anti-nuclear, and ecological movements, are studied in a different dimension than classical political movements (Kılıç, 2002, p. 100). The environmental movement first emerged in the United States and the United Kingdom and became a global issue in the 1970s, influenced by the wave of protests in 1968. These movements gained an international character as a result of the spread of identity-based movements alongside the process of globalization.

Environmental movements focus on issues such as uncontrolled population growth, disruption of ecological balance, extinction of certain plant and animal species, and misuse and overuse of natural resources. Although the organizations of these movements have different demands, forms of organization, and repertoires of action, they are all united in their goal of protecting the environment. Therefore, the environmental movement should not be viewed as a singular and homogeneous structure, but rather as a broad social spectrum that encompasses different demands and approaches (Bozkurt and Bayansar, 2016, p. 285).

Historically, environmental movements are examined in two periods. The first period, from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century, saw the emergence of the first organizations focused on protecting nature. The movements of this period aimed to protect natural habitats and wildlife, especially birds. The second period encompasses the forms of organization that emerged in the 1960s and formed the basis of modern environmental activism. During this period, the environmental movement acquired a modern identity through mass participation, new values, and broader social demands, while continuing to protect the issues of the previous period (Mazlum, 2012, p. 213).

The emergence of the environmental movement as a social movement stems from the increase in basic, water, and economic hardships, as well as the fact that it is a measurable concept. In other words, the fact that even "invisible" negative phenomena such as global warming and damage to the ozone layer can be measured and that these measurements are shared with the public plays an active role in keeping environmental problems on the agenda of societies. In addition, the fact that environmental problems have gone beyond the local level and reached a universal dimension is accepted as an indication that humanity will be under threat in the future (Garner, 2000, p.3). Most environmental movements start at the local level and are initiated by individuals who are independent of politics. Action groups have focused on

and achieved success in a single issue, such as the protection of parks, opposition to nuclear power plants, and opposition to new highways. These successes have played an active role in raising the impact of environmental movements to the national level (Müler-Rommel, 1989, p.5).

The growing importance of social movements in the political context and their subsequent transformation of politics has elevated environmental movements to a significant position. Environmental movements within new social movements have become political formations in many countries, transforming into political actors (Göktolga, 2013, p.127). Environmental movements and "green ideology," which formed an important part of the new social movements after 1968, have been present in political life in many countries through the Greens and similar organizations. Whether radical or reformist, it has been quite difficult to place these parties on the left or right side of politics. In this context, movements that are not organizationally defined or organized have a relationship with these political parties, and in this way, the parliamentary system can be shaped through struggles (Yıldırım, 2002, p.59).

Environmental movements also interact with other social movements such as women's movements and peace movements. For example, environmental movements establish a connection between nature and women through eco-feminism. Just like nature, women are also subject to domination, and in this sense, feminist theory and practice must be blended with an ecological perspective. Similarly, a feminist perspective should be used in seeking solutions to ecological problems. Environmental movements, like peace movements, oppose violence and aim to bring about a solution through persuasion by raising social awareness. In this context, environmental movements interact with peace movements and oppose armament. Environmental movements, which are part of new social movements that have succeeded in organizing at the global, national, and local levels, aim to convey their demands to the administration by expressing themselves through actions such as marches, signature campaigns, social media use, lobbying, and civil disobedience. Environmental movements also use democratic tools such as referendums (Balkaya, 2015, p. 47).

The Development of the Environmental Movement in Turkey

1923-1970 Period

Following the proclamation of the Republic, the Izmir Economic Congress held in 1923 decided to increase the number of forests, celebrate tree planting days across the country, and encourage students and members of the public to plant at least one tree during these days ( ) (Kısa 2008, cited in Dinçel, 2019, p.68). Subsequently, the Turkish Foresters Association emerged in 1924 under the name "Orman Mekteb-i Alisi Mezunları Cemiyeti" (Association of Forestry School Graduates), and between 1945 and 1946, with the emergence of freedom to form associations, an increase in the number of associations concerned with environmental issues was observed. Again, in 1951, the Forestry School of Higher Education Graduates Association acquired the status of an association working for the public benefit. Between 1953 and 1955, the Tuberculosis and Thoracic Association, the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, and the Turkish Nature Conservation Association were established. These organizations generally focused on problems such as air pollution, lack of infrastructure in cities, increase in shantytowns, and deforestation, which arose as a result of urbanization and population growth, and, like their counterparts around the world, sought to continue their work with the aim of preventing environmental problems affecting the local population (Duru, 1995). However, although the first environmental movement in Turkey was the Turkish Foresters Association, established in 1924, it is possible to say that environmental movements actually began between 1980 and 1990 (Atauz, 2000, p. 203).

The 1970-1990 Period

When examining civil society organizations in Turkey in the 1970s, it is possible to say that they followed a path parallel to international developments and that this led to a qualitative change within the organizations. In this context, the aim was to address environmental problems as a whole and to operate on a national basis, rather than focusing on specific issues such as forestry, urban planning, and pollution. In this context, organizations such as the Turkish Environment Foundation, the Turkish Environmental Protection and Greening Agency, and the Nature Conservation Association organized activities aimed at protecting the environment without directly engaging with domestic policy, but their impact was limited to influencing public opinion (Keleş, 2012, p.132).

Greenpeace, recognized as an international non-governmental organization that draws global attention through nonviolent actions, was founded in 1971, contributing to the rise in importance of the green movement worldwide, including in Turkey. When compared to

Western countries, Turkey industrialized later and began implementing neoliberal policies, which accelerated environmental threats and led to the emergence of environmental movements (Ertürk, 2012, p. 239). When examining the history of the environmental movement in Turkey, it can be seen that it began in Murgulin 1975, when individuals from the public filed a lawsuit against Etibank Copper Operations for damaging green areas, and in Ankara in 1977, when villagers from Elmadağ complained through their municipalities about the gunpowder and cement factories located near their agricultural lands. On July 25, 1975, people from villages and neighborhoods staged a march in Samsun to protest the negative impact of the Copper Refining Facilities on agricultural products. From the second half of the 1970s onwards, protests against practices causing environmental damage began to gain importance. In this sense, new methods began to be used, in addition to contacting government officials and legal opposition.

Members of the Silifke Taşucu Fishermen's Cooperative protested the planned nuclear power plant in Akkuyu by staging a demonstration with marine vessels. During the same period, the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers in Adana launched a "No to Nuclear Power Plants" campaign. On July 9, 1978, fishermen staged a demonstration with their boats to protest pollution in the Gulf of Izmit (Duru, 1995, p.57). The military coup on September 12, 1980, and the resulting state of emergency had a negative impact on environmental awareness and the development of the environmental movement in Turkey. Many developments of vital importance during these years led to environmental issues being pushed into the background, environmental actions being suppressed, and an environment conducive to democratic rights and freedoms not being found. In this context, the first action after the military coup was a foreign-origin action aimed at protesting human rights violations and repressive rule in Turkey. This action was carried out by seven environmentalists from Germany who chained themselves together in the Kızılay district of Ankara. Although it failed to influence public opinion in the chaotic environment of the time, this demonstration showed that the green movement was not just about protecting nature and was considered the first step in the environmental movement (Duru, 1995, p.58).

The first environmentalist response to influence public opinion in the 1980s was the movement that began in 1984 against the planned thermal power plant in Gökova. It lasted for about a year and was one of the first examples to raise awareness about environmental sensitivity (Ertürk, 2012, p. 239). The resistance initiated by the local community and people from surrounding areas to protect the region, which the government viewed as an energy source,

received support from all corners of the country. Local women blocked TEK officials from entering the village, while their husbands traveled to Ankara to explain their concerns, launching the "No to the Kemerköy Power Plant" campaign and quickly making their voices heard nationwide. The protests, signature campaigns, and meetings organized as part of the campaign quickly expanded beyond the local community to include municipalities, environmental associations, political parties, the press, artists, and businesspeople. (Özdemir, 1988, p.8). Despite all the opposition from the public, the government did not back down from its decision and began implementation in November 1986. In addition, environmentalists reacted to the plan to convert Zafer Park in Ankara into a parking lot by organizing cartoon competitions, exhibitions, statements, music lessons, and collecting 60,000 signatures for the "Not a Parking Lot, but Güvenpark" campaign, forcing the plan to be canceled. Furthermore, a project to convert Nişantaşı Park into a parking lot, similar to the one in Ankara, was also blocked by activities such as talks, concerts, and signature campaigns within the park (Duru, 1995, p.65).

In 1987, a series of actions, including hunger strikes and protest letters, were carried out against a tourist facility planned for the nesting grounds of loggerhead sea turtles in Dalyan. As a result of these actions, the movement gained international support and succeeded in stopping the construction of the tourist facility. On September 14, 1987, a picnic was organized to protest the damage caused by the cement factory in Büyükçekmece to the region. With the attention of the press, the public became aware of the damage caused by the cement factory to the region. Again in Istanbul, a group of environmentalists, later known as the Green Peace and Environment Association, formed to resist the demolition of Greek houses by the municipality to make way for a wider road. Their resistance became an important example for the environmental movement in Turkey. On May 30, 1989, the historic Taşkışla was slated to be converted into a hotel by an administrative court ruling. In response, faculty members and students of the ITU Faculty of Architecture launched a resistance movement that succeeded in raising awareness throughout the country. The resistance initiated by the Green Party, Radical Greens, and Green Solidarity Community continued for days with protests around the building, ultimately leading to the cancellation of the plan to convert Taşkışla into a hotel. In the same year, the plan to convert the Maçka Barracks into a stock exchange building was also canceled as a result of lawsuits filed by academics and civil society organizations (Ekinci, 1994, p.119).

In 1989, the planned construction of a thermal power plant in Aliağa triggered a process that affected the entire country. A group formed by Gencellili citizens, led by local mayors,

caused the closure of the Aliağa-Yeni Foça highway to traffic. In addition to displaying various banners, women from the villages and women residing in summer homes joined forces and organized a march. With the support of organizations such as the Izmir Chamber of Architects, the Foça-Gencelli Protection and Beautification Association, and the Chamber of Electrical Engineers, the growing opposition managed to gain support from the political arena as well. In this context, many provincial and district organizations and municipalities of the Green Party announced their support for this action. The Greens frequently appeared in the press on this issue to make their voices heard and launched a campaign called "We Will Not Allow the Gencelli Thermal Power Plant" against the planned thermal power plant. The Green Party aimed to prepare posters against the Japanese company and initiate a human chain action stretching approximately 50 km. In addition, the resistance that began nationally was intended to be taken to an international level with the printing of campaign brochures in three different languages. The Green Party wrote letters to green parties outside Turkey to support the human chain and ultimately, on May 6, 1990, thousands of people, regardless of age or class, formed a human chain for Aliağa, signing up for an action that would later be described as a historic popular movement. Although the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources announced that the power plant project had been abandoned after the love chain was formed, it soon became clear that the government had no intention of abandoning its plans for the power plant. Political parties opposed to the construction of the power plant in this region set aside their differences to work together and formed a committee in 1990 that included the Green Party, SHP, TBKP, and RP. Although the construction of the power plant could not be stopped, the decision to suspend its operation 10 times was one of the important developments in Turkey's environmental movement (Turhan and Özkaynak, 2019, p.182).

When examining environmental movements in Turkey between 1970 and 1990, they generally formed around negative attitudes toward land use and urban planning. Particularly with the energy issue in the 1980s, the concept of environmental protection ceased to be apolitical and began to gain political significance. In this context, actors such as doctors, lawyers, and members of professional associations, who had not previously been involved in environmental issues, began to become visible within environmental movements (Adem 2005, cited in Dinçer, 2019, p. 68). This situation led Turkey to encounter a form of opposition it was unfamiliar with, gaining importance in the political arena and leading to the establishment of the Green Party in 1988 (Şahin, 2007, p.79). With the participation of actors who had not previously been involved in the movement, the new wave of environmental movements differed

from the first wave in that they included signature campaigns, public demonstrations, anti-nuclear energy festivals, symbolic referendums, picnics, hunger strikes, music concerts, the love chain formed in Aliağa, and symbolic referendums. In this context, the diversity in social movements is one of the indicators of a dynamic period involving many different actors and institutions within Turkey (Dinçel, 2019, p.68).

1990 and After (Neoliberal Period)

With the 1990s, the environmental movement, which was characterized as a strong opposition movement, began to weaken. As was the case in the rest of the world, Turkey began to implement neoliberal policies in line with structural adjustment and stability programs as a result of the January 24, 1980 decisions. This situation aimed to restrict public spending and privatize public institutions, deepening existing inequalities in society and causing problems in meeting social needs (Sayılan, 2006, p. 48). The institutionalization and professionalization of civil society movements globally was also reflected in movements within Turkey, and as a result, environmental movements, along with organizational forms such as associations and foundations, began to find more space within the government and international organizations (Şahin, 2007, p. 92). Thanks to social movements, which regained vitality with the HABITAT II conference held in 1996, environmental movements were able to develop their vision by networking with national and international organizations, gain access to funding sources, and consequently become institutionalized and professionalized (Adem 2005, cited in Dinçel, 2019, p. 69).

During the neoliberal period, Turkey, like other Western countries, turned the concept of "environmentalism" into a value. In this context, environmental units began to form in municipalities, political parties created programs addressing environmental issues, professional chambers established environmental commissions, columns related to the environment began to appear in the print media, curricula for students changed, and even an "environmental pledge" was prepared for students, and programs aimed at raising awareness of environmental issues were continuously broadcast on television. Although this situation seemed promising at first, it has turned environmentalism into a key concept that should be used appropriately, a concept that facilitates entry into the commercial market. In this context, this transformation caused environmental movements to lose their "authenticity, rule-breaking nature, and youthful dynamism," and led official institutions such as the state, ministries, and municipalities to

merely begin to exploit the potential created by the problems being on the agenda, despite appearing to address the issues (Atauz, 1994, p.18).

Along with neoliberal policies, the institutionalization and professionalization of civil society movements led to the "normalization" of the concept of environmentalism, paving the way for many environmental civil society organizations. In this context, the following organizations were active at the national level during this period, were well-known to the public, and had a large number of members Turkey Foundation for Combating Erosion, Reforestation, and Protection of Natural Resources (1992), the Turkish Environmental Education Foundation (1993), the Clean Sea/TURMEPA Association ( ) (1994), the Greenpeace Mediterranean office (1995), and WWF-Turkey (2000) (Dinçel, 2019, p.71).

When examining the 1990s in terms of environmental movements, these years are considered to be the years when these movements became institutionalized and massified. Many environmental organizations and foundations that still exist today were established during this period. Resistance, primarily against mining activities and hydroelectric power plants, remained at the center of environmental movements (Kavas, 2011, p. 64). The protests organized in 1996 against Bergama and in 1997 against tree cutting for cyanide-based gold mining became quite noteworthy, forming one of the important agenda items of the period. Over time, the Ankara marches became a tradition, and road blockades organized to prevent mining companies from entering the region, along with media coverage of these events, contributed to the diversification of protests. In this context, the environmental movement gained national significance through the widespread use of mass communication tools and has become one of the key issues addressed by the current environmental movement in Turkey. By the end of the 1990s, it was evident that environmental problems had diversified and, consequently, new areas of resistance had emerged. Environmental movements in Turkey have increased in number. Nationwide, thousands of hydroelectric power plants continue to have negative local impacts and contribute to environmental problems on a mass scale (Öztürk, 2017, p. 451).

The gold mining, hydroelectric power plants, thermal power plants, and nuclear power plants projects that began in the 1990s gave rise to movements opposing them. These movements spread nationwide in the 2000s, leading to local movements against gold mining and hydroelectric power plants that aimed to mobilize social groups outside the local area. However, these movements, which succeeded in transcending locality to a certain extent, failed

to become popular movements. In this context, it has been observed that projects were temporarily halted in regions that showed strong resistance, but no changes were made to address the demands of the struggles. In this context, it is possible to say that the gains of the anti-gold mining and anti-HES struggles have not gone beyond minor achievements in the face of the environmental and vital threats contained in public policies shaped by the neoliberal context (Özen, 2018, p. 204).

By the 2000s, agricultural projects from the early 2000s had gained strength, and food security and organic markets had attracted public interest. In particular, Slow Food Conviviums gained importance within a short period of time and gathered the support of a large audience. From the 2010s onwards, social media tools such as email, Facebook, , and Twitter began to be widely used in civil society movements. In particular, campaigns such as the 2B campaign run by the TEMA Foundation, Greenpeace's anti-nuclear resistance, and the "How Many Centimeters is Yours?" campaign to prevent the decline in fish fry numbers were supported by hundreds of thousands of people. Similarly, academic studies on the environment have also increased significantly in number during this period. Many civil society organizations that existed until 1990 faced processes such as hierarchical structures and specialization that caused divisions within the organizations by the 2000s. Some civil society organizations, however, continued to retain their old structural elements, gained the support of the younger generation, and played a major role in the institutionalization and democratization of organizations. These innovations, which can be considered positive in terms of institutional development, have led to divisions between the old and the new. Civil society organizations that emerged with leadership qualities have maintained these structures to the present day, and some civil society organizations have been able to ensure continuity. For example, with the decision to rejuvenate the Tema Foundation and the establishment of the Nature Conservation Association in 1996, which became a foundation and took over the WMF representation, it became one of the civil society organizations that underwent management changes towards the end of the 2000s. However, some civil society organizations have not been able to develop institutionally, citing difficulties in responding to current demands alongside their structural reforms. Civil society organizations experiencing this situation have lost their past successes. Civil society organizations that have embarked on institutionalization efforts are struggling to adapt to the current circumstances and wish to maintain their spirit of volunteerism. In this context, looking at the 2000s, although there has been a quantitative increase in the number of environmental organizations, there has been a significant decline in the number of members of these

organizations. Although civil society organizations strive to achieve greater institutional success, they have not succeeded in terms of mass appeal (Öztürk, pp. 81-82, 2011).

The Politicization of Environmental Movements in Europe and Turkey

Environmental movements, which increased in the 1970s and left their mark on the period, broke away from the monopoly of conservationist groups and turned into a social movement. The fact that the damage to the environment was measurable, that all damage was shared with the public (ozone layer depletion, global warming, etc.), and the economic crisis of the period caused environmental movements to rise. In addition, the sharp rise in oil prices led European countries to consider nuclear energy as an alternative, which in turn gave momentum to environmental movements. The governments' support for nuclear energy was significant in terms of the expansion of local anti-nuclear groups to the national level and their ability to remain in the spotlight through protests and demonstrations. Although politically independent local protest movements gathered around a single issue, such as the protection of parks, new road construction, or the construction of a nuclear power plant, thanks to "citizen initiatives," these groups made efforts to make the environmental movement more effective and bring it together under a single umbrella (Müler-Rommel, 1989, cited in Sulak, 2018, p.41)

The politicization of environmental movements and their subsequent transformation into parties stemmed from the inability of existing traditional parties to provide solutions to environmental problems and meet demands. Neither the right nor the left in politics showed sufficient sensitivity to environmental issues, resulting in the environmental movement failing to establish itself and the emergence of green parties. In other words, the fact that environmental movements are anti-industrial has caused them to clash with the bureaucratic structures of traditional politics and the interests of the working class, which has contributed to their becoming political parties. In this context, the crises caused by economic and technological growth have also led to criticism of modernism, which is based on the objective interests of industrial society. These criticisms led to an identity crisis and a shift in individual values, as well as the emergence of alternative ideas and the search for new politics. Instead of areas such as economic development, public order, and national security, issues such as human rights, the rejection of social gender roles, opposition to war and nuclear energy, and the environment came to the fore through the Green parties. Thus, in addition to questioning class, race, and gender distinctions and the diversification of political tendencies, demands such as limiting economic growth, opposing the exploitation of nature, and establishing a peaceful society in

harmony with nature have emerged, calling into question the consumption-based mindset. In this context, it is an undeniable fact that the establishment of green parties has produced new social themes by changing the defining elements in politics (Sulak, 2018, p.43).

When examined within the Turkish context, the environmentalist mindset has been shaped by various struggles. Initially, struggles that emerged with the articulation of local problems showed that the environmental issues in question were not solely related to the environment but also encompassed the economy. However, protests addressing environmental issues gradually spread across the country. In particular, the resistance against the planned construction of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu between 1977 and 1979 sparked a widespread resistance movement, attracting participants not only from different settlements in the region but also from many other parts of the country. The protests, which also found political resonance, became a political issue, particularly for the local administration . The increase in environmental problems in the 1980s led to a corresponding increase in environmental struggles. In other words, while the 1970s were marked by the economic effects of environmental problems, the 1980s were marked by the political nature of environmental issues. The establishment of the Green Party in the 1980s, which strengthened environmental movements and gave them a political character, was founded to represent an opposition focused on social and environmental issues, unlike other political parties in Turkey, through the work of the Green Peace Environmental Association and the Turkish Association for the Fight Against Air Pollution. In addition, it revealed the potential for organization within the environmental movements that were striving for mass appeal at that time. In other words, the founding of the Green Party contributed to the strengthening of the idea that the environment is not merely an element to be protected, but an important component of the economy and politics. The protests spearheaded by the Green Party played an important role in terms of organizing the public and ensuring the continuity of the movement, which is considered one of the many dimensions of environmental struggles (Öztürk, 2017, p.450).

In Turkey, groups organized at the local level and voluntary environmental organizations have been insufficient in solving existing problems that threaten the environment. Realizing that local reactions cannot solve the problems, these groups have entered the process of becoming a political party. In other words, factors such as protests and actions, decisions made, and lack of coordination and harmony between organizations led to the formation of the Green Party. In addition, surveys conducted during this period concluded that higher-level

organization was necessary, and the requirement for associations to be supervised and prohibited from engaging in politics pushed environmental movements toward becoming a party in order to overcome bureaucratic obstacles (Sulak, 2018, p. 60).

The Green Party has stated that its foundation is based on elements such as nature, ecological systems, living beings, social relations, human rights and freedoms, and peace. The broad scope of this statement demonstrates that environmental struggles in Turkey have a wide theoretical range. The theoretical differences within the party, which has a broad perspective, have not been able to achieve continuity because they have failed to create a mass following (Öztürk, 2017, p. 451). Similar to Western countries, the fact that political mechanisms in Turkey are evaluated differently by groups within the movement has caused divisions within the Greens, which are considered a political institution. Furthermore, unlike the Greens in Europe, the Green Party in Turkey draws its strength from environmentalists , which has led to it being seen not as a grassroots party but as a top-down organization (Sulak, 2018, p.61). After the first Green Party was shut down in 1994, the second Green Party (YP) emerged on June 30, 2008, as a result of six years of work, shaping itself around principles such as harmony with nature, sustainability, global struggle, opposition to male dominance, localism, and freedom. On November 25, 2012, the Green Party merged with the Equality and Democracy Party and continued its political life as the Green Party and Left Future Party (Sipahi and Dinçer, 2019, p.32).

The process of politicization of environmental movements has been experienced differently in Europe and Turkey. In Europe, the environmental movement has come to the fore with the existence of an educated new middle class belonging to the social base and the effectiveness of social opposition. Environmental movements in Europe, which also included the student movement, gained environmental awareness much earlier and were able to mobilize the masses. At the same time, rapid industrialization in Europe and the resulting industrial pollution that emerged earlier ensured that environmental movements were activated at an earlier stage. In this context, when examining the measures taken, it is possible to say that, unlike in Europe, economic concerns rather than environmental sensitivity were important in Turkey. Due to these differences in experience, environmental movements in Europe and Turkey followed different paths of development. While the environment gained political identity and became a political issue in Europe, the environmental movement in Turkey was eventually relegated to voluntary charitable organizations (Sulak, 2018, p.70).

The Environmental Movement from the Perspective of New Social Movements

In the early days of modernity, social movements were generally defined as movements focused on economic interests, encompassing a single class, and whose main purpose was to seize political power. Such movements are referred to in the literature as "old social movements" (Şentürk, 2006, p.31). In this context, old social movements, which united under specific ideologies, fought for revolution, and had a hierarchical structure, can be distinguished from new social movements (Furuncu, 2014, p. 3). As a result of rapid change, social movements have also undergone a transformation parallel to society. In this context, the actors, goals, repertoire of actions, and sphere of influence of new social movements have changed. These new social movements aimed to draw attention to issues of concern rather than bring about fundamental change (Şentürk, 2006, p. 31). , environmental movements, feminist movements, and anti-nuclear movements, which gained importance starting in the 1960s, are examples of new social movements shaped by globalization. These movements draw attention not only to economic concerns but also to issues such as quality of life. In addition, thanks to mass media, they have become visible not only nationally but also internationally (Furuncu, 2014, p. 4).

With the emergence of new social movements, social movements with different ideologies have tended to come together and, along with the anti-globalization movement, have become prone to forming rainbow coalitions. In this context, the unemployed and workers harmed by the neoliberal system, students concerned about the future, victims of the patriarchal system, victims of urban transformation, and victims of environmental destruction have united their different demands on the streets. In other words, different groups gathering in different squares around the world have both criticized the economic and political system they live under and strived for the recognition of their different identities. In this context, women's, class, and environmental movements, which had previously fought in different areas, have fought together in many parts of the world (Çetinkaya, 2008, p.13).

New social movements also incorporate technological innovations that are rapidly changing day by day, giving them a different organizational structure from older social movements. Although there is no clear leader in new social movements, they are not independent of the society in which they exist. In this context, while it was frowned upon for a worker striving for revolution in old social movements to also be part of a nationalist ideology, actors in new social movements are involved in multiple movements. In this context, an actor

can play a role in both feminist movements and anti-nuclear movements, and this situation shows that these social movements are shifting towards the cultural sphere rather than the economic/political sphere (Furuncu, 2014, p.8).

One of the goals of new social movements is the organization of civil societies. Like civil society organizations, new social movements also strive to change society. In this context, it is possible to say that new social movements share common ground with civil society organizations. Civil society organizations strive to resolve issues that concern society as a whole. The most important medium through which new social movements and civil society organizations can express themselves most effectively and reach large audiences is the internet. The internet has replaced the concepts of time and space, creating a virtual environment and, in this context, enabling individuals to organize more easily and become aware of movements in different geographical locations. In addition, voluntarism is fundamental to new social movements. Individuals expend labor, time, and energy without any material expectations. Another noteworthy point is that new social movements are non-violent due to their heterogeneous structures (Aksulu, 2013, p. 23).

When examining environmental movements within new social movements in Turkey, social media plays a crucial role in mobilizing these movements to carry out their actions. Additionally, the action-oriented work of organizations such as Greenpeace, their reliance on volunteerism, the creation of public awareness regarding the environmental issue in question, and their efforts to resolve the problem are among the most striking characteristics of environmental movements. In this context, these environmental movements have encouraged individuals to participate in action by informing them through social media. In 1974, a lawsuit was filed in Murgul for damage caused to agricultural lands; in 1992, Greenpeace entered the port of Izmir with its ship Sirius and unfurled a banner reading "No to Nuclear Power Plants"; and the actions taken in Bodrum in 1994 to prevent the operation of the thermal power plant established in Gökova, and the construction of a windmill in Akkuyu to demonstrate alternative sources are examples of environmental movements within the framework of social movements in Turkey (Aksulu, 2013, p.24).

An Overview of Environmental Movements in Turkey

In Turkey, the environmental movement began in the 1970s with a small group seeking to raise environmental awareness, and continued to grow until the 1980s. In environmental

movements, institutions generally organized as non-governmental organizations carried out many activities to raise environmental awareness. In 1987, the Peace and Environment Association and the Turkey Association for the Fight Against Air Pollution worked to become politicized and, as a result, began to be known as the "Green Party." In the 1980s, new environmentalist groups emerged and added color to environmental movements, but as society began to focus on economic problems, environmental movements in Turkey slowed down (Yılmaz, 2018, p.42).

Environmental movements, which were largely driven by civil initiatives in the rest of the world, found opportunities to develop in Turkey only in state-affiliated associations and foundations due to the control over civil society organizations. In this context, the most significant impact of the movements within this wave was "awareness raising," and discourses such as environment, protection, sensitivity, and sustainability came to the fore. On the other hand, green political movements only developed after 1980 ( ). When examining environmental movements in Turkey in general, it is seen that non-violent activities such as protests, campaigns, actions, and rallies were used, and issues such as disarmament, social equality, ethnic identity, and women's rights were reflected alongside the environment. In this context, they have occasionally interacted with movements such as the peace movement and the women's movement (Aygün and Kağan, 2007, p.159).

With the belief that the emergence of environmental movements in response to the environmental destruction caused by the industrial revolution would ensure continuity in political life, green parties were established in many parts of the world in the 1980s. When examining the green parties established in Turkey, it is possible to see that they are structures formed not on the basis of establishing a political party, but through the union of environmental civil organizations. Environmentalists, who resorted to forming parties solely to make their voices heard more, criticized the government and the state rather than forming coalitions. In addition, green parties, which failed to gain the support of other environmental civil organizations, were unable to establish themselves permanently in Turkey. Individuals who value the concept of the environment on a personal level have not considered it necessary to join organizations. In this context, increasing environmental awareness in Turkey requires political parties to give more space to this environmentalist understanding in their programs (Bozkır, 2018, p.67).

Although there are many environmental movements in Turkey, the Bergama environmental movements that emerged in the 1990s, the Muğla environmental movements,

and the protests against hydroelectric power plants in Tunceli and the Black Sea region are considered significant. The actions organized in the Bergama and Muğla environmental movements to oppose environmental pollution and the risks to human life attracted participation from different social groups and received more coverage in the print and visual media than other movements. In the anti-HES environmental movement, actions were organized against the damage caused by dams and HESs in nature, and these actions formed a more effective mass in terms of organization and social support. Social media has played a particularly active role in opposition to HES in the Black Sea Region. Similarly, although concerts and protests that attracted public attention may have reached an international dimension at one point, unlike in Bergama and Muğla, efforts were made to follow a path from the local to the global. In this context, it is possible to say that the Bergama and Muğla examples were the first movements that contributed to the development of environmental awareness in Turkey. However, the Bergama and Muğla movements stand out from other movements due to certain characteristics. For example, it is noteworthy that the Bergama environmental movement, as a grassroots movement, provided social opposition in an apolitical environment that emerged as a result of the 1980 coup. In this context, these movements originated from the local people's attachment to their land but later adopted an "anti-imperialist" stance. The Bergama and Muğla environmental movements, characterized as local environmental movements, were seen as grassroots environmental movements based on the qualities of the actors involved, their repertoire of actions, and their demands. In this context, the grassroots of these environmental movements were formed by villagers and women. However, both the Bergama and Muğla environmental movements failed to transcend local boundaries due to their concerns about legitimacy. In addition, the actors demonstrated their attachment to national values through symbols such as the Turkish flag and Atatürk posters, and these nationalist discourses helped them gain public support, but they failed to explain their "environmentalist" discourse (Çobanoğlu, 2014, p.119).

The Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia regions have been at the center of projects due to their rich water resources. Although the reasons and effects differ, a total of 41 dam and hydroelectric power plant projects have victimized the local population and led to interaction between groups affiliated with environmental movements. When examining environmental movements in the regions, it is possible to find universal discourses emerging from a nationalist structure. For example, when we look at the environmental movements in Tunceli, we see that they are movements that carry universal traces as well as local characteristics. It is possible to

say that all dam and HES protests organized in the region are formed away from political authority and central ideologies, unlike the movements seen in the examples of Bergama and Muğla, which evoke nationalism due to the region's Alevi culture and Kurdish ethnic structure. In this context, along with discourses emphasizing the importance of land, nature, climate, water, and animals, the environmental issues in question have transcended locality and been defined as a "global problem." When considering the "No to Uzunçayır Dam" action, it is significant that more than 10,000 people participated in the protest of a city with a population of 28,000. However, it is possible to say that inconsistency, anti-democratic tendencies, lack of civil/autonomous capacity, centralism (statism, nationalism, even racism), intolerance, and unwillingness to share are characteristics observed in our country, regardless of whether the movement is environmental, political, or any other social movement. When considering the Bergama and Muğla movements, the discourse of resisting for the environment conflicts with the claim that the spirit of the National Forces was reborn in Bergama. In this context, environmental movements must strive to reach the universal without being confined to local boundaries or falling under nationalist ideologies. In addition, the actors demonstrated their commitment to national values through symbols such as the Turkish flag and Atatürk posters, and these nationalist discourses helped them gain public support; however, they failed to account for their 'universalist' discourse. (Çobanoğlu, 2018, 2014, p.126).

One of the most important characteristics of social movements is that actors mobilize through social networks. Parallel to the historical evolution of social movements, actors demanding change in society develop and modify the tools they use in these movements in line with that change. Depending on the organizational structure of movements within the concept of the "network society," actors connect with each other, share their feelings, unite and show solidarity, and mobilize by trying to produce alternative solutions for the whole society (Castells, 2015, cited in Erkmen, 2019, p.36). When examining environmental movements in Turkey, it is seen that digital activism was used in important protests such as the Artvin Cerattepe events, the HES struggle, and Gezi Park, with the use of many media tools, primarily Twitter (Erkmen, 2019, p.36). In addition, the development of internet technologies has enabled movements such as TEMA, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth to reach a large number of people. TEMA, established to raise public awareness about the threat of erosion and desertification in Anatolia, has attracted public attention with its slogan "Turkey Should Not Become a Desert." The TEMA Foundation actively uses social media tools such as Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. As of 2018, it had 580,000 followers on Facebook, 410,000 on Twitter,

113,000 on Instagram, and 3,179 on YouTube. Focusing on issues such as disasters caused by climate change and air pollution, TEMA continues to share content related to these topics. In addition, in 2018, individuals living in Turkey used social media tools such as Instagram and Twitter to share posts with the hashtag #kömürüESgeç (skip coal) against the plan to build a coal-fired thermal power plant in the Alpu Plain of Eskişehir and the Thrace region, which would negatively affect the air, water, and agricultural lands of Eskişehir. Thus, organization was achieved through social media, and it succeeded in quickly drawing the public's attention (Yılmaz, 2018, p.42). Similarly, in the 2014 Validebağ resistance, actors effectively used platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to turn the movement into a mass protest. The Validebağ Defense, which embodies the leaderless and decentralized nature of new social movements, continued to actively fight for a long time thanks to the instantaneous and unifying power of social media (Akyıldız, 2015, p.39).

Although Turkish environmental movements are generally referred to as "environmental civil society organizations," they mainly consist of associations and foundations, but also include different forms of organization such as student clubs and initiative groups that began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s ( ). In addition, professional chambers indirectly concerned with the environment (Mining Engineers, Architects, Land Registry and Cadastre Engineers, etc.) and organizations whose main goal is development and beautification and which are therefore indirectly involved with environmental movements(environmental research centers at universities, Provincial Environmental Protection Associations, etc.) are also among the organizations that constitute the environmental movements in Turkey. As a natural consequence of the environment being characterized as an interdisciplinary field, the inclusion of organizations that indirectly address environmental issues in environmental movements also brings with it discussions about who these organizations are composed of. In this context, in addition to the lack of comprehensive research and consensus on how environmental movements in Turkey can be classified and under which group, there is also no study that examines the similarities and differences within environmental movements in detail. This situation indicates that the literature on the environmental movement in Turkey needs to be developed (Aygün and Kağan, 2007, p.145).

When examining environmental movements in Turkey in general, the prominence of foundations is noteworthy. Organic links with the private sector, the right to carry out activities aimed at generating income, and access to the public budget are important factors in this

context. Civil society organizations mainly use the financial systems of funding organizations. When environmental movements are examined in general, it is seen that these movements obtain resources through memberships, donations, income-generating activities, sponsorship from the private sector, and international funds. For example, one of the most important civil society organizations that obtains resources from its members is Greenpeace. Greenpeace, which maintains its independence without receiving funds from the state or the private sector, is considered quite important in this context. However, when examined in general, resource creation based on volunteers is quite rare outside of foundations. Unlike in Western countries, trust in associations in Turkey has not extended beyond a few associations. Civil society organizations that cannot benefit from international funds and sponsorships generally try to carry out their activities with the support obtained by their founders personally or indirectly. An examination of recent environmental movements in Turkey reveals that they have contributed to strengthening relations between civil society and the private sector under the banner of "social responsibility." However, whether support should be accepted from multinational global companies that are openly responsible for environmental destruction has been a subject of debate. Some civil society organizations criticize this situation, arguing that access to funds is only provided by certain organizations , thereby reducing the effectiveness of small associations (Öztürk, 2011, p.90).

Conclusion

When examining movements in Turkey historically, it is possible to say that they show parallels with environmental movements around the world in some respects, while experiencing significant differences in others. Despite many projects planned in Turkey today that could cause environmental problems, environmental movements continue to exist only as a reaction and have not yet been successful. These movements, supported by many civil society organizations, are being blocked by political movements. The lack of knowledge on this subject among the public is one of the factors that reduces the effectiveness of these movements. When examined in general terms, it is possible to mention many environmental movements in Turkey, but while some movements have been successful, many have not. Factors such as lack of environmental awareness, lack of information, lack of organization, and the perception that it is only important for a specific region prevent many of these movements from achieving success (Koyun, 2019, p.15).

When examined broadly, the concept of environmentalism began in Turkey in the 1970s and continued to grow throughout the 1980s. The theme of protecting local areas has long been part of the concept of environmentalism in Turkey. The negative impact on local communities has created a link between environmental issues and the economy. Protests that gained importance at the local level gradually spread throughout the country, making the concept of environmentalism visible alongside politics. With the institutionalization of the concept of environmentalism, the struggles became permanent. In other words, the concept of environmentalism first became widespread through the actions of the environmental movement, and later through the foundations and associations that were established. During this process, mass communication tools, press outlets, and written publications helped environmental awareness gain continuity in Turkish society. With the environmental issue becoming more prominent on the international stage in 2010, civil society organizations acting in concert at the national and local levels became increasingly important. However, despite the increasing importance of environmental issues both in Turkey and worldwide, the lack of significant progress at the national or international level has led to growing concerns about environmental problems threatening the world. Although no effective results have been achieved, it is possible to say that progress has been made.

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